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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the influence of foreign directors on the advising role of 
corporate boards. I use cross-border mergers as a test of the ability of foreign directors to 
provide effective strategic advising. Social science literature argues that outsiders can 
positively influence groups by enhancing the quality of their decision-making.  
I find that firms with foreign directors on their boards are more likely to engage in 
cross-border mergers, engage in a higher number of cross-border mergers, and put more 
dollars in cross-border mergers. Consistent with the fact that outsiders positively impact 
groups, I find that firms with foreign directors are more likely to engage in non-
diversifying mergers, friendly mergers, and acquiring privately-held targets. Moreover, I 
find that firms with foreign directors have higher announcement-period returns, pay less 
for their cross-border targets, and acquire undervalued targets. I also find that firms with 
foreign directors are more likely to use equity in their payment for cross-border targets.  
This study answers important questions regarding the effect of diversity in 
corporate boards. This research expands our understanding of how board diversity in the 
form of foreign directors can enhance board advising effectiveness. As companies seek 
foreign acquisitions, they face difficult legal, cultural, and informational challenges that 
can impede merger competition. Foreign directors play a key role in reducing these 
challenges and help to bridge the cultural gap between the acquirer and target.
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the most important roles for directors on corporate boards is to advise the 
firm’s managers (Herlamin and Weisbach, 2003). Recent literature focuses on this 
advising role and notes that it is crucial to the governance of the firm (e.g., Brickley and 
Zimmerman, 2010 and Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2012). Since advising by the board of 
directors is a critical element to the governance of firms, this research focuses on that 
role. More specifically, I focus on a subset of directors – foreign directors, and the 
importance of their advising role.   
I argue that foreign directors play a unique and important role in advising the 
managers of their firm. The literature is scarce on studies that examine how foreign 
directors influence board functions (e.g., Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2012). Foreign 
directors come from countries with cultures and values different from that of the country 
where their firms are incorporated. Each board member is influenced by his culture, 
which in turn influences his actions, recommendations and decision-making. Moreover, 
cultural differences between board members can trouble the firm because it can affect the 
harmony and unity of the board. Despite these potential problems, foreign directors can 
bring value to the firm due to their business networks and knowledge of foreign 
commercial practices. I argue that foreign directors improve the advising ability of 
corporate boards.  
To examine the advising effectiveness of foreign directors, I investigate their role 
in cross-border mergers. I focus on cross-border mergers because these mergers contain 
many new legal, cultural, and informational challenges for which foreign directors can 
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assist. Cross-border mergers constitute a unique test of how foreign directors perform 
their advising role. Indeed, the literature often uses mergers to test the advising ability of 
boards (e.g., Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2012 and Miletkov, Poulsen and Wintoki, 2012). 
Board members advise managers on this strategically important decision and ultimately 
have final approval of the merger. Examining how foreign directors influence these 
merger decisions sheds further light on how foreign board members affect board advising 
effectiveness.  
I borrow theories from several strands of the social sciences literature to examine 
how outsiders affect the performance of a group. These theories come from sociology, 
psychology, and management and describe how group diversity influences performance, 
information flow, and decision-making. I apply these theories to corporate boards and 
specifically examine how the diversity brought by foreign directors affects a board’s 
advising effectiveness.  
I begin my theoretical development with a discussion of the homophily effect 
described in the sociology and psychology literatures (Shrum, Cheek and Hunter, 1988, 
McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook, 2001). Homophily refers to the tendency of people 
to associate with others similar to themselves. That is, individuals dislike interacting with 
those who lack a common culture, values, or demographics. Information-flow to 
homophilic groups is slow and localized to individuals within the group. Consequently, 
homophilic groups have fewer outsiders and reduced information-flow. I argue that 
foreign directors on boards can erode this homophilic effect and thus improve the 
information-flow to boards.  
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Next, I examine the social capital literature and describe how it relates to the 
activities of corporate directors. Granovetter (1973, 1983, and 2005) argues that new 
information flows to individuals through weak rather than strong ties. That is, distant 
friends or acquaintances provide information to groups that close relationships might not 
offer. I argue that foreign directors have these ‘weak-ties’ with constituencies that are 
crucial for cross-border mergers. Foreign directors are likely to have ties that other board 
members lack and these ties can be crucial for cross-border mergers. Such ties might be 
beneficial to acquirers especially if they are with regulatory agencies, legal institutions, or 
the target firm itself.  
I also examine the management literature on heterogeneity and whether it 
produces better decision-making (Earley and Mosakowski, 2000). I argue that board 
heterogeneity due to the presence of foreign directors can lead to better decision-making 
because it exposes the group to a wider range of opinions. Further, I contend that the 
diversity due to foreign directors can lead to enhanced information-flow because it 
exposes the board to different sources of information.  
Group members might prioritize unity over a diversity of opinions if they view 
differing opinions as a hurdle to decision-making. The sociology literature identifies this 
phenomenon as groupthink (Janis, 1971). This literature contends that introducing 
outsiders to a group reduces the groupthink problem and can improve overall group 
effectiveness. Thus, I argue that foreign directors can reduce groupthink pressures that 
might exist in a board and thereby improve its ability to provide critical advising.   
 From these theories, I develop four sets of hypotheses that describe a foreign 
director’s influence on cross-border mergers. My first set of hypotheses concern the 
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influence of foreign directors on the general level of merger activity. That is, I examine 
the frequency of mergers, the type of the merger, and the nature of merger negotiations 
with foreign directors. Then, I discuss how foreign directors might influence the 
performance of a merger. My third set of hypotheses describes how foreign directors can 
affect the price paid for a target. Finally, I test the type of targets that firms with foreign 
directors attempt to acquire.  
In my examination of merger activity level, I find that a foreign director’s 
presence on boards leads to more frequent cross-border merger activity.
 1
 I contend that 
cross-border acquirers face legal, cultural, and informational challenges that foreign 
directors are able to address, thus leading to greater cross-border merger activity. Also, I 
find that the presence of foreign directors leads to more non-diversifying mergers. This is 
consistent with the ability of foreign directors to bring new perspectives and information 
to the board that enhances the decision-making process. 
I then examine the nature of merger negotiations and find that foreign directors 
lead to more friendly mergers. Foreign directors can help to bridge the cultural divide 
between target and acquirer, thus leading to a more friendly merger. This phenomenon is 
referred to as cultural affinity which is a feeling of closeness to others who share the 
same culture or values (Calomiris, Kahn, and Longhofer, 1994 and Hunter and Walker, 
1996). Such cultural affinity can help to eliminate obstacles in merger negotiations and 
consequently a greater incidence of friendly mergers.  
My second set of hypotheses examines the foreign director’s influence on cross-
border merger performance. Masulis, Wang and Xie (2012) find that the presence of 
                                                          
1
 Miletkov, Poulsen and Wintoki (2012) find similar results and argue that foreign directors bring 
international expertise to the acquiring firm which helps them in cross-border acquisitions.  
 5 
 
foreign directors on U.S. acquirer’s boards leads to stronger cross-border mergers 
performance, but only when the target is from the same geographical region as the 
foreign director. I hypothesize that this is a broader effect, and that the inter-cultural 
competencies of foreign directors extends beyond that of their home region. Thus, I 
expect and find that firms with foreign directors to have higher cross-border acquisition 
announcement returns relative to firms without foreign directors.  I also argue that the 
benefits of a foreign director are not the same for all acquirers. I contend that these 
benefits are affected by a country’s accounting standards and the level of investor 
protection it offers. The benefit of having a foreign director is higher when there is 
ambiguity in assessing the value of the target firm. This ambiguity is higher for targets 
incorporated in countries where the accounting standards are lower and the protections 
provided to investors are weaker. While I do not find a strong support for this hypothesis, 
I find that a foreign director’s benefit to cross-border acquirers is more pronounced when 
they are from a country with stronger investor protections or accounting standards. 
Next, I examine the types of targets that cross-border acquirers with foreign 
directors might pursue. I find that acquirers with foreign directors on their boards are 
more likely to target privately held firms. Private targets are ambiguous to value and thus 
constitute a challenge when an acquirer bids for them (Capron and Shen, 2007 and Erel, 
Kiao and Weisbach, 2012). However, foreign directors are more likely to have 
information about these targets through their ‘weak-ties’. Moreover, I find that acquirers 
with foreign directors are more likely to pursue targets that are undervalued. Again, 
foreign directors are more likely to have private information about potential targets 
through their network of ‘weak-ties’.   
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Finally, I examine a foreign director’s impact on cross-border merger payment in 
terms of premium and method of payment. I find that the presence of a foreign director 
leads to lower payment by acquirers for their cross-border targets. A foreign director can 
help to increase the cultural fit between the acquirer and the target. This increase in the 
cultural affinity between acquirer and target can ultimately result in a lower price as 
negotiation obstacles are more easily resolved. Moreover, foreign directors can use their 
‘weak-ties’ to eliminate negotiation obstacles and facilitate the merger process, ultimately 
resulting in a lower target price.   
In terms of method of payment, I argue that the influence of foreign directors can 
be conflicting.
 
Hansen (1987) contends that information asymmetry leads to more equity 
as a method of payment in mergers. Acquirers are reluctant to pay in cash in a high 
information asymmetry environment where they do not know the true value of a target. 
Foreign directors, however, reduce this information asymmetry and lead to a greater use 
of cash as a method of payment. Thus, the presence of foreign directors on an acquirer’s 
board might lead to a greater percentage of cash in the payment package.  
Foreign directors, however, might have the opposite influence on the method of 
payment. Managers might prefer cash instead of equity either because they think their 
equity is undervalued (Malmendier and Tate, 2008 and Ferris, Jayaraman, and 
Sabherwal, 2013) or they hesitate to give other parties a huge percentage of ownership 
and thereby challenge the manager in his private benefits of control (Harford, Humphery-
Jenner and Powell, 2012). Since foreign directors challenge managers by reducing 
groupthink, the presence of foreign directors on acquirer’s boards might lead to a greater 
use of equity as merger payment. I find support for this conjecture.  
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This research expands our understanding of how board diversity in the form of 
foreign directors can enhance board advising effectiveness.
2
 As companies seek foreign 
acquisitions, they face legal, cultural, and informational challenges that can impede 
merger competition. Foreign directors play a key role in reducing these challenges and 
help to bridge the cultural gap between the acquirer and target. Moreover, my research 
expands the work of Masulis, Wang and Xie (2012) who argue that foreign directors of 
U.S. firms have a positive effect on the advising role of corporate boards. I argue that this 
is a broader effect and that the inter-cultural competencies of foreign directors extend 
beyond that of their home region. Moreover, I contend that foreign directors have 
influence not just on performance, but also on other aspects on the merger process.   
This research also contributes to the literature that examines the effect of diversity 
in corporate boards (e.g., Adams and Ferreira 2004). It adds to this literature by focusing 
on how diversity within a board influences a strategic decision such as a cross-border 
merger.  This research gives a positive view on a special set of directors – foreign 
directors, who bring a positive effect to cross-border acquirers. I contend that foreign 
directors positively influence the advising ability of boards by affecting cross-border 
merger performance, price paid, and the types of targets involved. 
Moreover, this research adds to the literature on corporate social capital and its 
impact on different investment decisions. Recent literature is focusing on such networks 
and their impact on corporate boards.
3
 Specifically, I add to the literature on social capital 
                                                          
2
 Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010) argue that FDs are especially beneficial for firms which plan to 
expand into foreign markets. 
3
For example, Cai and Sevilir (2012) find acquirers have higher announcement returns when the acquirer 
and the target share a common director on their board. Ishii and Xuan (2010) examine the effect of social 
ties between acquirer and target firms on merger performance. As opposed to Cai and Sevilir (2012) 
finding that professional connections present at the time of the acquisition announcement have a positive 
effect on acquirer announcement returns, they find that social ties between acquirer and target firms have a 
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by examining how ‘weak-ties’ of foreign directors are critical in the merger process. The 
sociology literature describe such ‘weak-ties’ as a part of the bridging nature of social 
capital. The bridging view of social capital refers to networks that groups have with 
different groups. Adler and Kwon (2002) and Woolcock and Narayan (2000) emphasize 
that the bridging nature of social capital can explain differential success of individuals 
and firms.  This research examine how ‘weak-ties’, which are a critical element of social 
capital, present opportunities for firms in the merger stage and how such networks are 
valuable. Such networks that foreign directors have positively influence merger 
negotiations, activity, and price paid.  
I also contribute to the M&A literature by focusing on how foreign directors on 
acquirer’s board can affect a merger. Such influence in unexplored in previous literature 
and I argue that foreign directors play a critical role in different aspects of the merger 
process and performance.
 4
 I argue that the foreign directors play a key role in cross-
border merger volume, negotiations, performance, financing, and type of target pursued. I 
also demonstrate how foreign directors reduce some of the challenges that cross-border 
acquires might face when they expand overseas.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
negative effect on acquirer announcement returns. Schonlau and Singh (2009) find that firms with more 
connected boards to other firms are more likely to undertake acquisitions as well as to be acquired. Such 
firms also exhibit better performance in the years after the acquisition. 
4
The literature on cross-border M&A is inconclusive regarding the value of such mergers for acquirers. For 
example, Moeller and Schlingemann (2005), argue that cross-border mergers destroy firm value while 
Francis, Hasan and Sun (2008) find opposite results.   
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Chapter 2: THEORETICAL DISCUSSION OF THE EFFECT OF 
OUTSIDERS 
 
In this chapter, I develop a set of explanations of why outsiders on a board might 
influence its effectiveness. First, I explore the effect of homophily that was originally 
developed in the sociology literature. Homophily explains why people tend to associate 
with others who are similar. Such individuals suffer from an information disadvantage 
since the contributions provided by outsiders are limited. Next, I discuss the role of social 
connections and networks. I examine how social networks, especially networks of people 
who are only remotely connected, enhance information flow. Then, I examine the 
management literature on heterogeneity its effect on team performance. Finally, I analyze 
the literature on groupthink and describe how outsiders can offset the tendency of groups 
to prioritize harmony rather than critical decision-making.  
I. Homophilic effects on group effectiveness 
The homophily effect describes the tendency of people to associate with those 
who are similar to themselves (Shrum, Cheek and Hunter 1988, McPherson, Smith-Lovin 
and Cook 2001 and Ruff, Aldrich and Carter 2003).  Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954) 
propose the term ‘homophily’ to refer to the tendency for persons who affiliate with each 
other to have similar attributes. The homophily effect asserts that contacts among 
individuals who are similar occur at a higher rate than among dissimilar individuals.  
This tendency of people to associate with people like themselves is widely 
recognized in the sociology literature as a major factor in group formations. People also 
form relationships based on comparability of attitudes or experiences. In general, the 
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probability of a relationship between two individuals increases as the two have more 
commonalities between them.   
Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954) argue that there are two kinds of homophilic 
groups. First, organizations that are formed on the basis of demographic characteristics 
(Bott 1928, Loomis 1946) are called status homophily groups. Second, groups formed by 
psychological characteristics or value such as intelligence, attitudes, or aspirations 
(Almack 1922 and Richardson 1940) are called value homophily groups. Both kinds of 
homophilic groups suffer from narrow information gathering channels. Status homophilic 
groups limit access to the group from outsiders with different demographics. This 
prevents the wider information gathering that a member from a different demographic 
group brings to the group. Value homophilic groups lack the analysis, debate, and 
different views an outsider offers. An outsider can expand the set of opinions and 
solutions that a group might require to solve a specific problem. 
McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook (2001) argue that the major implication of 
homophily is that the flow of information through groups tends to be localized. That is, 
the information flow in groups tends to be transmitted from person to person, which 
means that outside influences are minimal. External influence is limited because 
homophilic groups receive and process information exclusively from persons similar to 
themselves. Thus, the information received by homophilic groups typically originates 
from group members who share comparable demographics or values. Outsiders have little 
or no role in contributing to a homophilic group’s information gathering process.  
McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook (2001) describe the process under which 
groups receive information. They argue that social characteristics produce information 
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gathering channels or networks. People receive information from individuals with whom 
they are associated. Thus, social connections serve as information channels for group 
members. With large differences in social characteristics, more information gathering 
channels are created within a group. Homophilic groups suffer from narrower 
information sets because their information gathering channels are determined exclusively 
by the demographic and value characteristics on which the group is originally 
constructed. Thus, when making a decision, homophilic groups lack the wider 
information set that other groups might have. This disadvantages homophilic groups in 
making an informed decision.        
Homophilic groups also suffer from information isolation. Because homopilic 
individuals limit their networks to people similar to them, the group becomes 
informationally isolated. With more outsiders in a group, a greater number of 
perspectives, opinions, and solutions are introduced because a variety of information 
gathering channels are used. Moreover, homophilic groups suffer from slowness in their 
information gathering channels. New information is slow to reach homophilic groups 
because of the limited breadth of their information gathering network. This information 
delay puts the group at a disadvantage relative to competitors. 
Groups that are not homophilic gather a wider variety of perspectives on issues 
because their information gathering process is expanded (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and 
Cook 2001). Non-homophilic groups are better integrated with the broader information 
environment since members from different backgrounds share varying perspectives. 
Outsiders in a non-homophilic group improve the quality of decision-making because 
their different perspectives and information are now included.  
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A group such as a board of directors needs information to perform their advising 
role. Consequently, the channel under which the board obtains this information is crucial 
for effective decision-making. Homophily effects in corporate boards affect the 
information that they collect, how they internally process that information, and what 
decisions they ultimately make using that information. 
II. Social Networks 
Social networks are central to our understanding of how group membership can 
impact an organization’s effectiveness. According to Wasserman and Katherine (1994), a 
social network is a social structure that connects at least two groups or individuals. Blau 
(1977) argues that the fundamental fact of social life is that human beings do not live in 
isolation and they establish associations with others through interaction and 
communication. People interact with others through their social networks. People 
associate with others and create networks to satisfy different needs. Social networks are 
important because they allow people to learn of opportunities, solve problems, and attain 
goals.  
Most relevant for my analysis of how social networks influence board 
effectiveness is what social scientists call “weak ties”. A weak tie is a relationship among 
individuals or groups that is distant or infrequent. For example, when two individuals 
meet annually at a conference and their communication throughout the year is limited, 
their relationship is said to be a “weak tie”.  
Granovetter (1973, 1983, and 2005) argues that new information flows to 
individuals through weak rather than strong ties. Because our close friends tend to move 
in the same circles as we do, the information they receive overlaps considerably with 
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what we already know. More distant acquaintances, by contrast, know people that we do 
not and, thus, receive now information. This outcome arises in part because weak-tie 
individuals are different from us and their membership in other groups connects us to a 
wider world. These weak-tie acquaintances can therefore be better sources to obtain new 
information.    
Erickson (2003) further explains how weak ties are critical for group success. 
People are more likely to succeed in their objectives if their social networks are ‘well 
connected’ and diverse at the same time. People are more likely to find opportunities and 
obtain new information if they are socially connected. Socially connected individuals are 
more likely to have different sources of information and opinions about a specific issue. 
Thus, weak ties are critical for individuals and groups because of the expanded 
opportunity and information that these ties provide.  
Burt (1992, 2004) argues that groups characterized by dense clusters of strong 
connections lack the advantages of “weak tie” groups. Information within these groups 
tends to be redundant and stale. Since members share common views and opinions, they 
interpret and process information similarly. Burt (1992) argues that when two groups are 
connected through a “weak tie”, however, new or non-redundant information travels 
more easily. A weak tie relationship acts as a bridge between the two groups so that non-
redundant and material information travels quickly between them.  
Since social connections and networks are critical for group success, boards 
benefit from such connections. As a group, board of directors receive, process and 
interpret information necessary to perform their duties. Board members need material and 
non-redundant information on which to make decisions. Social networks and connections 
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can provide boards with the information that they need. Social connections can provide 
new perspective, new information, or a critical analysis that will allow a board to make a 
strong decision. The social connections generated from weak-ties can provide material, 
fresh, and non-redundant information to the board.  
III. The effect of group heterogeneity  
The literature on heterogeneity examines the impact of diversity on group 
performance (e.g. Bantel and Jackson, 1989; Boeker, 1997a; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992 
Hambrick, Cho, and Chen, 1996). My interest in this literature focuses on why we would 
expect diverse groups, specifically boards with foreign directors, to perform differently 
from homogenous groups. 
There are three streams in this literature regarding performance and diversity. 
First, many scholars argue for a positive association between team similarity and 
effectiveness. That is, teams that are similar are more effective than those which are 
diverse. (O’Reilly, Caldwell and Barnett 1989; Pfeffer, 1983; Tsui, Egan and O’Reilly 
1992; Hambrick and Mason 1984). Researchers such as Ibarra (1992), Byrne, (1969), 
Lott and Lott, (1965), Luttmer (2001) and Costa and Kahn (2003) argue that homogenous 
teams enjoy stronger affinity and loyalty, thus their performance is better. Their improved 
performance stems from the fact that the loyalty and affinity within a homogenous team 
allows for easier communication and the quicker resolution of conflict. The language, 
religion, and values barriers, which according to this literature hinder communication, are 
minimal among homogenous groups due to a common culture (Earley and Mosakowski 
2000).  
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Another set of researchers, however, offers contrary results regarding diversity 
and performance. This literature emphasizes the importance of diversity for team 
effectiveness. Specifically, these researchers conclude that a variety of cultural 
backgrounds and demographics enhances the skills of the team (Cox 1993; Cox, Lobel 
and McLeod 1991; Jackson 1992; Watson, Kumar and Mickaelson 1993). This variety 
improves the skill set of the group, allowing it to perform more effectively across varying 
environments. Homogenous teams lack this skill diversity. Thus, homogenous teams are 
less effective and perform at lower levels because of their similarities.  
Finally, research on team composition and minority influence demonstrates how a 
small amount of heterogeneity might enhance group effectiveness. Moscovici (1976) and 
Nemeth (1986) describe how a small minority influence can enhance a team’s 
functioning. Nemeth (1986) argues that minorities improve team functioning because 
their viewpoints stimulate divergent attention and thought. As a result, even if they are 
wrong, they contribute to the identification of solutions. The presence of a minority 
influence enhances the decision-making process because it fosters a greater range of 
thought about a particular issue. These ideas would most likely have been unavailable to 
decision makers if they possessed similar backgrounds.  
Earley and Mosakowski (2000) argue that these three different views regarding 
team performance and diversity imply a U-shaped relationship. They hypothesize that 
there is a curvilinear relationship between team heterogeneity and effective performance. 
Earley and Mosakowski (2000) contend that team homogeneity strengthens group 
performance in the short-run. That is, diverse teams might find it difficult to 
communicate, making diversity a short-term cost. In the long-run, however, 
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heterogeneous teams will pierce the communication barrier and team diversity becomes 
beneficial. Heterogeneity in the long-run brings new ideas and perspectives to the group. 
Consequently, Earley and Mosakowski (2000) speculate that there might be an optimal 
level of heterogeneity among teams.  
Since the literature regarding team heterogeneity and effectiveness is mixed, we 
are uncertain about the effect of heterogeneity on board effectiveness. Outsiders might 
bring new insights and information that boards need. They can enhance a board’s ability 
to make informed decisions based on an expanded information set. They might bring new 
insights, arguments, and information ignored by other group members. However, diverse 
boards can find it difficult to communicate and share common values. Moreover, there 
might be physical barriers to communication if outsiders are at locations far from the 
firm’s headquarters. These costs can hinder the board’s ability to make efficient 
decisions. A comparison of these benefits and costs might imply an optimal level of 
heterogeneity among board members.  
IV. The groupthink phenomenon  
Groupthink refers to the phenomenon that members of a group prioritize harmony 
or uniformity of decision making over the quality of the decision. Janis (1971) is the 
pioneer behind this theory and defines groupthink as “the mode of thinking that persons 
engage in when concurrence-seeking becomes so dominant in a cohesive in-group that it 
tends to override realistic appraisal of alternative courses of action”. Group members try 
to minimize conflict and reach a consensus without the critical evaluation of alternative 
ideas or viewpoints. They tend to isolate themselves from outside influences when 
deciding. Loyalty to the group requires individuals to avoid raising controversial issues or 
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alternative solutions, resulting in a loss of individual creativity, uniqueness, and 
independent thinking.  
Loyalty to the group plays an important role in the presence of groupthink. It is 
the main driver behind a member’s decision to concur with the group and not to offer 
different opinions or perspectives. Groups suffering from groupthink view conflict in 
their group as a cost rather a benefit (Myers 1999).  
Janis (1972) argues that there are three main causes behind groupthink. First, he 
argues that organizations characterized by a high ‘group cohesiveness’ can suffer from 
groupthink. This occurs because group cohesiveness becomes more important than 
personal freedom of expression. This cohesiveness, in turn, causes members to emphasize 
group unity and view divergence in opinions to be harmful. Second, Janis believes that 
structural faults within groups can cause groupthink. These include insulation of the 
group, lack of impartial leadership, an absence of norms requiring methodological 
procedures, or homogeneity of members' social backgrounds and ideology. Third, Janis 
asserts that the situational context of the group might foster groupthink. For example, 
groups that face highly stressful external threats, suffer from recent failures, face 
excessive difficulties on the decision-making task, or face moral dilemmas are more 
likely to suffer from groupthink.  
Janis (1982), Aldag and Fuller (1993), and Myers (1999) offer solutions to 
prevent groupthink. First, they contend that group members, and especially the group 
leader, should be impartial to alternative solutions or courses of actions. Second, groups 
should encourage critical evaluations and constructive feedback. Third, groups should 
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subdivide and assign tasks to subgroups, and then reunite to discuss solutions. Fourth, 
groups should welcome critiques and solutions from outside experts and associates.  
As another solution to groupthink, Hart (1991) argues that each member should 
discuss ideas and solutions with trusted people external to the group.  The group should 
invite outside experts to meetings and deliberations. Group members should be allowed 
to question the outside experts.  
All of these solutions involve external experts offering their opinions and 
proposing solutions. Group isolation and a negative view of outsiders can hinder the 
development of alternative solutions, thus leading to suboptimal decision-making. The 
active recruitment and use of members from outside the group can reduce groupthink.  
Since the board of directors is a social group, it might suffer from groupthink. 
Some board members might prioritize loyalty over a full discussion and analysis of 
alternatives. Those members might view such debate as a reduction in board 
effectiveness. One possible solution to this problem is to welcome the advice of outsiders 
and involve them in the decision making process. Outsiders can break the cultural 
barriers that prevent board members from introducing new solutions. Thus, the inclusion 
of foreign directors on corporate boards can erode groupthink tendencies and contribute 
to superior decision-making.  
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Chapter 3: HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
In this chapter, I develop a set of hypotheses regarding the effect of foreign 
directors on different aspects of mergers and acquisitions. In the preceding theory section, 
I discuss how outsiders have a distinct influence on teams and groups. In this section, I 
examine how a unique set of outsiders - foreign directors exerts its influence on the 
firm’s board of directors. More specifically, I investigate how foreign directors affect the 
merger and acquisition decision.  
I develop a set of hypotheses based on four aspects of mergers and acquisitions 
activity. First, I develop hypotheses regarding the influence of foreign directors on 
merger activity. That is, I examine the frequency of mergers, the type of the merger, and 
the nature of merger negotiations of firms with foreign directors. Then, I examine merger 
performance and develop hypotheses based on short-run and long-run performance of the 
merger and what firms are most likely to benefit of such mergers. Next, I examine the 
form of merger payment and develop hypotheses regarding how foreign directors might 
affect the form and magnitude of the payment. Finally, I test the type of targets that firms 
with foreign directors attempt to acquire. 
I. Merger activity and foreign directors 
In this section, I develop three hypotheses concerning the frequency and nature of 
cross-border merger activity and how foreign directors influence it. First, I examine the 
likelihood that a firm pursues a cross-border merger when it has a foreign director on its 
board. Next, I develop a hypothesis that pertains to the role of foreign director’s impact 
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on the diversifying nature of a cross-border merger. Finally, I examine how foreign 
directors impact the friendliness of cross-border mergers. 
1. Informational, legal and cultural effects on cross-border merger frequency 
Firms face various challenges when they elect to pursue a cross-border merger. 
These challenges are informational (e.g., Masulis, Wang and Xie, 2012 and Faccio and 
Masulis, 2005), legal (e.g. Chari, Ouimet and Tesar, 2010, Martynova and Renneboog, 
2008, Rossi and Volpin, 2004, and Bris and Cabolis, 2008) or cultural (e.g. Ahern, 
Daminelli and Fracassi, 2012, Coisne, 2011, Stahl and Voigt, 2008, Morosini, Shane and 
Singh, 1998, Chakrabarti, Gupta-Mukherjee and Jayaraman, 2009) in nature
5
. Firms face 
information problems when they acquire foreign targets because they are entering a new 
market and possess only limited knowledge about the target and its environment. Legal 
challenges occur due to customs and practices that are different from those of the 
acquirer’s own country. Due to differences in culture between the acquirer’s and target’s 
employees, it might also be difficult for the merger to realize the projected operating 
synergies.  
1.1 Informational challenges 
Acquirers in cross-border mergers often have limited knowledge about the target 
firm (Faccio and Masulis, 2005). Moreover, they have little knowledge about the industry 
and the market in which the target operates (Erel, Liao and Weisbach, 2012 and Stahl and 
Voigt 2005). Moreover, the geographical distance between the two countries hinders 
acquirers from physically following news about the target (Erel, Liao and Weisbach, 
                                                          
5
  See Shimizu, Hitt, Vaidyanath and Pisano (2004) for extensive review on this issue.  
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2012). Thus, acquirers suffer from limited information about the target and the industry 
when pursuing a cross-border merger.  
Firms need to improve their information about the target to make better cross-
border merger decisions. Outsiders are beneficial to cross-border acquirers if they can 
reduce this information asymmetry. If an outsider has better information regarding the 
target and its industry due to personal knowledge about the region or culture, then this 
individual can help acquirers make better acquisition decisions. Foreign directors can 
provide this perspective especially if they are from the same region as the target.  
The sociology and psychology literature argue that outsiders bring new insights to 
teams and improve decision making (e.g. Earley and Mosakowski, 2000). Foreigners play 
a key role in this regard because they bring an international perspective to a firm’s 
management. For example, the homophily effect suggests that the flow of material 
information to homophilic groups is either slow or segmented. McPherson, Smith-Lovin 
and Cook (2001) argue that introducing such outsiders to such groups fosters the flow of 
new information and thus enhances its collective decision-making. 
Granovetter’s (1973, 1983, 2005) ‘weak-ties’ effect can explain why foreign 
directors are valuable to cross-border acquirers. Foreign directors have contacts and 
networks that are different from the rest of the board. These contacts can provide board 
members with new or insightful information about potential targets.  This ‘weak-ties’ 
effect is another source of value to the acquiring firm provided by foreign directors.  
Outsiders can be a solution the groupthink problem. Janis (1982) argues that a 
lack of heterogeneity among groups increases the probability of groupthink. Thus, boards 
of directors lacking director diversity might be more vulnerable to groupthink. Janis 
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(1982), Aldag and Fuller (1993), and Myers (1999) argue that groups should recruit 
outsiders and incorporate their perspectives into decision-making. Thus, the presence of 
foreign directors on boards can eliminate or reduce groupthink effects on corporate board 
decision-making.  
Foreign directors might have superior information about potential targets in their 
own region. Indeed, Masulis, Wang and Xie (2012) find that foreign directors are 
beneficial when a company is pursuing a target that is from the same geographical region 
as the foreign director. This occurs because foreign directors often have better 
information regarding the markets into which the acquirer is expanding. Foreign directors 
can provide useful informational, legal, or cultural expertise based on their personal 
experiences.   
1.2 Legal challenges 
Legal challenges might hinder a firm’s decision to pursue a cross-border target. 
For example, acquirers face a set of legal rules and practices that are typically different 
from its own when pursuing a target. La Porta, Lopez, Shleifer, and Vishny (1996, 1997, 
1999 and 2000) argue that the degree of investor protection and the legal origins of the 
country where a firm is located can explain many of the differences in international 
business practices. The nature of investor protections available to minority shareholders 
might be an obstacle to a cross-border merger. For example, targets might be unwilling to 
accept offers from acquirers whose laws give more power to minority shareholders 
because they do not want to lose their private benefits of control. Indeed, the literature on 
crosslisting suggests that managers and owners of firms erode their private benefits of 
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control when they crosslist to a stronger legal protection country (see Ferris, Kim and 
Noronha (2009) for an extensive review of crosslisting).  
Cross-border acquirers face new legal practices in the target’s country. For 
example, an acquirer might expand to a country which does not enforce laws protecting 
property rights and patents. Moreover, acquirers might face employment laws that differ 
from their own. These laws can be an obstacle to mergers because acquirers might be 
reluctant to accept or implement them. International law states that in a cross-border 
acquisition of 100% of a target shares, the target firm becomes bound to the laws of the 
country in which the acquirer is headquartered. Nevertheless, laws of the target country 
that pertain to employees, suppliers, or some aspects of governance might still apply. 
Even though a merger is economically feasible, legal challenges might impede the 
smooth integration after the merger of the two companies. Indeed, Rossi and Volpin 
(2004), and Bris and Cabolis (2008) argue that the benefit of cross-border mergers is 
contingent on a country’s legal environment and investor protection.   
Because the ‘weak-tie’ effect of Granovetter (1973, 1983, and 2005) asserts that 
distant acquaintances can be valuable in obtaining material information, foreign directors 
can help the firm with their legal challenges. Foreign directors might have social 
networks and contacts that can help acquirers reduce these legal challenges. Foreign 
directors can help acquirers develop connections in the judicial or legal communities. A 
foreign director’s contacts might be more knowledgeable about the legal practices and 
customs in the target’s country. Moreover, foreign directors understand how the legal 
process operates in their region, especially with respect to informal or unwritten norms of 
 24 
 
practice. Thus, foreign directors can be valuable to acquirers in reducing the legal 
challenges faced by cross-border acquirers.  
1.3 Cultural challenges 
Cultural differences between acquirers and targets are obstacles in cross-border 
mergers. Firms face different values, languages, or attitudes when expanding globally. 
These differences in culture can jeopardize merger success. Employees, managers, and 
resources might find it difficult to integrate following a merger because of different 
cultures. Indeed, the findings of Ahern, Daminelli and Fracassi (2012) regarding cultural 
distance suggest that culture can hinder a firms’ decision to diversify globally. The 
difference in culture between the acquirer and the target can be a major impediment to 
merger completion.  
Foreign directors can help bridge this cultural distance between acquirer and 
target. Foreign directors serve as ‘interpreters’ between the acquirer and the target. 
Foreign directors interpret the ambiguous cultural signals that may arise during the 
merger. Also, a foreign director can serve as an ‘ambassador’ for the merger transaction. 
Foreign directors communicate different cultural values to the parties involved in the 
merger. Foreign directors can explain the target’s culture and thereby help to reduce fears 
held by either party. Also, foreign directors can represent the acquirer during negotiations 
and reduce tensions arising from differences in culture or business practices.  
Foreign directors can reduce the cultural challenges of cross-border mergers 
especially if boards are homophilic. Homophilic groups dislike associations with 
outsiders and thus might be reluctant to transact with firms outside their country. That is 
because homophilic boards might tend towards a less global perspective in their business 
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practices and choice of partners. Thus, we might expect firms with homophilic boards to 
have less cross-border M&A activity. However, foreign directors can help to expand the 
otherwise narrow view of homophilic boards.  
Because foreign directors can reduce the informational, legal, and cultural 
challenges faced by international acquirers, I hypothesize that: 
H1.1: Firms with foreign directors are more likely to engage in cross-border mergers. 
2. What kind of global mergers?  
The finance literature argues that diversifying mergers are value-destroying for 
firms (e.g. Jensen, 1986 and Servaes, 1996). That is, the acquisition of a target from an 
industry different from than that of the acquirer destroys shareholder value. Dos Santos, 
Errunza and Miller (2008) argue that diversified cross-border mergers result in about a 
24% loss in firm value. The hubris argument of Roll (1986) and the overconfidence effect 
of Malmendier and Tate (2008) imply that managers overestimate the synergy gains of 
their acquisitions and thus destroy shareholder value. One form of this value destruction 
is the acquisition of a target that diversifies the acquirer. Previous research suggests that 
managers are naïve about the outcomes from diversifying mergers or they destroy 
shareholder value for reasons of self-enhancements. For either reason, firms need strong 
boards to advise the management regarding the desirability of diversified mergers.  
Foreign directors might mitigate this problem of diversifying mergers because of 
several considerations. They introduce alternative thinking processes to the board 
because they challenge existing ways of thinking. Since they are outsiders, foreign 
directors are less sensitive to prevailing norms. Thus, foreign director’s arguments might 
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be considered “out of the box”. Foreign directors are also more likely to challenge the 
unity of opinions of the board that results from groupthink.   
Groups that suffer from groupthink prioritize unity over diversity of opinions 
when facing challenges (Janis, 1982, Aldag and Fuller, 1993 and, and Myers 1999). Such 
groups lack the diversity needed to generate solution alternatives. Such a lack of diversity 
often leads to poor decision-making because it is based on a limited view and incomplete 
information. Introducing outsiders to the group provides the analytical diversity that can 
improve decision-making. Thus, foreign directors, as outsiders, provide the diversity of 
thought that might be required to challenge the pursuit of a poorly selected target.  
The ‘weak-tie’ effect of Granovetter (1973, 1983, and 2005) argues that distant 
acquaintances are valuable because of the material information they possess. Foreign 
directors are more likely to have a set of internationally-linked ‘weak ties’. These 
networks broaden the information base for the board and contribute to better merger 
decision-making. The information obtained from the foreign director’s set of ‘weak-ties’ 
can help the board identify which targets are more likely to be value destroying. 
Consequently, I hypothesize:  
H 1.2: Firms with foreign directors are more likely to engage in non-diversifying cross-
border mergers.  
 
3. The nature of merger negotiations 
Acquirers seek to avoid merger negotiations that are hostile. Hostile mergers can 
be costly to the acquiring firm (Pound 1988, Servaes, 1991, Martynova, Oosting, and 
Renneboog, 2006, and Burkart and Panuzi 2006)
6
. Hostile mergers are more costly when 
                                                          
6
 Some tender offers might be viewed as more costly than hostile mergers. Indeed, Grossman and Hart 
(1980) show that a small percentage of shareholders might hold their shares in a tender offer and refuse to 
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the merger is cross-border, because they often involve legal and cultural costs 
(Martynova, Oosting, and Renneboog 2006). Foreign directors, however, can be valuable 
during merger negotiations and help to eliminate obstacles associated with hostile 
mergers. 
The ‘weak-ties’ networks of foreign directors can be important in the merger 
negotiation process. These networks might help eliminate the bidding conflicts between 
acquirers and targets. Foreign directors ‘weak-ties’ networks can reduce conflicts and 
subsequent bidding wars because they are familiar with both parties. These social 
networks can also accelerate the negotiating process and help eliminate inefficiencies that 
might arise because of lengthy negotiations. Further, foreign directors can reduce the 
cultural barriers that hinder merger negotiations by accelerating the information flow 
between acquirer and target.  
Foreign directors can help homophilic boards with their cross-border negotiation 
process. By definition, homophilic groups resist the influence of outsiders. Thus, a 
homophilic board might resist negotiation with a cross-border target and simply 
undertake a hostile takeover. Foreign directors can foster merger negotiations through 
compromises, adjustments in the terms of the merger, or dialogue. All of these conditions 
are characteristics of a friendly merger.  
A further advantage of foreign directors is their international knowledge about 
foreign markets and their expertise on how these markets operate. Indeed, Masulis, Wang 
and Xie (2012) and Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010) argue that foreign directors 
are especially beneficial for firms which plan to expand into foreign markets. They can 
                                                                                                                                                                             
relinquish their control until the offer price is increases. Thus, tender offers might sometimes be more 
expensive for acquirers.  
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advise the board on business related issues that only locals might know about. As 
companies expand overseas, they face legal, cultural, and informational environments 
that can hinder mergers. Plus, shareholders of the target firm might resist takeovers from 
foreign acquirers for non-business related reasons. For instance, some cultures value 
nationalism and can view foreign takeovers as offensive
7
. Thus, having foreign directors 
on boards might help in negotiating a deal that reduces or eliminates these obstacles to a 
successful merger. 
The literature on team heterogeneity and minority influence suggests how having 
foreign directors on a board might increase its efficiency. Moscovici (1976) and Nemeth 
(1986) describe how a small minority influence can enhance a team’s functioning. 
Nemeth (1986) argues that minorities improve team functioning because their viewpoints 
stimulate divergent attention and thought. Earley and Mosakowski (2000) argue that, in 
the long-run, having some outsiders is efficient for team functioning and decision-
making. Thus, having foreign directors on boards for acquirers who try to negotiate with 
cross-border targets can improve the negotiating process and make it more efficient. This 
is because foreign directors provide cultural interpretations and insights that bridge the 
cultural divide between firms. Also, foreign directors can help the board design an offer 
that is more likely to be acceptable.  
The preceding discussion shows how foreign directors can help an acquirer 
negotiate a better deal with its overseas target. Foreign directors help reduce the barriers 
to an effective negotiation process between the firms involved in the cross-border merger. 
Foreign directors help eliminate these barriers through the communication and 
                                                          
7
 See Ahern, Daminelli, and Fracassi (2012) for more details about cultural challenges with cross-border 
mergers.  
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information exchange provided through their ‘weak-ties’ networks. For these reasons, I 
hypothesize that: 
H 1.3: Firms with foreign directors are more likely to engage in friendly mergers with 
their cross-border targets.   
 
II. Merger performance 
In this section, I develop two hypotheses that pertain to how foreign directors 
influence cross-border merger performance. First, I argue that acquirers benefit from 
having foreign directors on their boards when pursuing a cross-border target as measured 
by announcement period returns. Then, I explain how the value of a foreign director is 
mitigated by the extent of legal protections available to investors and the nature of the 
required accounting standards.  
1. Announcement returns 
Given that foreign directors help cross-border acquirers with the informational, 
legal and cultural challenges that they face, I expect firms with foreign directors to have 
better performance from international mergers. Although the general performance of 
cross-border mergers is still ambiguous
8
, Masulis, Wang and Xie (2012) analyze U.S 
firms and find that acquirers in cross-border mergers experience higher returns if they 
have foreign directors on their boards when the target is from the same region as the 
foreign director’s9. They argue that foreign directors bring international knowledge to the 
board and thus help the firm in deal negotiation. Foreign directors help cross-border 
                                                          
8
 Much of the earlier evidence suggests that corporate international diversification increases firm value 
(e.g., Errunza and Senbet 1981, 1984, Kim and Lyn 1986 and Morck and Yeung 1991). However, more 
recent evidence finds that international diversification destroys value (e.g., Bodnar et al. 1999, Christophe 
1997, and Denis et al. 2002).  
9
 Miletkov, Poulsen and Wintoki (2012) find opposite result. They argue that foreign directors are costly 
and thus they hinder effective communication and performance of the board overall. 
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acquirers through their ‘weak-ties’ and connections. For example, because of their ‘weak-
ties’, foreign directors might be able to identify superior targets that have stronger 
profitability or are undervalued. Foreign directors can bridge the cultural gap between the 
two firms and help overcome homophilic resistance to a foreign acquirer. This process 
might result in a better offer price and avoid acquirer overpayment.  
Since foreign directors can serve as “ambassadors” from the acquirer to the target 
in the merger process, they can help reduce the cultural conflicts that might arise during 
the merger integration. This cultural conflict is the main reason behind the failure of 
many mergers. Indeed, Ahern, Daminelli and Fracassi (2012), argue that culture explains 
why the cross-border merger volume from culturally distant countries is low relative to 
cultures that are closer.
10
  Merging firms with divergent cultures might find it difficult to 
integrate, with language, religion, or social values hindering the interaction between 
employees, managers or board members. This might result in low or negative returns 
from the merger. Foreign directors can help reduce these conflicts since they are often 
more familiar with the target’s culture and business practices.  
I also argue that heterogeneity among board members result in a better decision-
making regarding cross-border mergers. Foreign directors expand the skill set of the 
board, allowing it to perform more effectively across varying environments. They can 
help in identifying targets that generate synergetic gains, making the payment and 
negotiation processes more efficient, or reducing conflicts during the integration process. 
Foreign directors can challenge the urgency to unity that often plagues boards. Foreign 
                                                          
10 For more information regarding the cultural influences in cross-border merger, see Coisne (2011), Stahl 
and Voigt (2008), Morosini, Shane and Singh (1998), Chakrabarti, Gupta-Mukherjee and Jayaraman 
(2009). 
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directors can introduce new ideas, opinions, or courses of actions that acquirers make in 
their cross-border merger decision.   
Moreover, foreign directors might have information about local markets that other 
board members or managers lack. This information can be firm-specific, industry-
focused, or market based. Indeed, the homophily effect asserts that the flow of 
information is facilitated by outsiders, allowing them to make better decisions. These 
advantages of having foreign directors on boards might be viewed as value-enhancing by 
investors. Thus, investors might react positively to the announcement of a cross-border 
acquisition by firms with foreign directors. Thus, I hypothesize: 
H 2.1: Firms with foreign directors have higher announcement period returns when 
engaging in cross-border acquisitions.  
 
2. Investor protection and accounting standards effects  
In this section, I develop a hypothesis regarding which acquirers benefit more 
from having foreign directors on their board. Since international acquirers face legal, 
cultural, and informational challenges when pursuing cross-border mergers, the benefit to 
acquirers is contingent on the foreign director’s ability to overcome these challenges. The 
benefit of having a foreign director might not be the same for all cross-border acquirers.  
I argue that the benefit of foreign directors to acquirers is high when there is 
ambiguity about the valuation of the target. For targets in weak legal protection countries, 
managers have higher private benefits of control (Dyck and Zingales, 2004) and thus, 
valuation is more ambiguous. Higher private benefits of control and less investor 
protection is associated with more asset misallocation, less transparency, and tunneling 
(e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1997 and Dyck and Zingales, 2004) and thus, more ambiguous 
 32 
 
valuation
11
. Information provided by foreign directors can help acquirers offer a more 
correct offer price. Thus, I expect cross-border acquirers to benefit from their foreign 
directors especially when the target is from a weak legal protection country.  
Moreover, valuation ambiguity is higher when the accounting standards in the 
target country are weak. Investors cannot assess the true value of a company if the 
accounting standards do not require sufficient disclosure or the transparency requirements 
are weak (e.g., Holthausen, 2009). Thus, acquirers have difficulty in assessing the true 
value of a target if the target is from a country with weak accounting standards. Foreign 
directors might be more knowledgeable about their region’s laws and accounting 
practices. This can help acquirers in their assessment of the target’s true value. Also, 
foreign directors might have ‘weak-ties’ to the target’s executives, employees, or auditors 
who have private information about the target. These connections can help acquirers gain 
information to better value the target. Thus, foreign directors can provide useful 
supplemental information to acquirers regarding targets located in countries with weak 
accounting standards.  
Because the benefits of having foreign directors on cross-border acquirers are 
greater when valuation ambiguity about the target is higher, I hypothesize that: 
H 2.2: Acquirers with foreign directors on their boards have higher announcement 
period returns when the target is incorporated in countries with weak legal 
protection or accounting standards.  
 
 
 
                                                          
11
 Bris and Cabolis (2008) and Martynova and Renneboog (2008) find that the better the shareholder 
protection and accounting standards in the acquirer’s country, the higher the merger performance in cross-
border mergers relative to domestic mergers. Also, Chari, Ouimet and Tesar (2010) find that the merger 
announcement returns for the acquirer is higher when the contracting environment is weak in the target’s 
country. Starks and Wei (2013) find similar results for stock offers. They argue that acquirers compensate 
target shareholders for the resulting exposure to inferior corporate governance regimes. 
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III. Merger Targets 
In this section, I develop two hypotheses regarding how foreign directors 
influence an acquirer’s choice of cross-border targets. First, I contend that cross-border 
acquirers with foreign directors are more likely to acquire private targets. Then, I argue 
that foreign directors are better able to identify targets that are undervalued. The basic 
premise of the arguments stems from the fact that foreign directors have social 
connections and information that might help cross-border acquirers make better decisions 
regarding the target. 
1. Types of targets 
Private firms are difficult to value because their financial position is not known to 
the public (Capron and Shen, 2007 and Erel, Kiao and Weisbach, 2012). Moeller and 
Schlingemann (2005) find that most cross-border acquisitions rarely involve private 
targets.
12
 This low frequency of private acquisitions suggests that information asymmetry 
plays a key role when firms consider the type of target they intent to buy. If acquirers do 
not know the true value of the target, they cannot bid a fair price for it.  
However, the M&A literature argues that acquiring private targets is value-
increasing. Prior research, such as Chang (1998) and Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller 
(2002), find that acquisitions of privately held targets are value-increasing while 
acquisitions of publicly-held targets are value decreasing. One reason for this increase in 
value is the liquidity discount due to the thin trading of the firm’s equity (Fuller, Netter, 
and Stegemoller, 2002 and Officer, 2007)
13
. Capron and Shen (2007) argue that another 
                                                          
12
 Although much recent evidence suggests that most cross-border M&A activity involves private targets. 
(e.g., Erel, et al. (2012).  
13
 Chang (1998) attribute this effect to the monitoring activities by target shareholders when the payment 
method is equity. He finds no significant difference when the payment method is cash.  
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reason is that less information on private targets creates more value-creating 
opportunities for exploiting private information.  
I argue that the presence of foreign directors on acquirer’s boards allows acquirers 
to exploit this private information. Thus, acquirers are more likely to purchase privately-
held targets. If valuation of privately-held target is difficult, then acquirers need private 
information that gives them the opportunity to assess the true value of the target and 
make a fair offer price. Foreign directors can help acquirers obtain this information and 
make competitive bids for these private targets. Also, foreign directors might be better 
able to interpret data that is available about private firms. That is, foreign directors might 
be more capable of serving as “auditors” of locally prepared financial information since 
they are likely to be more familiar with local business practices and norms.  
Foreign directors also have ‘weak-ties’ and connections that can help acquirers 
obtain additional information about privately-held targets. Foreign directors might have 
connections with regulatory or government agencies to which private targets submit 
financial information. This will allow acquirers to assess more correctly the target’s true 
value. Also, foreign directors might have connections with the target firm itself. 
Therefore, foreign directors can act as a facilitator for the deal, negotiating with both the 
target and the acquirer.  
Moreover, private firms might be better able to reach acquirers with foreign 
directors because of their ‘weak-ties’.  Ownership of private firms is concentrated so the 
owners might find it easier to approach an acquirer to sell their firm. The presence of 
foreign directors might reduce any resistance of a sale to a foreign acquirer since foreign 
directors can reduce the cultural divide or possible homophilic resistance to the merger.  
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Given that one form of value-increasing activities that firms can make is acquiring 
privately-held targets and that foreign directors are likely to have more private 
information about these targets, I hypothesize: 
H3.1 Firms with foreign directors are more likely to acquire privately-held targets.  
2. Valuation of the target 
The valuation of a publicly-held target plays a key role when acquirers bid for a 
target. Erel, Kiao and Weisbach (2012) argue that stock market valuations explain the 
volume in cross-border merger activity. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004, 2005) 
and Shleifer and Vishny (2003) find that stock market mis-valuations drive mergers. 
Overpricing the target leads to overpayment and subsequent value-destruction for the 
acquirer. Acquirers try to minimize the offer price to realize the full potential of synergy 
gains. However, managers might overpay for targets if they are overconfident about their 
ability to generate returns (Malmendier and Tate, 2008) or if they intent to destroy 
shareholder value for entrenchment purposes (Harford, Humphery-Jenner and Powell, 
2012). In fact, on aggregate, Roll’s (1986) hubris effect explains why most mergers have 
negative announcement returns and that managers overpay for targets.  
I argue that foreign directors help cross-border acquirers target targets that are 
undervalued and thus, are good investment opportunities for the acquirer. Targets that are 
undervalued (mispriced) do not require overpayment relative to targets that are 
overvalued. Indeed, Dos Santos, Errunza and Miller (2008) find that cross-border 
acquisitions of “fairly-valued” targets do not lead to value destruction. However, 
managers of the acquiring firms might be reluctant to bid for such firms because they are 
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perceived as bad investment due to their relatively low price. Foreign directors might be 
able to spot these “attractive” targets and recommend them to managers and boards.  
Foreign directors might have information about cross-border targets that convey 
whether they are a good investment. This information can be obtained through the foreign 
director’s ‘weak-ties’ with the target firm itself, regulatory agencies, or local industry or 
financial experts. Such information might prove to be crucial in valuation of the target 
firm and whether it is over or under valued. Acquirers can analyze this information and 
determine whether these undervalued targets should be pursued. Thus, the presence of 
foreign directors might lead to more cross-border acquisitions of undervalued targets.  
Since diversity among teams enhances the decision-making ability of teams, the 
presence of foreign directors on boards might lead to bidding for targets that are 
undervalued. If targeting undervalued targets is value-enhancing for the acquirer, then 
acquirers should search for such targets. The presence of foreign directors might help 
acquirers identify those targets that constitute a “good” investment for the firm. The 
literature on diversity (e.g., Earley and Mosakowski, 2000) argues that, in the long-run, 
diverse teams are better decision-makers. I argue that foreign directors help acquirers find 
these “good” investments and capitalize on this mispricing through their private 
information.  
Because mispricing leads to an attractive investment opportunity for acquirers, 
and that the presence of foreign directors improves decision-making for firms, I 
hypothesize that: 
H3.2: Firms with foreign directors are more likely to acquire targets that are 
undervalued.  
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IV. Merger Payment 
In this section, I develop two hypotheses with regards to foreign director’s 
influence on the method of payment for cross-border mergers. I examine whether cross-
border acquirers with foreign directors over or under pay for their targets. I argue that the 
presence of foreign directors leads to lower merger premiums relative to similar mergers. 
Thus, acquirers benefit from foreign directors since they lower the payment that targets 
receive from the merger. Next, I examine the foreign director’s influence on the design of 
the payment package. Specifically, I test whether the presence of foreign directors leads 
to a greater use of cash or equity as payment for cross-border mergers.  
1. Merger Premium  
 Overpayment for targets can be a form of value-destruction that managers might 
pursue during their tenure (Harford, Humphery-Jenner and Powell, 2012). Rossi and 
Volpin (2004) find that acquirers in cross-border mergers overpay for their targets. That 
is, acquirers pay higher premiums when pursuing international targets.
14
 Paying higher 
premium is often associated with loss in shareholder value (Baker, Pan, and Wurgler, 
2012)
15
.  
I contend that foreign directors help cross-border acquirers negotiate a better deal 
that results in a lower offer price. Baker, Pan, and Wurgler (2012) argue that, during 
merger negotiations, the negotiating parties usually use a target’s stock price as a 
reference point for the offer price. They argue that the offer price is biased towards recent 
                                                          
14
 Rossi and Volpin (2004) find that this result is contingent on the country’s legal protection. A higher 
legal protection for targets leads to more premium paid by acquirers. They attribute this finding to lower 
cost of capital and thus, high competition by bidders for targets.   
15
 Moeller et al. (2005) do not find evidence that high premium leads to negative shareholder’s gain. 
However, they attribute this result to noisy premium data.  
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peak prices and thus, result in higher premiums. Foreign directors can act as merger 
facilitators and reduce the conflicts that might arise over the course of the negotiations.   
Foreign directors might also help cross-border acquirers negotiate a better offer 
price because of their ‘weak-ties’. Foreign directors might have connections in their 
home country or region that can provide them with contacts to the target firm or its 
employees. These contacts can be crucial during merger negotiations and thus, enable the 
acquirer to build relations with the target prior to merger completion. Foreign directors 
might be able to negotiate an offer price that does not require revisions by the target 
because of their previous associations with the target.  
Foreign directors might also be able to negotiate a better offer price because of 
their ability to reduce the homophily effect. An acquirer that is homophilic might not 
pursue an international target while a homophilic target might resist a foreign acquisition. 
Homophily effects within a target might produce a higher offer price if the target resists a 
foreign acquisition. Foreign directors can also act as ambassadors between the two parties 
involve in the merger, reducing the adverse consequences resulting from homophily and 
cultural distance. This ultimately results in a better price.  
Moreover, foreign directors might have local information that can allow acquirers 
to make a better offer price. Masulis et al. (2012) argue that foreign directors are 
beneficial because their local expertise helps acquirers make superior cross-border 
merger decisions. Foreign directors might possess information about the true value of the 
target that is not available to other board members or managers. This information will be 
even more valuable when targets are located in countries with poor accounting and 
transparency standards.  
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Since foreign directors can help negotiate a better deal with cross-border targets 
and might have private information about those targets, I hypothesize that: 
H4.1: Firms with foreign directors are more likely to pay less for their cross-border 
targets.  
 
2. Method of payment 
There are several factors that determine the method of payment in a merger
16
. 
Bidders face a tradeoff between financial distress and corporate control considerations 
when deciding to finance an acquisition with cash or equity (Faccio and Masulis, 2005). 
Financing an acquisition with cash put acquirers at the risk of default, as more cash 
means higher debt financing for the merger. Alternatively, financing an acquisition with 
equity alters the ownership structure for the acquiring firm since a block of ownership is 
transferred to the target firm (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003)
17
. Moreover, financing an 
acquisition with equity might signal to shareholders that the bidder’s stock price is 
overvalued (e.g., Travlos, 1987 and Chang, 1998).  
I develop two competing hypotheses regarding the role of foreign directors and 
the choice of merger payment. First, using Hansen’s (1987) model, I argue that 
information asymmetry plays a role on the financing decision. Second, I argue that 
foreign director’s influence on the method of payment is correlated with the extent of the 
manager’s entrenchment or perceptions regarding the pricing of the firm’s equity. 
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 See Hansen (1987), Stultz (1988), and Fishman (1989) for a theoretical foundation of the method of 
payment decision in M&A.  
17
 The corporate control consideration is more severe when the bidder ownership concentration is large, 
thus allowing a blockholder with a significant amount of equity when the merger is financed with equity. 
Indeed, Amihud, Lev, and Travos (1990), Martin (1996), and Ghosh and Ruland (1996) conclude that 
buyer management shareholdings have a negative effect on stock financing. 
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A higher degree of information asymmetry between the acquirer and target induce 
acquirers to issue equity to finance the merger. Hansen (1987) argues that since managers 
of the acquiring firm do not know the true value of the target, they prefer to finance the 
merger with stock. That is, acquirers will not experience any cash outflows because of the 
merger, so they prefer equity financing when the valuation of the target is ambiguous
18
.  
Officer, Poulsen, and Stegemoller (2009) argue that information asymmetry leads 
to the use of stock as a method of payment because it helps a publicly traded acquirer 
share the risk of a target’s overvaluation with the target’s owners. Conversely, when the 
acquirer pays with cash, the acquirer bears all of the overvaluation risk. They find that 
stock-financed acquisitions have a positive announcement returns for privately held 
targets which are hard to value and thus, have higher degree of information asymmetry
19
.  
I argue that foreign directors can reduce the information asymmetry regarding the 
target’s value. Therefore, firm with foreign directors use more cash to acquire difficult-
to-value targets. Because of their ‘weak-ties’ and other information connections, foreign 
directors are better able to obtain new information about the target. This can make the 
acquirer less inclined to use equity in the offer. Therefore, I hypothesize: 
H4.2a: Firms with foreign directors are more likely to use cash in their payment for 
cross-border mergers.  
 
Managers might prefer cash for two reasons. Harford, Humphery-Jenner and 
Powell (2012) argue that entrenched managers use cash instead of equity because they do 
not want to create new equity blockholders.  Such blockholders have an incentive to 
monitor managers and can reduce the private benefits of control enjoyed by managers. 
                                                          
18
 Especially if the corporate control consideration is low (as in the case with highly diffuse ownership), 
equity financing is viewed as more preferable to cash (Faccio and Masulis, 2005).  
19
 Chang (1998) find similar results and attribute the positive announcement returns to value-enhancing 
monitoring activity by the new blockholders.  
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Moreover, some managers might prefer cash over equity because they think that their 
equity is undervalued. Thus, these managers are reluctant to use their stock as a method 
of payment in mergers.  
Thus, I expect that foreign directors are more likely to challenge the decisions 
reached by managers if they use cash as a method of payment when they should use 
equity. These managers use cash for entrenchment purposes because they do not want to 
create new equity blockholders or they believe that their equity is undervalued. If those 
managers prefer to use cash when they should use more equity, I expect that foreign 
directors will challenge that decision. Consequently, I hypothesize that:  
H4.2b: Firms with foreign directors are more likely to use equity in their cross-border 
merger payment package.  
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Chapter 4: DATA SOURCES AND SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION 
 
I use four different datasets to test my hypotheses. First, I use the BoardEx dataset 
to obtain information concerning director demographics. Then, I use the SDC Platinum 
M&A database to obtain merger information. Finally, I gather accounting and stock price 
information from the WorldScope and Datastream databases respectively.  
BoardEx covers different aspects of governance for firms worldwide. It contains 
biographical information on 510,100 directors and managers for the firms in the dataset. 
BoardEx covers 18,733 firms worldwide from 1999 to 2012. For each director in the 
dataset, I obtain the director’s unique identification number assigned by BoardEx, 
nationality, date of birth, employment information, and the start/end dates for each firm 
on whose boards they sit. Furthermore, for each firm in the dataset, I obtain the 
International Securities Identification Number (ISIN). I use ISIN to allow merging with 
the other datasets. I delete firms that lack an ISIN since I cannot obtain merger or 
accounting information for those firms
20
. My final sample from BoardEx covers 12,926 
firms with 129,873 different directors.  
I define a director to be a foreign director if his/her nationality is different from 
the country of incorporation of the firm on whose board they sit. Throughout the analysis, 
I use different measures to capture the presence of a foreign director. I examine whether a 
firm has a foreign director in a particular year, the number (percentage) of foreign 
directors on a firm’s board, and a measure that incorporates the foreign director’s role on 
                                                          
20
 Most of those deleted firms are privately held firms. Private firms do not have an ISIN so my final 
sample does not include private acquirers.  
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the board. For example, I incorporate in my analyses whether the foreign director is 
independent.  
To obtain merger information for my sample firms, I use the SDC platinum M&A 
database. However, SDC does not have an ISIN identifier for the firms in its database. I 
use WorldScope (which uses ISIN as an identifier) to retrieve the Sedol codes for the 
firms in my sample
21
. Then, I use those Sedol codes as my identifier to retrieve firm data 
from SDC.  
I obtain merger information from the SDC database for the period, 1995 to 2012. I 
follow Erel, Kiao and Weisbach (2012) procedure in retrieving data from the SDC 
database
22
. I exclude LBOs, spinoffs, recapitalizations, self-tender offers, exchange 
offers, repurchases, partial equity stake purchases, acquisitions of remaining interest, and 
privatizations, as well as deals in which the target or the acquirer is a government agency. 
I collect a number of data items from SDC, including the announcement date, the target’s 
name, public status, primary industry measured by the four-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification code, country of domicile, as well as the acquirer’s name,  public status, 
primary industry, and country of domicile. I collect the deal value in dollar terms when 
available, the fraction of the target firms owned by the acquirer after the acquisition, as 
well as other deal characteristics such as the method of payment made by the acquirer. I 
exclude deals in which the deal value is less than one million dollars.  Of the 12,926 
firms in my sample, 8,093 firms have at least one merger transaction from 1995 to 2012.  
                                                          
21
 Sedol stands for Stock Exchange Daily Official list.  
22
 This procedure is commonly used in M&A literature.  
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I obtain accounting and financial information for the firms in my sample from 
WorldScope
23
. For ach firm, I obtain values for total assets, book value of equity, 
common shares outstanding, market capitalization, total debt, cash and short-term 
investments, foreign assets as a percentage of total assets, foreign sales as a percentage of 
total sales, and return on assets (ROA).  I convert all variables to U.S. dollars according 
to WorldScope conversion rate for a given year. I obtain the same variables for the target 
firms using their Sedol codes
24
. I delete a firm-year observation if the total assets variable 
is missing. I use the director’s start-date and end-dates on each board to generate board 
size, foreign director measures, and other director measures for each year in my firm-year 
sample. I use DataStream to obtain stock price and return information for each of the 
sample acquirer firms. I obtain stock prices and returns from 1993 to 2012.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23
 I go back two years from 1995 to obtain control measures which I use the lag variables for.  
24
 Some of the variables are not available for the target firms because they are privately-held targets.  
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Chapter 5: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Tables 1, 2, and 3 present descriptive statistics for my sample. Table 1 shows the 
distribution of sample firms and foreign directors. The unit of observation is firm-year. 
Panel A of Table 1 shows the annual number of sample firms with no foreign directors, 
one foreign director, and multiple foreign directors. I have a total of 163,465 firm-year 
observations in my sample. The percentage of firms with at least one-foreign director is 
26.44%. This percentage ranges from 20 to 30 percent. There is a slight increasing trend 
of having foreign directors on boards during the first half of my sample period and a 
relatively low decreasing trend in the latter half of the sample.  
Panel B of Table 1 shows the country distribution of firms in my sample. There is 
some variability across countries in the frequency of having foreign directors sit on their 
corporate boards. For example, the United States has 10.78% of their firm-year 
observations with one foreign director and 3.27% of their firm-years with multiple 
foreign directors. Germany, however, has 20.44% and 24.7% of their firm-years with 
one-foreign director and multiple foreign directors respectively. Civil law countries have 
a higher percentage of their firm-year observations with foreign directors than common 
law countries. The difference is statically significant.  
Panel C of Table 1 describes the industry distribution of foreign directors. The 
industry definitions come from BoardEx. There is no noticeable concentration of foreign 
directors in any particular industry. The percentage of foreign directors in an industry is 
fairly evenly distributed among the industries. The food, drug retailors, and processors 
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industry has the largest percentage of foreign directors in my sample. Utilities industry, 
however, has the lowest percentage.  
Table 2 presents the profile statistics of foreign directors. Panel A shows the 
distribution of foreign director’s nationalities as described in the BoardEx database. The 
unit of observation is director-year. American foreign directors constitute more than 22% 
of foreign directors in my sample, while British foreign directors constitute more than 
17%. French and German foreign directors constitute more than 7% of director-years 
each. This panel implies that most of the foreign-directors in my sample come from 
developed economies.  
Panel B of Table 2 shows the foreign director’s roles on boards. The unit of 
observation is director-firm-year. Approximately 15% of the sample foreign directors are 
Chairmen of the board and around 15% are CEOs. About 8% hold Chairman and CEO 
position.  12.15% of the sample consists of independent foreign directors.  
Panel C of Table 2 contains the number of foreign directors on a firm’s board. 
Most of the observations indicate no foreign directors as in Table 1. Most firms who have 
foreign directors have only one foreign director. Only 3.6% of firm-year observations 
have more than three foreign directors on their board. Panel D of Table 2 shows the 
incidence of multiple boarding by foreign directors. Less than 19% of director-firm-years 
serve on multiple boards.   
Table 3 presents comparative analyses for key variables for firms with and 
without foreign directors. Panels A compares the means between firms with no foreign 
directors and firms with one foreign director. Panels B compares the means between 
firms with no foreign directors and firms with multiple foreign directors. Firms with 
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foreign directors are significantly larger than firms with no foreign directors in terms of 
total assets and market value of equity. There is no significant difference between firms 
with and without foreign directors in terms of leverage as measured by debt scaled by 
total assets. Firms with multiple foreign directors have significantly higher ROA than 
firms with no foreign directors. There is no statistically significant difference between 
firms in terms of foreign assets or foreign sales as scaled by total assets and total sales 
respectively.  
Firms with foreign directors have a larger board than those with no foreign 
directors. Moreover, firms with foreign directors are more likely to have less independent 
boards. There is no significant difference between firms with foreign directors and those 
with no foreign directors in terms of Tobin’s Q. In general, firms with foreign directors 
are larger, more profitable, and have larger boards.  
Panels C and D compare various aspects of M&A activity between firms with no 
foreign directors and those with one or multiple foreign directors. Firms with foreign 
directors are more likely to engage in mergers and cross-border mergers. The variables 
merger and cross-border merger are binary variables which assume the value of one if a 
firm pursues a merger or a cross-border merger in a particular year, respectively.  
This univariate analysis shows that firms are more likely to pay with cash for their 
targets. The table also demonstrates that acquirers with foreign directors actually pay less 
for their targets as measured by purchase price. Purchase price is measured as the 
transaction value scaled by total assets. Moreover, this analyses shows that firms with 
foreign directors are less likely to acquire privately-held targets and more likely to pursue 
diversifying mergers.  
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Chapter 6: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
I. Cross-border merger activity 
1. The effect of foreign directors on the incidences of cross-border mergers (H1.1) 
In this section, I empirically test my first set of hypotheses. First, I test my 
hypotheses with regards to merger activity. H1.1 predicts that firms with foreign directors 
are more likely to engage in cross-border mergers. I empirically test this hypothesis in 
Tables 4 and 5. Specifically, I use three tests to test this hypothesis. First, I examine the 
number of cross-border mergers that my sample firms undertake. I use a Poisson model 
to examine how foreign directors affect the number of cross-border mergers a firm 
executes in a given year. I use the following Poisson regression analysis: 
                                       ∑       
 
   
                                           
Where Num_CrossBorder is the number of cross-border mergers a firm commits 
to in a particular year, FD is a foreign director measure, and Zi, t  represents a set of 
control variables. In panel A of Table 4, Num_CrossBorder assumes the value of zero 
when the firm commits to a domestic merger or does not commit to a domestic or cross-
border merger
25
. The unit of observation is firm-year.  
Panel A of Table 4 shows the results of equation (1). All regressions use year 
fixed effects with clustered standard errors at the country level similar to Miletkov, 
Poulsen and Wintoki (2012). All the control variables are lagged by one year. In model 
(1), I use FD variable which is a dummy variable which assumes the value of one if a 
firm has a least one foreign director in a given year and zero otherwise. The coefficient is 
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 In Table 5, I restrict the analysis to just firms who commit to a merger, either domestic or cross-border.  
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significantly positive. The presence of foreign directors on a firm’s board leads to an 
increase in the log of the number of cross-border mergers by a firm in a given year or 
about two cross-border mergers annually.  
The presence of a foreign director on a board might take time to influence 
corporate decision-making. For this reason, I use the first and second lag of FD variable 
in models (2) and (3). The results remain highly significant. Moreover, I use the number 
of foreign directors as an independent variable with the results presented in model (4) of 
panel A. An increase in the number of foreign directors by one leads to an increase of 
about 1.15 cross-border mergers in a given year. I also use the percentage of foreign 
directors on a firm’s board and obtain similar results.  
Masulis, Wang and Xie (2012) and Miletkov, Poulsen and Wintoki (2012) argue 
that the benefits of foreign directors are more pronounced when the foreign director is 
independent. That is, the benefits of foreign directors might be higher if the director is not 
affiliated with the acquirer firm. I repeat my estimation of equation (1) using FID, which 
assumes the value of one if the firm has at least one foreign independent director and zero 
otherwise. The results are shown in model (6) of Panel A of Table 4. The results are 
similar in magnitude to previous models.   
Next, I examine the volume of cross-border mergers committed by firms with 
foreign directors. I estimate the following Ordinary Least Squares regression: 
                                    ∑       
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Where CrossBorder_Volume is the dollar volume of cross-border mergers a firm 
commits to in a given year. All models use year fixed effects with clustered standard 
errors at the country level. Panel B of Table 4 contains the results. 
The results support H1.1. The presence of foreign directors leads to an increase of 
about $83 million committed to cross-border mergers. My various measures of the 
presence of foreign directors generally lead to the same conclusion.  
In another direct test of H1.1, I use a logit model to examine the impact of having 
a foreign director on the likelihood of pursuing a cross-border merger. Specifically, I use 
the following logistic model: 
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The results are reported in panel C of Table 4. The results are statistically and 
economically significant. The presence of foreign directors leads to an increase of 87 
percent in the odds that a firm pursues a cross-border merger. All different specifications 
of the benefits of foreign directors lead to the same conclusion in support of H1.1.  
As a robustness test of the previous table in support of H1.1, I restrict the sample 
to only firms that commit to a merger in a particular year, either domestic or cross-
border. I repeat my logistic analysis on this restricted sample in Table (5). The first five 
models use the same specifications of foreign directors as in panel C of Table 4. The 
results are economically and statistically significant. In model 6, I estimate equation (3) 
using FD_SameRegion variable which assumes the value of one if the foreign director is 
from the same region as the target firm. The regions are defined in Table 2.  Masulis, 
Wang and Xie (2012) argue that the benefits of foreign directors in cross-border mergers 
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are more pronounced when the director is from the same region the target firm. Model (6) 
of Table 5 supports this argument. The presence of foreign directors from the same 
region as the target firm increases the odds of that merger by 80 percent.  
Moreover, I re-examine equation (3) when the foreign director is a Chairman or 
CEO in the firm they are board members on. Models (7) and (8) of Table 5 report these 
results. The results are economically and statistically significant. The presence of a 
foreign chairman or a foreign CEO board member raises the odds of a cross border 
merger by 13 and 19 percent respectively.  
I incorporate cultural distance between the country of the foreign director and the 
country of the target firm in my analysis of equation (4). I construct a cultural distance 
measure (CD) that incorporate the cultural distance between the country of the target firm 
and the country of the foreign director. I follow Chakrabarti, Gupta-Mukherjee and 
Jayaraman (2009) who use Hofstede’s cultural dimensions to calculate this measure. The 
distances are calculated from the numerical values of the four Hofstede dimensions, 
namely, Individualism (IDV), Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI), Power Distance 
Index (PDI) and Masculinity (MAS). The measure is computed as follows:  
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Where      is the cultural dimension score of the country of the target firm firm 
and      is the cultural dimension score for the country of the foreign director. I argue that 
the likelihood of a cross-border merger is higher when the cultural distance between the 
target and the foreign director is low. The target firm might not resist an acquisition when 
they can more easily relate to the culture of the acquiring firm.  
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The results of my analysis of cultural distance are reported in model (9) of Table 
5. The variable of interest is the interaction effect of FD*CD. I argue that the higher the 
cultural distance between the target firm and the foreign director, the less likely a cross-
border merger will take place. The sign of the FD*CD coefficient is statistically negative, 
implying that a higher cultural distance between the foreign director and the target firm, 
makes a cross-border merger less likely to occur.  
In general, Tables 4 and 5 offer strong support for H1.1. Firms with foreign 
directors are more likely to engage in cross-border mergers. The presence of foreign 
directors leads to a higher number of cross-border mergers in a given year, more dollars 
spent on cross-border mergers, and a greater likelihood that a cross-border merger will 
occur. 
2. Foreign directors and the nature of diversifying merger activity (H1.2) 
I argue in H1.2 that firms with foreign directors are more likely to engage in non-
diversifying cross-border merger activity. I argue that the presence of foreign directors 
lead to better decisions regarding cross-border acquisitions. One of these decisions is 
acquiring cross-border targets from the same line of business, since diversifying mergers 
have been shown to be value destructive. I test this hypothesis in Table 6.  
My univariate analysis is presented in panel A of Table 6. I define a cross-border 
merger to be diversifying if the SIC of the acquirer and target differ at the one-digit level. 
Diversifying cross-border merger is a binary variable which assumes the value of one if 
the cross-border merger is a diversifying merger and zero otherwise. The Number of 
diversified mergers is the number of diversified cross-border mergers a firm in my 
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sample commits to in a given year. Volume of diversified mergers is the dollar amount 
spent on diversified mergers by a firm in a given year.  
Panel A of Table 6 presents a univariate test of H1.2. Firms with foreign directors 
are more likely to engage in non-diversifying mergers. However, firms with foreign 
directors commit to a higher number of diversifying cross-border mergers and invest 
more dollars in cross-border diversifying mergers in a given year. Thus, this univariate 
analysis only partially supports H1.2. 
I further test H1.2 with multivariate analysis. First, I test the hypothesis with the 
following logit model: 
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Panel B of Table 6 reports the results. Model (1) shows that the coefficient of FD 
is negative and significant at the 5% level. The presence of a foreign director on a firm’s 
board decreases the odds of pursuing a diversifying cross-border merger by 9.7 percent. 
The first and second lags of the FD measure show similar significantly negative 
coefficients. The coefficients for the number of foreign directors and the percentage of 
foreign directors are not statistically significant. The coefficient of the independent 
foreign director, however, is significantly negative.  
In the next multivariate analysis, I test the impact of foreign directors on the 
number of diversifying cross-border mergers an acquirer commits to in a year. I use a 
Poisson model and include the number of diversified cross-border mergers as my 
dependent variable in the following way: 
                                                    ∑       
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Panel C of Table 6 reports the results. In model (1), the coefficient for FD 
variable is negative and significant at the 1% level. I obtain similar results with the first 
and second lag of FD. The number of foreign directors and the percentage of foreign 
directors on a firm’s board show significantly positive coefficients, in contradiction to 
H1.2, while the FID coefficient is insignificant. These results might stem from the 
decreasing benefits to outsiders as their number increase (Earley and Mosakowski, 2000).  
In further analysis, I regress the dollar volume of diversifying cross-border 
mergers in a given year against my foreign director measures. The results are reported in 
Panel D of Table 6. The coefficients for the foreign director measures are statistically 
insignificant. This result might stem from the fact the firms with foreign directors put 
more dollars in cross-border mergers in the first place, as reported in Tables 4 and 5.  
In general, the results from Table 6 support H1.2. Firms with foreign directors are 
more likely to engage in non-diversifying cross-border mergers. The results from the 
logit model strongly support the hypothesis, while the results from the Poisson model 
partially support the hypothesis.  
3. Foreign directors and the nature of merger negotiations (H1.3) 
In this section, I test H1.3 which examines the friendliness of cross-border 
mergers when acquirers have foreign directors. Specifically, H1.3 argues that firms with 
foreign directors are more likely to engage in friendly mergers with their cross-border 
targets. The SDC database identifies merger negotiations between acquirer and targets as 
being friendly, hostile, neutral, unsolicited, or not applicable. I delete the neutral, 
unsolicited, and not applicable mergers, which are 5.79 percent of the sample, to focus 
exclusively on the friendly/hostile difference.  
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I report the results in Table 7. I use the same procedures and models as in Table 6. 
I test the hypothesis by modeling logit, Poisson, and OLS regressions. In the logit model, 
I introduce a binary variable that equals to one if the deal is friendly and zero otherwise. 
For the Poisson model, I calculate the number of cross-border friendly mergers that a 
firm commits to in a given year and add this as a new predictor. For the OLS regression, I 
calculate the dollar volume that a firm undertakes in a given year of friendly cross-border 
mergers and include this as a new independent variable. 
Panel A of Table 7 shows the results of my initial univariate analysis. The 
percentage of mergers classified as friendly does not support H1.3, while the number of 
friendly-cross border mergers and the volume of friendly cross-border mergers support 
the hypothesis. All differences are statistically significant. Firms with foreign directors 
commit a larger number of cross-border mergers than firms with no foreign directors. 
Also, firms with foreign directors put more dollars in friendly mergers than firms with no 
foreign directors.  
Panels B, C and D report the results of the logit, Poisson and OLS models 
respectively. The coefficients for the foreign director measures are not statistically 
significant for the logit model. However, the results are statistically significant for some 
measures of the Poisson and OLS regressions. The insignificant results of the logit model 
might stem from the fact that 93.7% of my sample consists of friendly deals.  
To address this unbalanced sample in the logit model, I re-estimate the logit 
model with a matched sample. For every hostile deal in the sample, I match it with a 
friendly deal that with common characteristics. Specifically, in the matched sample, I 
require that the acquirers share the same country and industry. I then choose one acquirer 
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which is closest in total assets size to the corresponding acquirer from the hostile deal 
sample.  
The results of the logit model of this matched sample are reported in panel E of 
Table 7. The coefficients for FD, FD lagged one and two years, the number of foreign 
directors and the percentage of foreign directors are all positive. The coefficient for FD 
and the one period lagged FD are statistically significant. Only the coefficient of FID is 
negative and significant. Foreign independent directors might not increase the likelihood 
of a friendly merger because they do not oversee the daily aspects of the negotiations of 
the merger. I argue in the hypothesis that foreign directors increase the likelihood of a 
friendly merger because of their involvement in merger negotiation. This involvement is 
reduced for directors who do not operate daily in the firm. Thus I conclude that the 
presence of a foreign director on an acquirer’s board increases the likelihood that the 
cross-border merger will be friendly.  
In general, my results support H1.3. Firms with foreign directors commit to a 
higher number of friendly cross-border mergers in a given year, and put more dollars in 
those friendly mergers. The results of a matched sample between hostile and friendly 
deals provide further confirmation that the likelihood of a friendly cross-border merger is 
greater for acquirers with foreign directors.  
II. Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
1.  CARs and foreign directors (H2.1) 
In this section, I test H2.1. I argue in this hypothesis that acquirers with foreign 
directors on their boards enjoy higher announcement period abnormal returns. This 
higher return stems from the fact that foreign directors are better able to direct acquirers 
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towards targets that have greater synergy potential. Consequently, acquirers with foreign 
directors experience higher cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) as a result of their 
cross-border announcement.  
I measure the market impact of each acquisition by calculating buy-and-hold 
cumulative abnormal returns. I first estimate the market model regression of dollar 
dominated daily returns on the corresponding dollar dominated market return. For each 
acquirer, I use the returns of the major equity index in the acquirer’s country of 
incorporation as the market return. Data on the returns to the indices are available from 
DataStream. For acquirers that lack a corresponding market index available in 
DataStream, I use the MSCI world index as their market index (these countries include 
Argentina, Belgium, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, India, 
Indonesia, Israel, Slovenia, South Korea, Turkey, and United Arab Emirates) . I calculate 
the CARs for a window around the announcement date of the cross-border merger. The 
market model regressions are performed in the following way: 
             
                                              
Where                 and      refers to the daily stock return for the 
acquiring firm   in country   and      is the market return in country  . I require that each 
firm has at least fifty non-missing return data in this estimation period. The residual     
defines the excess return for firm   and day  .  
I then compute the abnormal returns and accumulate them over five different 
subperiods:  (-1, +1), (-2, +2), (0, +1), (-5, +5), and (0, +10). The CAR in period (T1, T2) 
for firm   is computed as: 
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Panel A of Table 8 reports the averages of these estimation windows for firms 
with and without foreign directors. There is no statistically significant difference in CARs 
for firms with and without foreign directors in the windows (-1, +1), (-2, +2), and (0, +1). 
However, the longer windows (-5, +5) and (0, +10) show that firms with foreign directors 
generate higher CARs surrounding the cross-border merger announcement date. The 
difference is statistically significant and is consistent with H2.1. Firms with foreign 
directors generate an average of 60 additional basis points of return compared to firms 
with no foreign directors surrounding the announcement of their cross-border merger.  
In my corresponding multivariate analysis, I estimate the following OLS 
regression model: 
      
                       ∑       
 
   
                              
Panel B of Table 8 contains the empirical results. The variables FD, the first and 
second lag of FD, and the percentage of FD on boards show positive and significant 
coefficients. Firms with foreign directors generate 59 basis points higher CARs than 
firms with no foreign directors
26
. Only the number of foreign directors and the FID 
measure exhibit insignificant coefficients.  
In general, the results of Table 8 support H2.1. Firms with foreign directors have 
higher announcement period abnormal returns than firms with no foreign directors. 
                                                          
26
 In unreported results, I estimate equation (9) using other windows. My strongest results occur in the (-2, 
+2) window. In the M&A literature, it is common to use the (-2, +2) window. Examples include Masulis, 
Wang, and Xie (2012), Bris and Cabolis (2008), Erel, Liao and Weisbach (2012), and Moeller and 
Schlingemann (2005).  
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Investors welcome cross-border mergers announced by acquirers with foreign directors. 
This higher return stems from the fact that foreign directors are better able to direct 
acquirers towards targets that have greater synergy potential. Consequently, acquirers 
with foreign directors experience higher cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) as a result 
of their cross-border announcement.   
2. Foreign directors, investor protection and accounting standards (H2.2) 
I argue in H2.2 that acquirers with foreign directors on their boards have higher 
announcement period returns when the target is incorporated in countries with weak legal 
protections for investors or lower accounting standards. I argue that foreign directors can 
provide more benefit to acquirers when there is ambiguity in a target’s valuation. This 
ambiguity is more pronounced when the target is incorporated in countries with weak 
investor protection or accounting standards. Less investor protection and weak 
accounting standards are associated with more asset misallocation, reduced transparency, 
and tunneling (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1997 and Dyck and Zingales, 2004). These 
activities make valuation more difficult.  
To test this hypothesis, I use the La Porta, Lopez, Shleifer, and Vishny (1996, 
1997, 1999 and 2000) definitions of legal regime and accounting standards quality. La 
Porta el al. argue that common law countries have better investor protections laws and 
practices than firm in civil law countries. I use the target’s firm country of incorporation 
and its legal regime in my analysis of H2.2. Moreover, La Porta, Lopez, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1998) measure the degree of accounting standards for most of my sample 
countries. I use their measure of accounting standards in my analysis.  
Panel A of Table 9 reports the results of the following OLS regression model: 
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Where LR refers to the legal regime and AS refers to the accounting standards of 
the target firm in a cross-border merger. LR is equal to one if the target firm is from a 
civil law country and zero otherwise. AS is the accounting standard score of the target 
firm.  H2.2 implies a positive (negative) and significant coefficient of    when using LR 
(AS) as an interaction effect with FD.  Panel A shows that there are no significant 
coefficients for any of the interaction effects of FD and AS or LR. These initial results 
are inconsistent with investor protection or accounting standards effects explaining 
merger announcement period returns to the acquirer. 
As a more restrictive test of H2.2, I include the legal regime and accounting 
standards for the home country of the foreign director as well as that of the acquiring 
firm. Specifically, I argue that the benefits to cross-border acquirers might be higher 
when the foreign director comes from a country with a stronger legal regime or 
accounting standards than those of the acquiring firm
27
.  
A foreign director who comes from a country with a better legal regime or 
stronger accounting standards than the acquirer firm might have a better understanding of 
international legal practices and the issues associated with global finance. Moreover, 
foreign directors who come from a stronger legal regime might be more knowledgeable 
about international law. Thus, foreign directors can be valuable to acquirers in reducing 
the legal challenges faced with cross-border acquisitions. These challenges can be costly 
                                                          
27
 Miletkov, Poulsen and Wintoki (2012) find support for the same argument.  
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to the acquiring firm. Thus, reducing them increases the synergy potential of the cross-
border merger.  
In panel B of Table 9, I estimate the following OLS regression model: 
      
                                                ∑       
 
   
                   
Where                 is a binary variable that equals to one if the foreign 
director is from a common law country and the acquirer is from a civil law country and 
zero otherwise.                       is a binary variable that equals to one if the 
foreign director is from a country with stronger accounting standards than the acquiring 
firm and zero otherwise. The results of panel B demonstrates that foreign directors who 
are from a better legal regime or accounting standards than the acquirer firm generate 
higher CARs.  
The results of Table 9 do not provide evidence in support of H2.2. But, for a 
subset of foreign directors whose home country has stronger investor protection or 
accounting standards than the acquiring firm have a positive influence on announcement 
period abnormal returns. This result shows that a foreign director’s benefit to cross-
border acquirers is more pronounced when they are from a country with stronger investor 
protections or accounting standards. A foreign director’s knowledge about international 
law and business practices might signal to investors that the acquiring firms are pursuing 
value enhancing cross-border targets.  
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III. Foreign directors and merger targets 
1. Public status of target firms (H3.1) 
I argue in H3.1 that cross-border acquirers are more likely to acquire privately 
held targets. Private firms are difficult to value because their financial position is not 
known to the public (Capron and Shen, 2007 and Erel, Kiao and Weisbach, 2012). 
Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) find that most cross-border acquisitions rarely involve 
private targets. However, the M&A literature argues that acquiring private targets is 
value-increasing because less information on private targets creates more value-creating 
opportunities for exploiting private information (Capron and Shen, 2007).  
I argue that the presence of foreign directors on acquirer’s boards allows acquirers 
to better exploit this private information. If the valuation of privately-held target is 
difficult, then acquirers need private information that gives them the opportunity to assess 
the true value of the target. Foreign directors are more likely to have the weak-tie 
networks that will provide them with this information, thus allowing the acquirer to make 
competitive offers.  
To test this hypothesis, I follow the same empirical procedures used in Table 6. 
That is, I use Logit, Poisson, and OLS analysis to examine the impact of foreign directors 
on the type of target pursued. For my dependent variables, I use the probability that a 
cross-merger target is a privately-held target, the number of cross-border mergers that 
involve privately-held targets in a given year, and the dollar volume of cross-border 
mergers that involve privately-held targets in a given year respectively.  
The results are reported in Table 10. Panel A reports my univariate analysis. 
Private target is a binary variable that equals to one if the cross-border merger involves a 
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privately-held target and zero otherwise. The SDC database classifies targets as public, 
private, government owned, joint venture, mutual, and subsidiary. To test the hypothesis 
as stated, I delete mergers that involve government owned, joint venture, mutual, and 
subsidiary targets.  From this univariate analysis, I observe that firms with foreign 
directors are less likely to pursue a privately-held target in a given year. But they have a 
higher number of cross-border mergers involving a privately-held target and they put 
more dollars into deals that involve privately-held targets.  
Panels B, C, and D exhibit the results of my Logit, Poisson, and OLS analysis of 
H3.1 respectively. The Logit analysis does not show any significant coefficient for the 
foreign director measures
28
. However, Panel C shows a strong support for this 
hypothesis. All the coefficient estimates for the foreign director measures have significant 
positive coefficients at the 1% level. Firms with foreign directors commit to a higher 
number of cross-border mergers that involve a privately-held target than firms without 
foreign directors. 
My OLS analysis supports H3.1. Panel D shows that the coefficients of FD, the 
number of FD, percent of FD on boards, and FID are positive and significant. The 
presence of foreign directors leads acquirers to put more dollars in cross-border mergers 
that involve privately-held targets in a given year.  
In general, I find support of H3.1. The presence of foreign directors on boards 
leads to a higher number of cross-border deals that involve privately-held targets over my 
sample period. Moreover, firms with foreign directors put more dollars into deals that 
involve privately-held targets. Although the results from the Logit models do not show 
                                                          
28
 In unreported results, I estimate the logit model based on a balanced sample similar to panel E of Table 7. 
The results do not show any significant coefficients for the foreign director measures.  
 64 
 
significant coefficients, the results from the Poisson and OLS analyses are consistent with 
the hypothesis.  
2. Target valuation (H3.2) 
I find in section 6.2.1 that cross-border acquirers with foreign directors enjoy 
higher announcement period returns. One reason that these acquirers experience these 
higher returns is that they might target relatively undervalued targets. Consequently, I 
argue in H3.2 that firms with foreign directors are more likely to acquire targets that are 
undervalued.  
Targets that are undervalued (mispriced) do not require overpayment relative to 
targets that are overvalued. Indeed, Dos Santos, Errunza and Miller (2008) find that 
cross-border acquisitions of “fairly-valued” targets do not lead to value destruction. 
However, managers of the acquiring firms might be reluctant to bid for such firms if they 
are perceived as a bad investment due to their low price. I argue in H3.2 that foreign 
directors might be better able to identify “attractive” targets abroad and recommend them 
to acquirers. Moreover, I argue that foreign directors are more likely to challenge 
managers who might bid for over-valued targets.  
To test this hypothesis, I collect data on target firms from the WorldScope 
database. Specifically, I calculate the market-to-book ratio for target firms in my 
sample
29
. I use this ratio as my measure of the under valuation of target firms. Then, I 
estimate the following OLS model to test the hypothesis: 
                             ∑       
 
   
                         
                                                          
29
 I lose few observations because some cross-border mergers involve privately-held targets as discussed in 
the previous section.  
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Where              is the target’s market-to-book ratio during the year 
preceding the year of the merger announcement. Support for H3.2 means that   is 
negative and significant.  
Table 11 reports the results. All the foreign director measures show negative 
coefficient estimates. The coefficients of FD and the first and second lags of FD are 
significantly negative. These results are consistent with H3.2.Firms with foreign directors 
tend to acquire targets that are relatively undervalued compared to firms with no foreign 
directors. This might explain why cross-border acquirers with foreign directors enjoy 
higher announcement period returns. 
IV. Foreign directors and cross-border merger payment 
1.  Merger premium (H4.1) 
I argue in H4.1 that cross-border acquirers with foreign directors on their boards 
are more likely to pay less for their targets. Overpayment for targets can be a form of 
value-destruction that managers might pursue during their tenure (Harford, Humphery-
Jenner and Powell, 2012). Paying higher premium is often associated with loss in 
shareholder value (Baker, Pan, and Wurgler, 2012).  
I contend that foreign directors help cross-border acquirers negotiate a better deal 
that results in a lower offer price. This lower bid price might result from the foreign 
director’s possession of weak-ties with various parties located in the country of the target. 
These weak-ties can eliminate conflicts that might arise during the merger negotiation. 
Foreign directors might also be able to negotiate a better offer price because of their 
ability to reduce the effect of homophily.  
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To test this hypothesis, I compare the value of the transaction to the target firm’s 
market valuation one year before the merger. Specifically, I estimate the following OLS 
regression: 
 
                    
                  
                 ∑       
 
   
                               
Where                      is the dollar value of the cross-border merger 
transaction as reported by the SDC database and                    is the market 
capitalization of the target firm   in year     as reported in WorldScope database30. I 
hypothesize in H4.1 that the left hand side of equation (13) is low for firms with foreign 
directors. Thus, evidence in support of this hypothesis implies a negative and significant 
coefficient for   .  
Table 12 presents my results. The coefficients of the foreign director measure 
strongly support H4.1. Five of the six measures have significantly negative coefficients. 
Thus, I conclude that the presence of foreign directors on an acquirer’s boards leads to 
lower payments for their cross-border targets than acquirers without foreign directors.  
2. Foreign directors and the method of payment (H4.2) 
I argue in H4.2a that cross-border acquirers with foreign directors on their boards 
are more likely to use cash in their payment for cross-border acquisitions. There is a high 
degree of information asymmetry between acquirers and targets especially in cross-
border mergers. A higher degree of information asymmetry between the acquirer and 
                                                          
30
 The dependent variable in equation (13) is widely used in the literature to test for merger overpayment 
(e.g., Sung 1993). However, it is used as a per share basis. That is, the offer price per share divided by the 
target’s stock price. I estimate the term in aggregate basis because international firm’s stock price data is 
missing for a lot of observations in my sample. The results should yield the same conclusion in both cases.  
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target induce acquirers to issue equity to finance the merger. Hansen (1987) argues that 
since managers of the acquiring firm do not know the true value of the target, they prefer 
to finance the merger with stock. I argue in H4.2a that foreign directors reduce this 
information asymmetry, and thus, acquirers with foreign directors are more likely to use 
cash in their cross-border mergers. 
On the other hand, I argue in H4.2b that cross-border acquirers with foreign 
directors on their boards are more likely to use stocks in their payment for cross-border 
mergers. Managers might prefer to pay for acquisitions with cash for two reasons. 
Harford, Humphery-Jenner and Powell (2012) argue that entrenched managers use cash 
instead of equity because they do not want to create new equity blockholders. Other 
managers prefer cash over equity because they think that their equity is undervalued. 
Thus, these managers are reluctant to use their stock to pay for their acquisitions. I expect 
that foreign directors are more likely to challenge the decisions reached by managers if 
they use cash as a method of payment when they should use equity. 
Table 13 reports the results of my analysis of these two competing hypotheses. 
Panel A reports my initial univariate analysis of the method of payment for my mergers. 
D_Cash is a dummy variable that equals to one if the method of payment in the cross-
border merger is cash and zero otherwise. D_Mixed is a dummy variable that equal to 
one if the method of payment is mixed and zero otherwise. D_Equity is a dummy 
variable that equal to one if the method of payment is equity and zero otherwise
31
. %Cash 
is the percentage of cash used in the transaction.  
                                                          
31
 Mixed payments are those that involve cash and equity at the same time.  
 68 
 
The results of this univariate analysis support H4.2a. Firms with foreign directors 
use more cash in their payment for cross-border targets. This is clear from the results of 
the D_Cash and %Cash variables.  
In my multivariate analysis, I estimate the following logit model: 
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            The results are reported in panel B of Table 13. The results support H4.2b. 
The coefficients of the FD measures are negative and significant. This result implies that 
firms with foreign directors are more likely to use equity as a method of payment for their 
cross-border mergers.  
In further analysis of these two competing hypotheses, I estimate the following 
Tobit regression: 
                     ∑       
 
   
                                                           
The results are reported in panel C of Table 13. The results support H4.2b. The 
coefficients for the foreign directors are negative and significant in five of the six models. 
Thus, the results of my multivariate analyses support H4.2b and contradict the univariate 
results of panel A. 
In general, I conclude that firms with foreign directors are more likely to use 
equity in the payment of their cross-border targets. The results of my multivariate 
analyses support this conjecture and support H4.2b. Although Panel A of Table 13 
implies a support for H4.2a, panels B and C arrive at a different conclusion.   
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Chapter 7: ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
 
  
In this Chapter, I explore alternative explanations that might drive my results. I 
conclude that firms with foreign directors engage in a higher frequency of cross-border 
mergers. This conclusion, however, might be driven by the fact that firms who intend to 
engage in cross-border mergers choose to import foreign directors because of their 
advantages. Indeed, I discuss throughout this study many advantages that foreign 
directors bring to corporate boards and how they might benefit cross-border acquirers. It 
might be that the decision to recruit foreign directors is itself be correlated with the 
decision to engage in a cross-border merger. In other words, self-selection, endogeneity, 
or unobservable characteristics issues might be the driver behind my main results.  To 
control for these effects, I use two methodologies: propensity score matching and the 
Heckman (1979) adjustment. 
I. Propensity score matching 
Despite my conclusion that firms with foreign directors engage in higher 
frequency of cross-border mergers, other explanations might drive my results. For 
example, it might be that foreign directors do not increase the likelihood of cross-border 
mergers, but firms who decide to engage in cross-border mergers hire foreign directors. 
That is, reverse causality might be the driver behind my results. To correct this possible 
effect, I need to control for unobservable firm characteristics that might increase the 
likelihood that a firm engages in a cross-border merger. Specifically, I use the propensity 
score matching method similar to Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, and Williamson (2010).  
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I match firms based on a set of firm characteristics as described by Aggarwal et 
al. (2010). Specifically, I match firms on assets, ROA, foreign assets, foreign sales, 
leverage, cash, and board size. I compute the propensity that a firm has a foreign director 
using the following Probit model: 
        |              [     ∑       
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Where      are the characteristics mentioned above. Based on this model, each 
firm gets a score based on its characteristics. I match a firm with a foreign director in a 
particular country in a particular year and industry with a firm with no foreign directors 
based on the closet score. I then estimate a t-statistic between these two groups of firms 
to examine their propensity to engage in cross-border mergers. The reason behind this 
test is that I examine the difference between two groups of firms after controlling for all 
possible observable and unobservable characteristics. That is, I match two sets of firms 
where the only difference is the main variable of interest which is the presence of foreign 
directors.  
The results of my propensity score matching tests are reported in Table 14. I use 
FD, the first and second lags of FD, and FID as my separation variables (i.e., the left hand 
side of equation 16). I report the differences between the two sets of firms based on the 
dollar volume of cross-border mergers a firm commits to in a particular year, a binary 
variable that a firm commits to a cross-border merger in a particular year, and the number 
of cross-border mergers a firm commits to in a particular year.  
The results are consistent with my earlier results. After controlling for similarities 
for firms with and without foreign directors, firms with foreign directors are more likely 
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to engage in a cross-border merger, commit more dollars to cross-border mergers, and 
engage in higher number of cross-border mergers in a particular year. The results are 
robust at the 99 percent level. Each of the four separation variables demonstrates a 
similar significance. I conclude that my earlier results are robust and are unlikely to be 
driven by unobservable firm characteristic.  
II. Heckman (1979) methodology 
I employ Heckman’s (1979) methodology, sometimes called the treatment effect 
model, to control for possible endogeneity with my results. That is, firms might appoint 
foreign directors because they anticipate engaging in future cross-border mergers, rather 
than foreign directors influence the decision to engage in such mergers. I adjust for this 
potential self-selection by using Heckman’s (1979) two-stage procedure.  
I assume that a firm’s decision to appoint a foreign director is determined by 
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Where      are those firm characteristics influencing the decision to appoint 
foreign directors while    is an error term. Then, the expected decision to engage in a 
cross-border merger conditional on the firm having a foreign director can be written as: 
                |           ∑       
 
   
                     |                 
Assuming that the error terms in (17) and (18) have a bivariate normal 
distribution with mean zero and a standard deviation of 1 and σ respectively, and a 
correlation of ρ, then     |      = πλ1(         where 
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Where      and      are the density and cumulative distribution functions of the 
standard normal respectively and π = ρσ32.  
In the first stage of the Heckman (1979) two-stage procedure, I use a Probit 
regression (equation 17) to obtain estimates of    and then I use these estimates to 
compute   . In the second stage, I estimate the following equations to examine several 
different aspects of cross-border activity: 
                 |             [                ∑       
 
   
           ]       
                                       ∑       
 
   
                                  
                                    ∑       
 
   
                                         
These equations are similar to equations (1), (2), and (3) of section 6.1.1; 
however, they are corrected by the Heckman (1979) two-stage procedure. In the first 
stage, I include all (and only) the firm controls from the second stage to identify the 
determinants of the choice to appoint a foreign director. This means that I have no 
“exclusion restrictions” and there is no need to justify an external exogenous instrument. 
Exclusion restrictions are not necessary in the Heckman selection model because the 
model is identified by non-linearity (Li and Prabhala 2007). My self-selection regressions 
will yield consistent estimates even without exclusion restrictions.  
                                                          
32
 The ratio in (19) sometimes referred to as the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR). 
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Table 15 reports the results of my Heckman (1979) analysis. The table shows the 
results of the second stage of the analysis. Panel A exhibit the results from equation (20). 
All four measures of foreign directors show positive and significant coefficients. The 
presence of foreign directors increases the likelihood that a firm engages in cross-border 
mergers even after controlling for self-selection and endogeneity concerns. Panels B and 
C report the results from equations (21) and (22) respectively. All foreign director 
measures show positive and significant coefficients. I conclude that the presence of 
foreign directors increases the number of cross-border mergers a firm pursues and the 
dollar volume that a firm commits to cross-border mergers in a particular year even after 
controlling for endogeneity concerns.  
III. Concluding remarks on robustness tests 
While endogeneity is a possibility, the propensity score matching and Heckman 
(1979) approaches correct for many possible biases. I conclude from my propensity score 
matching results that no unobservable firm characteristics drive the decision to engage in 
cross-border merger activity. I show that even after controlling for these unobservable 
characteristics, firms which appoint foreign directors engage in subsequent cross-border 
mergers more frequently.  
Second, my results might suffer from reverse causality. That is, firms who decide 
to engage in cross-border mergers appoint foreign directors beforehand. This effect 
weakens my conclusion that foreign directors by themselves influence the decision to 
engage in cross-border mergers. The Heckman (1979) approach correct for this 
possibility, allowing me to conclude that foreign directors do influence the decision to 
engage in cross-border mergers.  
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Using these methodologies, I conclude that foreign directors influence the 
likelihood that acquirers engage in cross-border mergers, the dollar volume of such deals, 
and the number of cross-border mergers a firm pursues. My propensity score matching 
and Heckman (1979) results show that these conclusions are robust to alternative 
explanations that might arise from endogeneity.  
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Chapter 8: CONCLUSION 
 
I argue in this study that a special subset of directors on corporate boards exerts a 
distinct advising influence on corporate decision-making. I argue that foreign directors, 
those that do not share the same nationality as the firm of which they are directors, have a 
unique effect on the cross-border merger decision of firms. This unique effect stems from 
the enhancement of the decision-making ability that those foreign directors bring to 
corporate boards.   
I begin my analysis by hypothesizing that firms with foreign directors are more 
likely to engage in cross-border mergers. I contend that cross-border acquirers face 
special legal, cultural, and informational challenges that foreign directors are better able 
to address thus leading to greater levels of cross-border merger activity. I find that firms 
with foreign directors engage in a higher number of cross-border mergers, invest more 
dollars in cross-border mergers, and are more likely to engage in cross-border mergers 
than firms without foreign directors.  
Moreover, I hypothesize and find that firms with foreign directors are more likely 
to engage in non-diversifying mergers. Diversifying mergers are well-known to be value 
destroying to acquirers. This is consistent with the ability of foreign directors to bring 
new perspectives and information to the board that enhances the decision-making 
process.  
I hypothesize and find that firms with foreign directors are more likely to engage 
in friendly mergers with their cross-border targets. Foreign directors can help to bridge 
the cultural divide between target and acquirer, thus leading to a more friendly merger. 
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This phenomenon is referred to as cultural affinity which is a feeling of closeness to 
others who share the same culture or values (Calomiris, Kahn, and Longhofer, 1994 and 
Hunter and Walker, 1996). Such cultural affinity can help to eliminate obstacles in 
merger negotiations and consequently a greater incidence of friendly mergers.  
I then examine the effect of foreign directors on the performance of cross-border 
mergers. Masulis, Wang and Xie (2012) find that the presence of foreign directors on 
U.S. acquirer’s boards leads to stronger cross-border mergers performance, but only 
when the target is from the same geographical region as the foreign director. I find a 
broader effect, and that the inter-cultural competencies of foreign directors extend beyond 
that of their home region. Specifically, I find firms with foreign directors have higher 
cross-border acquisition announcement returns relative to firms without foreign directors. 
I also find that a foreign director’s benefit to cross-border acquirers is more pronounced 
when they are from a country with stronger investor protections or accounting standards. 
If foreign directors have greater knowledge about international law and business 
practices, then their presence on a board might signal to investors that the acquiring firms 
are pursuing more value enhancing cross-border targets.  
Next, I examine the types of targets that cross-border acquirers with foreign 
directors might pursue. I find that acquirers with foreign directors on their boards are 
more likely to target privately held firms. Private targets are more difficult to value and 
constitute a challenge when an acquirer bids for them (Capron and Shen, 2007 and Erel, 
Kiao and Weisbach, 2012). Foreign directors however, might be more likely to have 
information about these targets through their ‘weak-ties’ connections. Moreover, I find 
that acquirers with foreign directors are more likely to pursue targets that are 
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undervalued. Again, foreign directors often have private information about potential 
targets through their network of ‘weak-ties’.   
Finally, I examine a foreign director’s impact on cross-border merger payment in 
terms of premium and method of payment. I find that firms with foreign directors pay 
less for their cross-border targets relative to acquirers without foreign directors. A foreign 
director can help to increase the cultural fit between the acquirer and the target. This 
increase in the cultural affinity between acquirer and target can ultimately result in a 
lower price as negotiation obstacles are more easily resolved. Moreover, foreign directors 
can use their ‘weak-ties’ to eliminate negotiation obstacles and facilitate the merger 
process, ultimately resulting in a lower target price.   
Moreover, I find that firms with foreign directors are more likely to use equity in 
the payment of their cross-border targets. Managers might prefer cash instead of equity 
either because they think their equity is undervalued (Malmendier and Tate, 2008 and 
Ferris, Jayaraman, and Sabherwal, 2013) or they hesitate to give other parties a huge 
percentage of ownership and thereby challenge the manager in his private benefits of 
control (Harford, Humphery-Jenner and Powell, 2012). Since foreign directors challenge 
managers by reducing groupthink, the presence of foreign directors on acquirer’s boards 
leads to a greater use of equity as merger payment. 
This research expands our understanding of how board diversity in the form of 
foreign directors can enhance board advising effectiveness. As companies seek foreign 
acquisitions, they face difficult legal, cultural, and informational challenges that can 
impede merger competition. Foreign directors play a key role in reducing these 
challenges and help to bridge the cultural gap between the acquirer and target. Moreover, 
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I contend that foreign directors have influence not just on performance, but also on other 
important aspects on the merger process.   
This research also answers important questions regarding the effect of diversity in 
corporate boards (e.g., Adams and Ferreira 2004). It adds to this literature by focusing on 
how diversity within a board influences a strategic decision such as a cross-border 
merger. Social scientists often ask whether demographic diversity matter in 
organizations. Diversity might decrease group loyalty and thus hinders the decision-
making process. On the other hand, diversity might foster the thinking process within 
groups by alternative opinions and different points of view thus enhancing the decision-
making process. This study contributes to this strand of literature by giving a positive 
view on a special subset of directors that positively influence the advising role for boards 
of directors.    
I also contribute to the M&A literature by focusing on how foreign directors on 
acquirer’s board can affect a merger. Such influence in unexplored in previous literature 
and I argue that foreign directors play a critical role in different aspects of the merger 
process and performance. Foreign directors reduce the cultural conflicts that might arise 
in cross-border mergers that usually negatively influence international merger activity 
(Ahern, Daminelli and Fracassi, 2012). I also show that the negotiation process before 
mergers are critical for the success of the merger. Thus, boards should pay attention to 
ways to reduce any hurdles that might arise during negotiations with the target firm. I 
show that board demographics play a critical role in this regard.  
This study raises important questions about the role of foreign directors on 
corporate boards. I look at the advising role of foreign directors on boards by examining 
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their influence on cross-border mergers. However, an important question remaining for 
future work is whether foreign directors affect the monitoring role of corporate boards. 
For example, do foreign directors influence CEO compensation in a way that increases 
firm value? Masulis, Wang and Xie (2012) examine both the monitoring and advising 
roles of foreign directors in U.S. corporate boards. Similar to this study, they find a 
positive effect of foreign directors on U.S. boards in terms of their advising role. 
However, they find that foreign directors negatively affect the monitoring role of 
corporate boards. An important extension of this study is whether such negative effect is 
internationally present and to what extent it varies with cultural and legal differences.  
An important question remaining to be answered is whether other aspects of board 
diversity similarly affect strategic corporate decision-making. For example, I argue that 
the “foreignness” of the board positively influence its advising role. Does the 
“foreignness” resulting from gender or race diversity have an effect on the decision-
making processes of the board? Plus, as Earley and Mosakowski (2000) argue, more than 
the optimal level of heterogeneity might have a negative effect on the decision making 
ability among groups. Such arguments raise important questions for future research to 
explore.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 80 
 
REFERENCES: 
Adams, R., & Ferreira, D. (2004). Gender Diversity in the Boardroom. ECGI Working 
Paper Series in Finance. 
Adams, R., Hermalin, B., & Weisbach, M. (2010). The Role of Boards of Directors in 
Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey. Journal of 
Economic Literature, 48, 58-107. 
Adler, P., & Kwon, S.-W. (2002). Social Capital: Prospects for a New Concept. The 
Academy of Management Review, 17-40. 
Aggarwal, R., Erel, I., Stulz, R., & Williamson, R. (2010). Differences in Governance 
Practices between U.S. and Foreign Firms: Measurement, Causes, and 
Consequences. Review of Financial Studies, (23) 3131-3169. 
Ahern, K., Daminelli, D., & Fracassi, C. (2012). Lost in Translation? The Effect of 
Cultural Values on Mergers Around the World. Journal of Financial Economics, 
forthcoming. 
Aldag, R. J., & Fuller, S. R. (1993). Beyond Fiasco: A Reappraisal of the Groupthink 
Phenomenon and a New Model of Group Decision Processes. Psychological 
Bulletin, 113 (3): 533–552. 
Almack, J. (1922). The Influence of Intelligence on the Selection of Associates. School 
and Society, (16) 529-530. 
Amihud, Y., Lev, B., & Travlos, N. (1990). Corporate Control and the Choice of 
Investment Financing: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions. The Journal of 
Finance, 45, 603-66. 
Baker, M., Pan, X., & Wurgler, J. (2012). The Effect of Reference Point Prices on 
Mergers and Acquisitions. Journal of Financial Economics, 106, 49-71. 
Bantel, K., & Jackson, S. (1989). Top Management and Innovations in Banking: Does the 
Composition of the Top Team Make a Difference? Strategic Management 
Journal, (10)107-124. 
Blau, P. (1977). Inequality and Heterogeneeity: A Primitive Theory of Social Structure. 
New York: Free Press. 
Bodnar, G., Tang, C., & Weintrop, J. (1999). Both Sides of Corporate Diversification: 
The Value Impacts of Geographic and Industrial Diversification. NBER Working 
Paper. 
Boeker, W. (1997). Strategic change: The Influence of Managerial Characteristics and 
Organizational Growth. Academy of Management Journal, 152-170. 
 81 
 
Bott, H. (1929). Observation in Play Activities in a Nursery School. Psychol. Monogr., 
(4) 44-88. 
Brickley, J., & Zimmerman, J. (2010). Corporate Governance Myths: Comments on 
Armstrong, Guay, and Weber. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 85, 66-101. 
Bris, A., & Cabolis, C. (2008). The Value of Investor Protection: Firm Evidence from 
Cross-Border Mergers. The Review of Financial Studies, 21, 605-648. 
Burkart, M., & Panuzi, F. (2006). Takeovers. Financial Markets and Institutions: An 
European Perspective. 
Burt, R. (1992). Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Burt, R. (2004). Structural Holes and Good Ideas. American Journal of Sociology.  
Byrne, D. (1969). Attitudes and Attraction: Advances in Experimental Social Psychology. 
Austin TX: Department of Psychology - University of Texas at Austin. 
Cai, Y., & Sevilir, M. (2012). Board Connections and M&A Transactions. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 103, 327–349. 
Calomiris, C., Kahn, C., & Longhofer, S. (1994). Housing-Finance Intervention and 
Private Incentives: Helping Minorities and the Poor. Journal of Money, Credit 
and Banking, 634-674. 
Capron, L., & Shen, J.-C. (2007). Acquisitions of Private vs. Public Firms: Private 
Information, Target Selection, and Acquirer Returns. Strategic Management 
Journal, 891-911. 
Chakrabarti, R., Gupta-Mukherjee, S., & Jayaraman, N. (2009). Mars–Venus Marriages: 
Culture and Cross-Border M&A. Journal of International Business Studies, 40, 
216–236. 
Chang, S. (1998). Takeovers of Privately Held Targets, Methods of Payment, and Bidder 
Returns. The Journal of Finance, 53, 773–784. 
Chari, A., Ouimet, P., & Tesar, L. (2010). The Value of Control in Emerging Markets. 
The Review of Financial Studies, 23,1741-1770. 
Christophe, S. (1997). Hysteresis and the Value of the U.S. Multinational Corporation. 
The Journal of Business, 70, 435-462. 
Coisne, C. (2011). Managing Culture in International Mergers and Acquisitions. Working 
paper. 
Costa, D., & Kahn, M. (2003). Civic Engagement and Community Heterogeneity: An 
Economist's Perspective. Perspective on Politics, 103-111. 
Cox, T. (1993). Cultural Diversity in Organizations. San Francisco: Berrett Koehler. 
 82 
 
Cox, T., Lobel, S., & McLeod, P. (1991). Effects of Ethnic Group Cultural Differences 
on Cooperative and Competitive Behavior on a Group Task. Academy of 
management journal, (34) 827-847. 
Denis, D., Denis, D., & Yost, K. (2002). Global Diversification, Industrial 
Diversification, and Firm Value. The Journal of Finance, 57, 1951–1979. 
Dos Santos, M., Errunza , V., & Miller, D. (2008). Does Corporate International 
Diversification Destroy Value? Evidence From Cross-Border Mergers and 
Acquisitions. Journal of Banking and Finance, 32, 2716–2724. 
Dyck, A., & Zingales, L. (2004). Private Benefits of Control: An International 
Comparison. The Journal of Finance, 59, 537–600. 
Earley, P., & Mosakowski, E. (2000). Creating Hybrid Team Culture: An Empirical Test 
of Transnational Team Functioning. Academy of Management Journal, (43) 26-
49. 
Erel, I., Liao, R., & Weisbach, M. (2012). Determinants of Cross-Border Mergers and 
Acquisitions. The Journal of Finance, forthcoming. 
Erickson, B. (2003). Social Networks: The Value of Variety. American Sociological 
Association. 
Errunza, V., & Senbet, L. (1981). The Effects of International Operations on the Market 
Value of the Firm: Theory and Evidence. The Journal of Finance, 36, 401–417. 
Errunza, V., & Senbet, L. (1984). International Corporate Diversification, Market 
Valuation, and Size-Adjusted Evidence. The Journal of Finance, 39, 727–743. 
Faccio, M., & Masulis, R. (2005). The Choice of Payment Method in European Mergers 
and Acquisitions. The Journal of Finance, 60, 1345–1388. 
Ferris, S., Jayaraman , N., & Sabherwal, S. (2013). CEO Overconfidence and 
International Merger and Acquisition Activity. Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, 137 - 164. 
Ferris, S., Kim, K., & Noronha, G. (2009). The Effect of Crosslisting on Corporate 
Governance: A Review of the International Evidence. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 17, 338–352. 
Fishman, M. J. (1989). Preemptive Bidding and the Role of the Medium of Exchange in 
Acquisitions. The Journal of Finance, 44, 41–57. 
Francis, B., Hasan, I., & Sun, X. (2008). Financial Market Integration and the Value of 
Global Diversification: Evidence for US Acquirers in Cross-Border Mergers and 
Acquisitions . Journal of Banking and Finance, 32, 1522–1540. 
 83 
 
Fuller, K., Netter, J., & Stegemoller, M. (2002). What Do Returns to Acquiring Firms 
Tell Us? Evidence from Firms That Make Many Acquisitions. The Journal of 
Finance, 57, 1763–1793. 
Ghosh, A., & Ruland, W. (1998). Managerial Ownership, the Method of Payment for 
Acquisitions, and Executive Job Retention. The Journal of Finance, 53, 785-798. 
Granovetter, M. S. (1973). The Strengths of Weak Ties. American Journal of Sociology, 
(78) 1360-1380. 
Granovetter, M. S. (1983). The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited. 
Sociological theory. 
Granovetter, M. S. (2005). The Impact of Social Structure on Economic Outcomes. The 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 33-50. 
Grossman, S., & Hart, O. (1980). Takeover Bids, The Free-Rider Problem, and the 
Theory of the Corporation. The Bell Journal of Economics, 11, 42-64. 
Hambrick, D. C., Cho, T. S., & Chen, M.-J. (1996). The Influence of Top Management 
Team Heterogeneity on Firms' Competitive Moves. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, (41) 659-684. 
Hambrick, D., & Mason, P. (1984). Upper Echelons: The Organization as a Reflection of 
its Top Managers. Academy of management review, (9) 193-206. 
Hansen, R. (1987). A Theory for the Choice of Exchange Medium in Mergers and 
Acquisitions. Journal of Business, 60, 75-95. 
Harford, J., Humphery-Jenner, M., & Powell, R. (2012). The Sources of Value 
Destruction in Acquisitions by Entrenched Managers. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 247–261. 
Hart, P. (1991). Irving L. Janis' Victims of Groupthink. Political Psychology, 2 (12): 
247–278. 
Heckman, J. (1979). Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error. Econometrica, (47) 
153-161. 
Hermalin, B., & Weisbach, M. (2003). Boards of Directors as an Endogenously 
Determined Institution: A Survey of Economic Literature. FRBNY Economic 
Policy Review, 9, 7-26. 
Holthausen, R. W. (2009). Accounting Standards, Financial Reporting Outcomes, and 
Enforcement. Journal of Accounting Research, 47, 447–458. 
Hunter, W., & Walker, M. (1996). The Cultural Affinity Hypothesis and Mortgage 
Lending Decisions. The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 57-70. 
 84 
 
Ibarra, H. (1992). Homophily and Differential Returns: Sex Differences in Network 
Structure and Access in an Advertising Firm. Administrative Science Quarterly, 
(37) 422-447. 
Ishii, J., & Xuan, Y. (2010). Acquirer-Target Social Ties and Merger. Working Ppaper. 
Jackson, S. E. (1992). Diversity in the Workplace: Human Resources Initiatives. New 
York: Guilford. 
Janis, I. (1971). Groupthink. Psychology Today, 5 (6): 43–46, 74–76. 
Janis, I. (1972). Victims of Groupthink: a Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy 
Decisions and Fiascoes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 
Janis, I. (1982). Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes. 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 
Jensen, M. (1986). Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers. 
The American Economic Review, 76,323-329. 
Kim, W., & Lyn, E. (1986). Excess Market Value, the Multinational Corporation, and 
Tobin's q-Ratio. Journal of International Business Studies, 17, 119-125. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer , A., & Vishny , R. (1998). Law and Finance. 
Journal of Political Economy. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1997). Legal Determinants 
of External Finance. The Journal of Finance, 52, 1131-1150. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1999). Corporate 
Ownership Around the World. The Journal of Finance, 54, 471-517. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2000). Investor Protection 
and Corporate Goernance. Journal of Financial Economics, 58, 3-27. 
Lazarsfeld, P., & Merton, R. (1954). Friendship as a Social Process: A Substantive and 
Methodological Analysis. In Freedom and Control in Modern Society, Morroe 
Berger, Theodore Abel, and Charles H. Page, eds. New York: Van Nostrand, 18-
66. 
Li, K., & Prabhala, N. (2007). Self-Selection Models in Corporate Finance. In E. Eckbo, 
Hankbook of Corporate Finance: Empirical Corporate Finance (pp. Ch. 2, 37-
86). Elsevier/North-Holland. 
Loomis, C. (1946). Political and Occupational Cleavages in a Hanoverian Village. 
Sociometry, (9) 316-333. 
Lott, A. J., & Lott, B. E. (1965). Group Cohesiveness as Interpersonal Attraction: A 
Review of Relationships with Antecedent and Consequent Variables. 
Psychological bulletin, 64(4) 259. 
 85 
 
Luttmer, E. F. (2001). Group Loyalty and the Taste for Redistribution. Journal of 
Political Economy, (109) 500-528. 
Malmendier, U., & Tate, G. (2008). Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO Overconfidence and 
the Market's Reaction. Journal of Financial Economics, 20-43. 
Martin, K. J. (1996). The Method of Payment in Corporate Acquisitions, Investment 
Opportunities, and Management Ownership. The Journal of Finance, 51, 1227-
1246. 
Martynova, M., & Renneboog, L. (2008). Spillover of Corporate Governance Standards 
in Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions. Journal of Corporate Finance, 14, 
200-223. 
Martynova, M., Oosting, S., & Renneboog, L. (2006). The Long-Term Operating 
Performance of European Mergers and Acquisitions. Working Ppaper. 
Masulis, R., Wang, C., & Xie, F. (2012). Globalizing the Boardroom—The Effects of 
Foreign Directors on Corporate Governance and Firm Performance. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 53, 527-554. 
McPherson, M., Smith-Lovin, L., & Cook, J. (2001). Birds of Feather: Homophily in 
Social Networks. Annual Review of Sociology, (27) 415-444. 
Miletkov, M., Poulsen, A., & Wintoki, B. (2013). A Multinational Study of Foreign 
Directors on Non-U.S. Corporate Boards. Working Paper. 
Moeller, S., & Schlingemann, F. (2005). Global Diversification and Bidder Gain: A 
Comparison Between Cross-Border and Domestic Acquisitions. Journal of 
Banking and Finance, 29, 553-564. 
Moeller, S., & Schlingemann, F. (2005). Wealth Destruction on a Massive Scale? A 
Study of Acquiring-Firm Returns in the Recent Merger Wave. The Journal of 
Finance, 60, 757–782. 
Morck, R., & Yeung, B. (1991). Why Investors Value Multinationality. The Journal of 
Business, 165-187. 
Morosini, P., Shane, S., & Singh, H. (1998). National Cultural Distance and Cross-
Border Acquisition Performance. Journal of International Business Studies, 29, 
137-158. 
Moscovici, S. (1976). Social influence and social change. London: Academic Press. 
Myers, D. G. (1999). Social Psychology. McGraw-Hill College. 
Nemeth, C. J. (1986). Differential Contribution of Majority and Minority Influence. 
Psychological Review, (93) 23-32. 
Officer, M. (2007). The Price of Corporate Liquidity: Acquisition Discounts for Unlisted 
Targets. Journal of Financial Economics, 83, 571-598. 
 86 
 
Officer, M., Poulsen, A., & Stegemoller, M. (2009). Target-Firm Information Asymmetry 
and Acquirer Returns. Review of Finance, 13, 467-493. 
O'Reilly, C., Caldwell , D., & Barnett, W. (1989). Work Group Demography, Social 
Integration, and Turnover. Administrative Science Quarterly, (34) 21-37. 
Pfeffer, J. (1983). Organizational Demography. Research in Organizational Behavior, (4) 
299-357. 
Pound, J. (1988). Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 20, 237-265. 
Rhodes‐Kropf, M., & Viswanathan, S. (2004). Market Valuation and Merger Waves. The 
Journal of Finance, 59, 2685–2718. 
Rhodes‐Kropf, M., & Viswanathan, S. (2005). Valuation Waves and Merger Activity: 
The Empirical Evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 77, 561–603. 
Richardson, H. (1940). Community of Values a Factorin Friendships of College and 
Adult Women. The Journal of Social Psychology, (25) 335-361. 
Roll, R. (1986). The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers. The Journal of Business, 
59, 197-216. 
Rossi, S., & Volpin, P. (2004). Cross-Country Determinants of Mergers and Acquisitions. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 74, 277–304. 
Ruef, M., Aldrich, H., & Carter, N. (2003). The Structure of Founding Teams: 
Homophily, String Ties, and Isolation Among U.S. Entrepreneurs. American 
Sociological Review, (68.2) 195-222. 
Schonlau, R., & Singh, P. (2009). Board Networks and Merger Performance. Working 
Ppaper. 
Servaes, H. (1991). Tobin's Q and the Gains from Takeovers. The Journal of Finance, 46, 
409–419. 
Servaes, H. (1996). The Value of Diversification During the Conglomerate Merger 
Wave. The Journal of Finance, 51, 1201–1225. 
Shimizu, K., Hitt, M., Vaidyanath, D., & Pisano, V. (2004). Theoretical Foundations of 
Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions: A Review of Current Research and 
Recommendations for the Future. Journal of International Management, 10, 307–
353. 
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1997). A Survey of Corporate Governance. The Journal of 
Finance, 52, 737–783. 
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (2003). Stock Market Driven Acquisitions. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 70, 259-311. 
 87 
 
Shrum, W., Cheek, N., & Hunter, S. (1988). Friendship in School: Gender and Racial 
Homophily. Sociology of education, (61) 227-239. 
Stahl, G., & Vogit, A. (2008). Do Cultural Differences Matter in Mergers and 
Acquisitions? A Tentative Model and Examination. Organization Science, 19, 
160-176. 
Starks, L., & Wei, K. (2013). Cross-Border Mergers and Differences in Corporate 
Governance. International Review of Finance, forthcoming. 
Stulz, R. M. (1988). Managerial Control of Voting Rights . Journal of Financial 
Economics, 20, 25-54. 
Sung, H. (1993). The Effects of Overpayment and Form of Financing on Bidder Returns 
in Mergers and Tender Offers. Journal of Financial Research, 351-365. 
Travlos, N. G. (1987 ). Corporate Takeover Bids, Methods of Payment, and Bidding 
Firms' Stock Returns. The Journal of Finance, 42, 943–963. 
Tsui, A., Egan, T., & O'Reilly, C. (1992). Being Different: Relational Demography and 
Organizational Attachment. Administrative Science Quarterly, (37) 549-579. 
Wasserman, S., & Faust, K. (1994). Social Network Analysis in the Social and 
Behavioral Sciences. Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications, 1–27. 
Watson, W., Kumar, K., & Michaelsen, L. (1993). Cultural Diversity's Impact on 
Interaction Process and Performance: Comparing Homogeneous and Diverse Task 
Groups. Academy of Management Journal, (36) 590-602. 
Wiersema, M., & Bantel, K. (1992). Top Management Team Demography and Corporate 
Strategic Change. Academy of Management Journal, (35) 91-121. 
Woolcock, M., & Narayan, D. (2000). Social Capital: Implications for Development 
Theory, Research, and Policy. The World Bank Research Observe, 225-249. 
 
 
 
 
88 
T
a
b
le
 1
: 
D
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
 o
f 
sa
m
p
le
 f
ir
m
s 
an
d
 f
o
re
ig
n
 d
ir
ec
to
rs
 
T
ab
le
 1
 s
h
o
w
s 
so
m
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 w
it
h
 r
eg
ar
d
s 
to
 t
h
e 
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
 o
f 
sa
m
p
le
 f
ir
m
s 
an
d
 f
o
re
ig
n
 d
ir
ec
to
rs
. 
T
h
e 
u
n
it
 o
f 
o
b
se
rv
at
io
n
 i
s 
fi
rm
-y
ea
r.
 
P
an
el
 A
 s
h
o
w
s 
th
e 
an
n
u
al
 d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
 o
f 
sa
m
p
le
 f
ir
m
s 
b
ro
k
en
 d
o
w
n
 t
o
 t
h
e 
n
u
m
b
er
 (
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e)
 o
f 
fi
rm
s 
w
it
h
 n
o
 f
o
re
ig
n
 d
ir
ec
to
rs
, 
o
n
e 
fo
re
ig
n
 
d
ir
ec
to
r,
 a
n
d
 m
u
lt
ip
le
 f
o
re
ig
n
 d
ir
ec
to
rs
. 
P
an
el
 B
 s
h
o
w
s 
th
e 
co
u
n
tr
y
 d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
 o
f 
fi
rm
s 
in
 t
h
e 
sa
m
p
le
. 
P
an
el
 C
 s
h
o
w
s 
th
e 
in
d
u
st
ry
 d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
 
o
f 
fo
re
ig
n
 d
ir
ec
to
rs
. 
T
h
e 
in
d
u
st
ry
 d
ef
in
it
io
n
s 
co
m
e 
fr
o
m
 B
o
ar
d
E
x
. 
T
h
e 
v
ar
ia
b
le
 d
ef
in
it
io
n
s 
ar
e 
co
n
ta
in
ed
 i
n
 t
h
e 
ap
p
en
d
ix
. 
  
P
a
n
el
 A
: 
A
n
n
u
al
 d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
 o
f 
sa
m
p
le
 f
ir
m
s.
 
y
ea
r 
#
 o
f 
fi
r
m
s 
#
 (
%
) 
o
f 
fi
r
m
s 
w
it
h
 n
o
 f
o
re
ig
n
 
d
ir
ec
to
rs
 
#
 (
%
) 
o
f 
fi
r
m
s 
w
it
h
 o
n
e 
fo
re
ig
n
 
d
ir
ec
to
r
 
#
 (
%
) 
o
f 
fi
r
m
s 
w
it
h
 m
u
lt
ip
le
 f
o
re
ig
n
 
d
ir
ec
to
rs
 
1
9
9
3
 
3
1
7
0
 
2
5
2
1
 
(7
9
.5
2
6
8
%
) 
4
1
9
 
(1
3
.2
2
%
) 
2
3
0
 
(7
.2
5
6
%
) 
1
9
9
4
 
3
7
2
5
 
3
0
0
6
 
(8
0
.6
9
8
%
) 
4
5
9
 
(1
2
.3
2
%
) 
2
6
0
 
(6
.9
8
%
) 
1
9
9
5
 
4
1
5
9
 
3
3
3
9
 
(8
0
.2
8
3
7
%
) 
5
1
7
 
(1
2
.4
3
%
) 
3
0
3
 
(7
.2
8
5
%
) 
1
9
9
6
 
4
9
4
5
 
3
9
4
2
 
(7
9
.7
1
6
9
%
) 
6
3
2
 
(1
2
.7
8
%
) 
3
7
1
 
(7
.5
0
3
%
) 
1
9
9
7
 
5
6
3
4
 
4
4
5
2
 
(7
9
.0
2
0
2
%
) 
7
4
7
 
(1
3
.2
6
%
) 
4
3
5
 
(7
.7
2
1
%
) 
1
9
9
8
 
6
3
7
8
 
4
9
7
8
 
(7
8
.0
4
9
5
%
) 
8
7
5
 
(1
3
.7
2
%
) 
5
2
5
 
(8
.2
3
1
%
) 
1
9
9
9
 
6
8
7
4
 
5
2
9
3
 
(7
7
.0
0
0
3
%
) 
9
4
7
 
(1
3
.7
8
%
) 
6
3
4
 
(9
.2
2
3
%
) 
2
0
0
0
 
7
5
1
6
 
5
7
1
1
 
(7
5
.9
8
4
6
%
) 
1
0
3
4
 
(1
3
.7
6
%
) 
7
7
1
 
(1
0
.2
6
%
) 
2
0
0
1
 
8
1
4
7
 
6
1
3
0
 
(7
5
.2
4
2
4
%
) 
1
1
3
9
 
(1
3
.9
8
%
) 
8
7
8
 
(1
0
.7
8
%
) 
2
0
0
2
 
8
6
4
2
 
6
4
8
0
 
(7
4
.9
8
2
6
%
) 
1
1
9
9
 
(1
3
.8
7
%
) 
9
6
3
 
(1
1
.1
4
%
) 
2
0
0
3
 
9
1
7
6
 
6
8
5
7
 
(7
4
.7
2
7
6
%
) 
1
2
9
0
 
(1
4
.0
6
%
) 
1
0
2
9
 
(1
1
.2
1
%
) 
2
0
0
4
 
9
7
7
0
 
7
2
3
8
 
(7
4
.0
8
3
9
%
) 
1
4
2
8
 
(1
4
.6
2
%
) 
1
1
0
4
 
(1
1
.3
%
) 
2
0
0
5
 
1
0
4
0
5
 
7
5
7
5
 
(7
2
.8
0
1
5
%
) 
1
6
1
5
 
(1
5
.5
2
%
) 
1
2
1
5
 
(1
1
.6
8
%
) 
2
0
0
6
 
1
1
0
6
2
 
7
9
3
3
 
(7
1
.7
1
4
%
) 
1
7
5
6
 
(1
5
.8
7
%
) 
1
3
7
3
 
(1
2
.4
1
%
) 
2
0
0
7
 
1
1
4
7
1
 
8
1
6
3
 
(7
1
.1
6
2
1
%
) 
1
8
0
7
 
(1
5
.7
5
%
) 
1
5
0
1
 
(1
3
.0
9
%
) 
2
0
0
8
 
1
1
1
0
2
 
7
8
5
4
 
(7
0
.7
4
4
%
) 
1
7
4
2
 
(1
5
.6
9
%
) 
1
5
0
6
 
(1
3
.5
7
%
) 
2
0
0
9
 
1
0
7
0
2
 
7
5
3
8
 
(7
0
.4
3
5
4
%
) 
1
7
2
8
 
(1
6
.1
5
%
) 
1
4
3
6
 
(1
3
.4
2
%
) 
2
0
1
0
 
1
0
5
3
9
 
7
3
7
3
 
(6
9
.9
5
9
2
%
) 
1
7
0
3
 
(1
6
.1
6
%
) 
1
4
6
3
 
(1
3
.8
8
%
) 
2
0
1
1
 
1
0
2
8
9
 
7
1
2
6
 
(6
9
.2
5
8
4
%
) 
1
7
0
5
 
(1
6
.5
7
%
) 
1
4
5
8
 
(1
4
.1
7
%
) 
2
0
1
2
 
9
7
5
9
 
6
7
3
5
 
(6
9
.0
1
3
2
%
) 
1
6
1
1
 
(1
6
.5
1
%
) 
1
4
1
3
 
(1
4
.4
8
%
) 
T
o
ta
l 
1
6
3
4
6
5
 
1
2
0
2
4
4
 
  
2
4
3
5
3
 
  
1
8
8
6
8
 
1
6
3
4
6
5
 
 
 
 
 
 
89 
P
a
n
el
 B
: 
C
o
u
n
tr
y
 d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
 o
f 
fo
re
ig
n
 d
ir
ec
to
rs
 
C
o
u
n
tr
y
 o
f 
in
c
o
r
p
o
ra
ti
o
n
 
L
eg
a
l 
r
e
g
im
e
 
#
 (
%
) 
o
f 
fi
r
m
-y
e
a
r
s 
w
it
h
 o
n
e 
fd
 
#
 (
%
) 
o
f 
fi
r
m
-y
e
a
r
s 
w
it
h
 
m
u
lt
ip
le
 f
d
 
C
o
u
n
tr
y
 o
f 
in
c
o
r
p
o
ra
ti
o
n
 
L
eg
a
l 
r
e
g
im
e
 
#
 (
%
) 
o
f 
fi
r
m
-y
e
a
r
s 
w
it
h
 o
n
e 
fd
 
#
 (
%
) 
o
f 
fi
r
m
-y
e
a
r
s 
w
it
h
 
m
u
lt
ip
le
 f
d
 
A
rg
en
ti
n
a 
C
iv
il
 
6
3
 
(3
0
.7
3
%
) 
7
6
 
(3
7
.0
7
%
) 
G
ib
ra
lt
ar
 
C
o
m
m
o
n
 
5
 
(1
6
.1
3
%
) 
1
1
 
(3
5
.4
8
%
) 
A
u
st
ra
li
a 
C
o
m
m
o
n
 
1
3
2
1
 
(1
7
.6
6
%
) 
4
9
0
 
(6
.5
5
%
) 
G
re
ec
e 
C
iv
il
 
1
2
4
 
(1
9
.0
8
%
) 
9
9
 
(1
5
.2
3
%
) 
A
u
st
ri
a 
C
iv
il
 
2
1
4
 
(2
9
.8
5
%
) 
1
3
0
 
(1
8
.1
3
%
) 
G
u
er
n
se
y
 
C
iv
il
 
1
4
4
 
(2
6
.6
7
%
) 
2
9
0
 
(5
3
.7
%
) 
B
ah
am
as
 
C
o
m
m
o
n
 
7
 
(2
6
.9
2
%
) 
1
9
 
(7
3
.0
8
%
) 
H
o
n
g
 K
o
n
g
 
C
o
m
m
o
n
 
5
7
9
 
(1
6
.9
9
%
) 
5
6
1
 
(1
6
.4
6
%
) 
B
ar
b
ad
o
s 
C
o
m
m
o
n
 
0
 
(0
%
) 
8
 
(1
0
0
%
) 
H
u
n
g
ar
y
 
C
iv
il
 
4
 
(1
0
.2
6
%
) 
4
 
(1
0
.2
6
%
) 
B
el
g
iu
m
 
C
iv
il
 
2
9
1
 
(2
1
.7
5
%
) 
3
7
7
 
(2
8
.1
8
%
) 
Ic
el
an
d
 
C
iv
il
 
1
8
 
(2
0
.6
9
%
) 
2
2
 
(2
5
.2
9
%
) 
B
el
iz
e 
C
o
m
m
o
n
 
0
 
(0
%
) 
1
3
 
(1
0
0
%
) 
In
d
ia
 
C
o
m
m
o
n
 
3
3
2
 
(9
.4
3
%
) 
2
3
1
 
(6
.5
6
%
) 
B
er
m
u
d
a 
N
A
 
2
4
5
 
(2
4
.1
9
%
) 
6
7
2
 
(6
6
.3
4
%
) 
In
d
o
n
es
ia
 
C
iv
il
 
5
 
(1
1
.6
3
%
) 
3
 
(6
.9
8
%
) 
B
ra
zi
l 
C
iv
il
 
1
5
2
 
(1
1
.3
4
%
) 
1
8
4
 
(1
3
.7
3
%
) 
Is
le
 O
f 
M
an
 
N
A
 
9
9
 
(2
5
.4
5
%
) 
2
2
2
 
(5
7
.0
7
%
) 
B
u
lg
ar
ia
 
C
iv
il
 
6
 
(8
5
.7
1
%
) 
0
 
(0
%
) 
Is
ra
el
 
C
o
m
m
o
n
 
3
5
5
 
(3
1
.1
7
%
) 
1
6
3
 
(1
4
.3
1
%
) 
C
an
ad
a 
C
o
m
m
o
n
 
1
8
0
7
 
(2
4
.0
1
%
) 
1
2
8
8
 
(1
7
.1
1
%
) 
It
al
y
 
C
iv
il
 
4
4
8
 
(2
4
.5
9
%
) 
3
4
4
 
(1
8
.8
8
%
) 
C
ay
m
an
 I
sl
an
d
s 
N
A
 
4
6
 
(1
5
.1
8
%
) 
1
2
7
 
(4
1
.9
1
%
) 
Ja
p
an
 
C
iv
il
 
2
1
2
 
(1
3
.2
7
%
) 
1
1
2
 
(7
.0
1
%
) 
C
h
il
e 
C
iv
il
 
6
5
 
(2
8
.0
2
%
) 
3
4
 
(1
4
.6
6
%
) 
Je
rs
ey
 
B
o
th
 
1
2
9
 
(2
8
.0
4
%
) 
2
6
0
 
(5
6
.5
2
%
) 
C
h
in
a 
C
iv
il
 
4
5
6
 
(1
4
.0
1
%
) 
1
5
4
 
(4
.7
3
%
) 
K
az
ak
st
an
 
N
A
 
0
 
(0
%
) 
0
 
(0
%
) 
C
o
lo
m
b
ia
 
C
iv
il
 
1
 
(2
.1
3
%
) 
0
 
(0
%
) 
K
en
y
a
 
N
A
 
6
 
(2
1
.4
3
%
) 
5
 
(1
7
.8
6
%
) 
C
ro
at
ia
 
C
iv
il
 
8
 
(6
1
.5
4
%
) 
2
 
(1
5
.3
9
%
) 
K
o
re
a,
 R
ep
u
b
li
c 
O
f 
(S
o
u
th
 K
o
re
a)
 
N
A
 
7
3
 
(1
8
.3
9
%
) 
4
3
 
(1
0
.8
3
%
) 
C
y
p
ru
s 
C
o
m
m
o
n
 
1
0
 
(1
2
.3
5
%
) 
3
5
 
(4
3
.2
1
%
) 
L
ie
ch
te
n
st
ei
n
 
N
A
 
0
 
(0
%
) 
1
5
 
(3
7
.5
%
) 
C
ze
ch
 R
ep
u
b
li
c 
C
iv
il
 
0
 
(0
%
) 
2
9
 
(6
3
.0
4
%
) 
L
u
x
em
b
o
u
rg
 
C
iv
il
 
4
1
 
(1
0
.2
%
) 
3
2
4
 
(8
0
.6
%
) 
D
en
m
ar
k
 
C
iv
il
 
1
6
4
 
(2
4
.0
8
%
) 
1
4
2
 
(2
0
.8
5
%
) 
M
ac
au
 
C
iv
il
 
0
 
(0
%
) 
0
 
(0
%
) 
E
g
y
p
t 
C
iv
il
 
1
5
 
(2
3
.0
8
%
) 
2
9
 
(4
4
.6
2
%
) 
M
al
ay
si
a 
C
o
m
m
o
n
 
1
0
4
 
(2
1
.2
7
%
) 
1
9
 
(3
.8
9
%
) 
F
al
k
la
n
d
 I
sl
an
d
s 
N
A
 
3
 
(2
7
.2
7
%
) 
8
 
(7
2
.7
3
%
) 
M
al
ta
 
B
o
th
 
5
 
(2
7
.7
8
%
) 
1
3
 
(7
2
.2
2
%
) 
F
ar
o
e 
Is
la
n
d
s 
N
A
 
2
 
(1
8
.1
8
%
) 
0
 
(0
%
) 
M
au
ri
ti
u
s 
B
o
th
 
1
4
 
(5
8
.3
3
%
) 
1
 
(4
.1
7
%
) 
F
in
la
n
d
 
C
iv
il
 
1
6
1
 
(1
8
.5
9
%
) 
1
7
2
 
(1
9
.8
6
%
) 
M
ex
ic
o
 
C
iv
il
 
8
9
 
(1
2
.3
8
%
) 
3
1
3
 
(4
3
.5
3
%
) 
F
ra
n
ce
 
C
iv
il
 
8
6
5
 
(1
6
.8
4
%
) 
1
1
8
4
 
(2
3
.0
4
%
) 
M
o
n
ac
o
 
C
iv
il
 
1
4
 
(6
0
.8
7
%
) 
3
 
(1
3
.0
4
%
) 
G
ab
o
n
 
C
iv
il
 
3
 
(1
5
%
) 
1
2
 
(6
0
%
) 
M
o
n
g
o
li
a 
C
iv
il
 
3
 
(1
0
0
%
) 
0
 
(0
%
) 
G
er
m
an
y
 
C
iv
il
 
7
1
5
 
(2
0
.4
4
%
) 
8
6
4
 
(2
4
.7
%
) 
M
o
ro
cc
o
 
C
iv
il
 
1
3
 
(3
2
.5
%
) 
2
5
 
(6
2
.5
%
) 
C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
 i
n
 n
ex
t 
p
ag
e 
 
 
 
 
90 
C
o
u
n
tr
y
 o
f 
in
c
o
r
p
o
ra
ti
o
n
 
L
eg
a
l 
r
e
g
im
e
 
#
 (
%
) 
o
f 
fi
r
m
-y
e
a
r
s 
w
it
h
 o
n
e 
fd
 
#
 (
%
) 
o
f 
fi
r
m
-y
e
a
r
s 
w
it
h
 
m
u
lt
ip
le
 f
d
 
C
o
u
n
tr
y
 o
f 
in
c
o
r
p
o
ra
ti
o
n
 
L
eg
a
l 
re
g
im
e
 
#
 (
%
) 
o
f 
fi
r
m
-y
e
a
r
s 
w
it
h
 o
n
e
 
fd
 
#
 (
%
) 
o
f 
fi
r
m
-y
e
a
r
s 
w
it
h
 m
u
lt
ip
le
 f
d
 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s 
C
iv
il
 
3
6
2
 
(2
1
.3
4
%
) 
6
7
0
 
(3
9
.5
1
%
) 
T
u
rk
ey
 
C
iv
il
 
1
5
 
(7
.8
1
%
) 
4
0
 
(2
0
.8
3
%
) 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s 
A
n
ti
ll
es
 
C
iv
il
 
4
 
(6
.3
5
%
) 
5
9
 
(9
3
.6
5
%
) 
U
n
it
ed
 A
ra
b
 
E
m
ir
at
es
 
C
iv
il
 
1
2
 
(1
2
.1
2
%
) 
4
9
 
(4
9
.5
%
) 
N
ew
 Z
ea
la
n
d
 
C
o
m
m
o
n
 
4
9
 
(2
3
.1
1
%
) 
3
2
 
(1
5
.0
9
%
) 
U
K
 
C
o
m
m
o
n
 
3
4
1
7
 
(1
5
.8
7
%
) 
2
6
0
7
 
(1
2
.1
1
%
) 
N
ig
er
ia
 
C
o
m
m
o
n
 
6
 
(1
0
.3
5
%
) 
9
 
(1
5
.5
2
%
) 
U
K
- 
N
 I
re
la
n
d
  
C
o
m
m
o
n
 
1
0
 
(2
3
.2
6
%
) 
6
 
(1
3
.9
5
%
) 
N
o
rw
a
y
 
C
iv
il
 
2
2
6
 
(1
6
.9
4
%
) 
1
7
5
 
(1
3
.1
2
%
) 
U
K
 -
 S
co
tl
an
d
 
B
o
th
 
1
7
6
 
(1
1
.3
9
%
) 
1
3
4
 
(8
.6
7
%
) 
P
an
am
a 
N
A
 
1
1
 
(8
4
.6
2
%
) 
0
 
(0
%
) 
U
K
 -
 W
al
es
 
C
o
m
m
o
n
 
3
8
 
(1
6
.2
4
%
) 
2
7
 
(1
1
.5
4
%
) 
P
ap
u
a 
N
ew
 G
u
in
ea
 
N
A
 
2
3
 
(2
9
.8
7
%
) 
3
6
 
(4
6
.7
5
%
) 
U
n
it
ed
 S
ta
te
s 
C
o
m
m
o
n
 
7
8
4
5
 
(1
0
.7
8
%
) 
2
3
8
0
 
(3
.2
7
%
) 
P
er
u
 
C
iv
il
 
2
 
(1
3
.3
3
%
) 
4
 
(2
6
.6
7
%
) 
U
ru
g
u
ay
 
C
iv
il
 
7
 
(7
0
%
) 
3
 
(3
0
%
) 
P
h
il
ip
p
in
es
 
N
A
 
7
 
(1
8
.9
2
%
) 
0
 
(0
%
) 
V
ie
tn
am
 
C
iv
il
 
2
 
(2
8
.5
7
%
) 
0
 
(0
%
) 
P
o
la
n
d
 
C
iv
il
 
3
8
 
(1
5
.3
2
%
) 
9
2
 
(3
7
.1
%
) 
V
ir
g
in
 I
sl
an
d
s 
C
o
m
m
o
n
 
5
1
 
(3
6
.1
7
%
) 
2
4
 
(1
7
.0
2
%
) 
P
o
rt
u
g
al
 
C
iv
il
 
9
6
 
(2
1
.5
7
%
) 
1
1
5
 
(2
5
.8
4
%
) 
Z
am
b
ia
 
N
A
 
0
 
(0
%
) 
8
 
(1
0
0
%
) 
P
u
er
to
 R
ic
o
 
N
A
 
9
 
(1
0
.7
1
%
) 
3
5
 
(4
1
.6
7
%
) 
  
  
  
 
 
 
R
ep
u
b
li
c 
O
f 
Ir
el
an
d
 
C
o
m
m
o
n
 
2
9
8
 
(2
4
.7
3
%
) 
5
2
6
 
(4
3
.6
5
%
) 
L
e
g
al
 R
e
g
im
e
 
#
 o
f 
fi
rm
-
y
ea
rs
 w
it
h
 
fd
 
p
er
ce
n
t 
o
f 
  
le
g
al
 r
eg
im
e
 
 
 
 
R
o
m
an
ia
 
C
iv
il
 
1
 
(8
.3
3
%
) 
1
1
 
(9
1
.6
7
%
) 
C
o
m
m
o
n
 
2
5
3
9
0
 
2
0
.7
9
%
 
 
 
 
R
u
ss
ia
n
 F
ed
er
at
io
n
 
C
iv
il
 
8
6
 
(2
2
.6
3
%
) 
7
3
 
(1
9
.2
1
%
) 
C
iv
il
 
1
4
4
8
1
 
4
2
.1
2
%
 
 
 
 
R
éu
n
io
n
 
N
A
 
0
 
(0
%
) 
3
 
(1
0
0
%
) 
C
h
i-
sq
u
ar
e 
te
st
 
fo
r 
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
 
  
6
4
2
8
*
*
*
 
 
 
 
S
au
d
i 
A
ra
b
ia
 
N
A
 
0
 
(0
%
) 
0
 
(0
%
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S
in
g
ap
o
re
 
C
o
m
m
o
n
 
4
2
2
 
(1
9
.2
4
%
) 
2
8
5
 
(1
3
%
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S
lo
v
en
ia
 
C
iv
il
 
0
 
(0
%
) 
0
 
(0
%
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S
o
u
th
 A
fr
ic
a 
B
o
th
 
5
6
6
 
(2
2
.7
8
%
) 
3
5
0
 
(1
4
.0
9
%
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S
p
ai
n
 
C
iv
il
 
2
6
5
 
(1
6
.5
%
) 
3
2
1
 
(1
9
.9
9
%
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S
w
ed
en
 
C
iv
il
 
4
9
5
 
(1
8
.2
5
%
) 
6
0
4
 
(2
2
.2
6
%
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S
w
it
ze
rl
an
d
 
C
iv
il
 
3
4
8
 
(1
8
.6
1
%
) 
1
0
3
8
 
(5
5
.5
1
%
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
ai
w
an
, 
P
ro
v
in
ce
 O
f 
C
h
in
a 
C
iv
il
 
2
6
 
(1
1
.3
5
%
) 
2
0
 
(8
.7
3
%
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
an
za
n
ia
, 
U
n
it
ed
 
R
ep
u
b
li
c 
O
f 
N
A
 
4
 
(4
4
.4
4
%
) 
0
 
(0
%
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
h
ai
la
n
d
 
B
o
th
 
0
 
(0
%
) 
0
 
(0
%
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
91 
 
 
Panel C: Industry distribution of foreign directors 
Sector Name # (%) of firm-years with one fd # (%) of firm-years with multiple fd 
Aerospace & Defense 175 (16.11%) 97 (8.93%) 
Automobiles & Parts 337 (15.27%) 360 (16.31%) 
Banks and Financial Services 5191 (22.62%) 4559 (17.08%) 
Construction & Building Materials 1914 (16.37%) 1248 (12.06%) 
Diversified Industrials 680 (18.62%) 731 (20.02%) 
Electricity, Electronic Equipment 1681 (30.85%) 845 (22.71%) 
Food, Drug Retailers & Processors 1128 (31.19%) 1063 (26.44%) 
General Retailers 800 (12.48%) 503 (7.04%) 
Health & Household Products 1875 (28.57%) 986 (12.66%) 
Leisure & Hotels 563 (14.04%) 448 (11.17%) 
Media & Entertainment 877 (17.65%) 919 (18.49%) 
Oil, Gas, Mining & Renewable Energy 3031 (16.43%) 2301 (14.19%) 
Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology 1919 (18.25%) 1538 (13.97%) 
Software & Computer Services 2023 (14.82%) 1186 (7.57%) 
Steel & Other Metals 304 (14.43%) 288 (13.68%) 
Telecommunication Services 604 (15.05%) 815 (20.3%) 
Tobacco 66 (26.4%) 67 (26.8%) 
Transport 830 (14.19%) 690 (11.79%) 
Utilities 235 (9.2%) 194 (7.59%) 
Wholesale Trade 120 (13.64%) 30 (3.41%) 
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Panel B: Foreign director’s role on boards 
Role # of director-firm-years with fd % of director-firm-years with fd 
CEO 3516 14.53% 
chairman 7397 15.02% 
chairman/CEO 1094 7.88% 
Independent 35807 12.15% 
Acquisition committee 65 11.34% 
Auditing committee 14810 12.44% 
Compensation committee 6684 9.19% 
Nomination committee 5461 20.85% 
 
Panel C: Incidence of foreign directors  
# of fd on a firm's board # of firm-year obs % of sample 
0 120244 (73.56%) 
1 24353 (14.9%) 
2 8809 (5.39%) 
3 4154 (2.54%) 
> 3 5905 (3.6%) 
 
Panel D: Multiple boarding by foreign directors 
# of board seats per director # of director-firm-year obs % of sample 
1 57323 81.83% 
2 9239 13.19% 
3 2286 3.26% 
> 3 1206 1.72% 
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Table 3: Sample firm and merger characteristics 
This table shows some univariate analyses of some variables for firms with and without foreign directors. 
Panels A and B compares the means of some variables between firms with no foreign directors and firms 
with one director or firms with multiple foreign directors respectively. Panels C and D compare some 
M&A variables between firms with no foreign directors and firms with one or multiple foreign directors 
respectively. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. The 
variable definitions are in the appendix.  
Panel A: Comparative firm characteristics, one foreign director  
Variable Firms with one fd firms with no fd Test statistic 
Assets 11798740 4937290 14.56*** 
Market value of equity 4743752 1906578 24.37*** 
Debt / Assets 0.9504 0.5758 1.08 
ROA -1.2328 -0.6689 -1.04 
Board Size 7.7734 6.1966 55.16*** 
Foreign Assets 0.000304 0.000215 1.46 
Foreign Sales 0.00044 0.0004 0.85 
Book Value of equity 2012546 887605 21.06*** 
Tobin's Q 2.6539 2.4261 0.39 
Cash 0.0223 0.1906 -1 
Board Independence 0.4746 0.5745 -28.5*** 
 
Panel B: Comparative firm characteristics, multiple foreign directors 
Variable Firms with multiple fd firms with no fd Test statistic 
Assets 40520120 4937290 26.2*** 
Market value of equity 10877648 1906578 43.45*** 
Debt / Assets 0.5682 0.5758 0.86 
ROA 2.8285 -0.6689 7.44*** 
Board Size 10.5775 6.1966 108.89*** 
Foreign Assets 0.00155 0.000215 1.02 
Foreign Sales 0.000429 0.0004 0.26 
Book Value of equity 4960816 887605 40.47*** 
Tobin's Q 2.2235 2.4261 0.66 
Cash 0.1736 0.1906 -2.25** 
Board Independence 0.3864 0.5745 -49.23*** 
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Panel C: Comparative merger characteristics, one foreign director 
Variable Firms with one fd firms with no fd Test statistic 
Merger 0.2963 0.2326 21.26*** 
Cross-border merger 0.4309 0.2456 30.76*** 
Cash payment 0.000153 0.000149 0.06 
Hostile merger 0.00554 0.00441 1.25 
Purchase price 0.209 0.357 -1.92* 
Private target 0.386 0.4535 -11.05*** 
% of shares acquired 81.7975 87.941 -14.34*** 
Diversifying merger 0.4646 0.4628 0.29 
 
Panel D: Comparative merger characteristics, multiple foreign directors 
Variable Firms with multiple fd firms with no fd Test statistic 
Merger 0.3528 0.2326 35.22*** 
Cross-border merger 0.6701 0.2456 72.48*** 
Cash payment 0.000048 0.000149 -6.28*** 
Hostile merger 0.00766 0.00441 3.08*** 
Purchase price 0.098 0.357 -5.93*** 
Private target 0.3047 0.4535 -25.08*** 
% of shares acquired 74.3513 87.941 -28.24*** 
Diversifying merger 0.4886 0.4628 4.09*** 
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Table 4: The effect of foreign directors on cross-border mergers 
This table shows the results of testing hypothesis H1.1. The unit of observation is firm-year observation. 
Panel A reports the results of a Poisson regression where the dependent variable is the number of cross-
border mergers a firm commits to in a year. Panel B reports the results of an OLS regression where the 
dependent variable is the dollar volume a firm puts into cross-border mergers. Panel C reports the results 
of a Logit regression where the dependent variable is one if a firm commits to a cross-border merger in a 
particular year and zero otherwise. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
respectively. P-values are reported in parenthesis. The variable definitions are in the appendix.  
Panel A: Poisson analysis of cross-border mergers 
                                       ∑       
 
   
        
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FD 0.7086*** 
     
 
(<.0001) 
     FDt-1 
 
0.7037*** 
    
  
(<.0001) 
    FDt-2 
  
0.7067*** 
   
   
(<.0001) 
   #FD 
   
0.1387*** 
  
    
(<.0001) 
  %FD on board 
    
1.5057*** 
 
     
(<.0001) 
 FID 
     
0.6727*** 
      
(<.0001) 
Log(Assets)t-1 0.3509 0.3501 0.3493 0.3552 0.3505 0.3516 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
ROAt-1 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0012 0.0011 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Board Sizet-1 -0.025 -0.0241 -0.0235 -0.0293 -0.0056 -0.0197 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Board Independence -0.2947 -0.2961 -0.297 -0.3165 -0.2969 -0.445 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Duality -0.0405 -0.0421 -0.0454 -0.0202 -0.0252 -0.0353 
 
(0.0140) (0.0106) (0.0059) ( 0.2185) (0.1251) (0.0325) 
Foreign Assetst-1 0.0007 0.0007 0.0008 0.0007 0.0007 0.0008 
 
(0.0042) (0.0025) (<.0001)  (0.0005) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Foreign Salest-1 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0005 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Intercept -6.7843 -6.7821 -6.7712 -6.6355 -6.8078 -6.6473 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
       N 98708 98708 98708 98708 98708 98708 
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered St errors at the country level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Panel B: OLS analysis of cross-border mergers 
                                    ∑       
 
   
        
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FD 83.1529*** 
     
 
(0.003) 
     
FDt-1 
 
85.2543*** 
    
  
(0.0034) 
    
FDt-2 
  
80.0515** 
   
   
(0.0107) 
   
#FD 
   
77.1782** 
  
    
(0.0387) 
  
%FD on board 
    
689.4951*** 
 
     
(<.0001) 
 
FID 
     
27.2008 
      
(0.5768) 
Log(Assets)t-1 151.9013 151.6766 151.7733 147.7255 146.8098 153.4531 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (<.0001) 
ROAt-1 -0.0158 -0.01 -0.0136 0.0878 0.0828 -0.0313 
 
( 0.9862) (0.9912) (0.9880) (0.9268) (0.9295) (0.9721) 
Board Sizet-1 28.567 28.6392 28.864 21.9921 30.407 30.2521 
 
(0.0003) (.0003) (.0004) (0.0006) (<.0001) (0.0001) 
Board Independence 97.3626 97.2628 96.9636 100.3892 101.1287 91.3612 
 
(.15) (.152) (.1526) (0.112) (0.1055) (0.1516) 
Duality 63.005 62.7803 62.6855 65.5240 66.1847 62.5891 
 
(0.022) (0.0221) (0.0229) ( 0.0187) (0.0177) (0.023) 
Foreign Assetst-1 -0.5486 -0.5472 -0.5099 -1.5651 -1.4577 -0.2239 
 
(0.62) (0.6257) (.6685)  (0.0231) (0.1225) (0.8245) 
Foreign Salest-1 -0.2608 -0.2613 -0.2605 -0.3024 -0.2955 -0.248 
 
(.268) (.267) (0.2687) (0.2276) (0.2133) (0.2968) 
Intercept -2281.33 -2279.7 -2281.27 -2175.29 -2232.52 -2300.15 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
       
adj-R square 0.02536 0.02537 0.02535 0.02673 0.02659 0.02522 
N 28347 28347 28347 28347 28347 28347 
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered St errors at the country level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Panel C: Logit analysis of cross-border mergers 
                 |                             ∑       
 
   
          
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FD 0.6286*** 
     
 
(<.0001) 
     
FDt-1 
 
0.6009*** 
    
  
(<.0001) 
    
FDt-2 
  
0.5896*** 
   
   
(<.0001) 
   
#FD 
   
0.1459*** 
  
    
( <.0001) 
  
%FD on board 
    
1.4019*** 
 
     
(<.0001) 
 
FID 
     
0.5515*** 
      
( <.0001) 
Log(Assets)t-1 0.261 0.2606 0.2607 0.2641 0.2616 0.2624 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) ( <.0001) (<.0001) ( <.0001) 
ROAt-1 0.00349 0.00352 0.00353 0.00356 0.00362 0.00336 
 
( 0.1215) (0.1164) (0.1139) ( 0.1148) (0.1098) ( 0.1345) 
Board Sizet-1 -0.00468 -0.00297 0.00202 -0.00766 0.0119 0.00259 
 
(0.5052) (.6751) (0.7746) ( 0.2773) (0.0862) ( 0.7158) 
Board Independence -0.1266 -0.1284 -0.1296 -0.1432 -0.1316 -0.2486 
 
(.1168) (.1179) (0.1170) ( 0.0602) (0.0903) ( 0.0008) 
Duality 0.00833 0.00739 0.00453 0.0113 0.0135 0.00675 
 
(0.8823) (0.8967) (0.9372) ( 0.8567) (0.8299) ( 0.9063) 
Foreign Assetst-1 0.0098 0.0099 0.00992 0.0100 0.0099 0.0104 
 
(0.0138) (0.0134) (0.0136) ( 0.0139) (0.0144) ( 0.0112) 
Foreign Salest-1 0.007 0.00707 0.00713 0.00715 0.00713 0.00731 
 
(.1451) (.1455) (0.1474) ( 0.1778) (0.1599) ( 0.1679) 
Intercept -7.4081 -7.4092 -7.3875 -7.323 -7.4574 -7.3281 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) ( <.0001) (<.0001) ( <.0001) 
       
Pseudo-R square 0.1860 0.1851  0.1847  0.1836 0.1842 0.1823 
N 98708 98708 98708 98708 98708 98708 
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered St errors at the country level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 6: Foreign directors and diversifying merger activity 
This table tests hypothesis H1.2. Panel A reports the averages of the specified variables. Diversifying 
cross-border merger is a binary variable which takes the value of one if the cross-border merger is a 
diversifying merger and zero otherwise. Number of diversified mergers is the number of diversified cross-
border mergers a firm in my sample commits to in a given year. Volume of diversified mergers is the 
dollar amount spent on diversified mergers in a given year. Panel B reports the logit model where the 
dependent variable is Diversifying cross-border merger. Panel C reports the Poisson regression model 
where the dependent variable is Number of diversified mergers. Panel D reports OLS estimates where the 
dependent variable is Volume of diversified mergers. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels respectively. P-values are reported in parenthesis. The variable definitions are in the 
appendix. 
 
Panel A: Diversifying mergers and foreign directors 
 
Firms with foreign 
directors 
firms with no foreign 
directors 
Test 
statistics 
Diversifying cross-border merger 0.2849 0.3118 -3.65*** 
Number of diversified mergers 0.6918 0.5788 6.09*** 
Volume of diversified mergers 84.5289 46.5055 3.02*** 
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Panel B: Logit analysis of diversifying mergers 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FD -0.1017** 
     
 
(0.0283) 
     FDt-1 
 
-0.0792* 
    
  
(0.0863) 
    FDt-1 
  
-0.1089** 
   
   
(0.0175) 
   #FD 
   
-0.00729 
  
    
(0.5099) 
  %FD on board 
    
-0.0728 
 
     
(0.4878) 
 FID 
     
-0.0939** 
      
(0.0441) 
Log(Assets)t-1 0.0664 0.0659 0.0673 0.0645 0.0645 0.0671 
 
(<.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) 
ROAt-1 -0.00446 -0.00447 -0.00447 -0.00445 -0.00445 -0.0044 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0033) 
Board Sizet-1 -0.0229 -0.0236 -0.0231 -0.0243 -0.0255 -0.0245 
 
(<.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) 
Duality 0.0337 0.0337 0.034 0.0337 0.0335 0.0344 
 
(0.0202) (0.0202) (0.0192) (0.0202) (0.0209) (0.0177) 
Foreign Salest-1 0.00103 0.00101 0.00104 0.000992 0.000987 0.00103 
 
(0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0021) 
Previous Cross Border Acquirer -0.0527 -0.0535 -0.0496 -0.0603 -0.0597 -0.0557 
 
(0.3581) (0.3513) (0.3882) (0.2922) (0.297) (0.3311) 
Intercept -1.3786 -1.376 -1.3919 -1.3725 -1.3629 -1.3971 
 
(<.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) 
       Pseudo -R square 0.0956 0.0954 0.0957 0.0952 0.0952 0.0952 
N 12199 12199 12199 12199 12199 12199 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered St errors at the country level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
105 
 
 
Panel C: Poisson analysis of diversifying mergers 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FD -0.071*** 
     
 
(0.0062) 
     
FDt-1 
 
-0.0519** 
    
  
(0.0436) 
    
FDt-1 
  
-0.0604** 
   
   
(0.018) 
   
#FD 
   
0.025*** 
  
    
( <.0001) 
  
%FD on board 
    
0.2379*** 
 
     
(  <.0001) 
 
FID 
     
-0.0248 
      
(0.3208) 
Log(Assets)t-1 0.1867 0.1864 0.1867 0.1802 0.1811 0.1861 
 
( <.0001) ( <.0001) (<.0001) ( <.0001) (  <.0001) ( <.0001) 
ROAt-1 -0.0037 -0.0037 -0.0037 -0.0036 -0.0037 -0.0037 
 
( <.0001) ( <.0001) (<.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) ( <.0001) 
Board Sizet-1 -0.0179 -0.0185 -0.0184 -0.0239 -0.0197 -0.0195 
 
( <.0001) ( <.0001) (<.0001) ( <.0001) (  <.0001) ( <.0001) 
Duality 0.0765 0.0765 0.0766 0.0743 0.0753 0.0765 
 
( <.0001) ( <.0001) (<.0001) ( <.0001) (  <.0001) ( <.0001) 
Foreign Salest-1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
(0.804) (0.8016) (0.8057) (0.6351) (0.7568) (0.8272) 
Previous Cross Border Acquirer 0.4029 0.4017 0.4035 0.39 0.3877 0.3977 
 
( <.0001) ( <.0001) (<.0001) ( <.0001) (  <.0001) ( <.0001) 
Intercept -2.7428 -2.7333 -2.7417 -2.5893 -2.6239 -2.7195 
 
( <.0001) ( <.0001) (<.0001) ( <.0001) (  <.0001) ( <.0001) 
       
N 12199 12199 12199 12199 12199 12199 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered St errors at the country level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Panel D: OLS analysis of diversifying mergers 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FD -10.2612 
     
 
(0.1266) 
     FDt-1 
 
-23.1349 
    
  
(0.2276) 
    FDt-1 
  
-19.1998 
   
   
(0.2898) 
   #FD 
   
5.74418 
  
    
(0.1674) 
  %FD on board 
    
10.21187 
 
     
(0.5296) 
 FID 
     
-15.7362 
      
(0.3607) 
Log(Assets)t-1 27.23421 27.77097 27.67168 25.65364 26.64827 27.56499 
 
(<.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) (<.0001) 
ROAt-1 -0.32267 -0.33168 -0.32866 -0.29241 -0.31381 -0.31556 
 
(0.2029) (0.205) (0.2078) (0.2111) (0.2055) (0.2105) 
Board Sizet-1 5.23258 5.47621 5.36476 4.22472 5.02667 5.14679 
 
(0.0907) (0.0774) (0.084) (0.1426) (0.0964) (0.0904) 
Duality -0.08527 -0.08207 -0.08287 -0.09667 -0.08915 -0.08323 
 
(0.1097) (0.1149) (0.1112) (0.0901) (0.0993) (0.1173) 
Foreign Salest-1 -10.8545 -9.37059 -9.55557 -13.0981 -12.051 -10.3146 
 
(0.0109) (0.0556) (0.0552) (0.0042) (0.0067) (0.0238) 
Previous Cross Border Acquirer -322.269 -332.269 -330.509 -291.754 -311.87 -327.558 
 
(0.0007) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
       adj-R square 0.009401 0.009502 0.009464 0.009521 0.009382 0.009435 
N 12199 12199 12199 12199 12199 12199 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered St errors at the country level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 7: Foreign directors and merger negotiations 
This table tests hypothesis H1.3. Panel A reports the averages of the specified variables. Friendly cross-
border merger is a binary variable which takes the value of one if the cross-border merger is a friendly 
merger and zero otherwise. Number of friendly mergers is the number of friendly cross-border mergers a 
firm in my sample commits to in a given year. Volume of friendly mergers is the dollar amount spent on 
friendly mergers in a given year. Panel B reports the logit model where the dependent variable is friendly 
cross-border merger. Panel C reports the Poisson regression model where the dependent variable is 
Number of friendly mergers. Panel D reports OLS estimates where the dependent variable is Volume of 
friendly mergers. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. P-
values are reported in parenthesis. The variable definitions are in the appendix. 
 
Panel A: Foreign directors and the incidence of friendly mergers  
 
 
Firms with foreign 
directors 
firms with no foreign 
directors 
Test 
statistics 
friendly cross-border merger 0.9035 0.9363 -7.47*** 
Number of friendly mergers 2.0015 1.5712 18.25*** 
Volume of friendly mergers 458.1 148.7 8.7*** 
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Panel B: Logit analysis of merger negotiations 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FD -0.0934 
     
 
(0.2253) 
     
FDt-1 
 
-0.0493 
    
  
(0.6032) 
    
FDt-2 
  
-0.0885 
   
   
(0.35) 
   
#FD 
   
-0.0206 
  
    
(0.3021) 
  
%FD on board 
    
-0.028 
 
     
(0.8947) 
 
FID 
     
-0.0634 
      
(0.5091) 
Log(Assets)t-1 -0.1968 -0.0441 -0.043 -0.0427 -0.0448 -0.0433 
 
(  <.0001) (0.0505) (0.0572) (0.0578) (0.047) (0.0554) 
ROAt-1 -0.00094 0.000934 0.000858 0.000906 0.000957 0.000978 
 
(0.7767) (0.7906) (0.8074) (0.7962) (0.7854) (0.7801) 
Board Sizet-1 0.00446 -0.00238 -0.00175 -0.00067 -0.0034 -0.00273 
 
(0.4975) (0.759) (0.8211) (0.9338) (0.6563) (0.722) 
Board Independence 0.3245 0.1491 0.1524 0.1541 0.1476 0.1692 
 
(  <.0001) (0.0992) (0.092) (0.0886) (0.1025) (0.0749) 
Duality -0.0473 -0.0257 -0.0251 -0.0245 -0.0262 -0.0259 
 
(0.0217) (0.3119) (0.3236) (0.3333) (0.3025) (0.3079) 
Foreign Salest-1 0.000678 0.000993 0.001 0.00105 0.000991 0.00102 
 
(0.2064) (0.1157) (0.1179) (0.1051) (0.113) (0.1089) 
Diversified Cross Border merger -0.0857 -33.6567 -33.6183 -33.0958 -33.618 -33.3625 
 
(0.2421) (0.0148) (0.0149) (0.0161) (0.015) (0.0156) 
Private target 0.7112 0.0342 0.0342 0.0342 0.0342 0.0342 
 
(  <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) (  <.0001) ( <.0001) (<.0001) 
Intercept 5.1019 0.9984 0.9897 0.9577 0.9999 0.9682 
 
(  <.0001) (0.0037) (0.004) (0.0056) (0.0036) (0.0053) 
       
Pseudo -R square 0.0693 0.2829 0.2831 0.2831 0.2829 0.283 
N 12204 12204 12204 12204 12204 12204 
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Panel C: Poisson analysis of merger negotiations 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FD 0.0665*** 
     
 
(  <.0001) 
     FDt-1 
 
0.0743*** 
    
  
( <.0001) 
    FDt-2 
  
0.074*** 
   
   
( <.0001) 
   #FD 
   
0.0286*** 
  
    
( <.0001) 
  %FD on board 
    
0.3058*** 
 
     
( <.0001) 
 FID 
     
0.0614*** 
      
( <.0001) 
Log(Assets)t-1 0.0739 0.0735 0.0732 0.0692 0.0693 0.0732 
 
(  <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) 
ROAt-1 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0011 -0.0012 -0.0013 
 
(0.0206) (0.0218) (0.0223) (0.0387) (0.0335) (0.0176) 
Board Sizet-1 -0.0024 -0.0024 -0.0023 -0.005 -0.0002 -0.0014 
 
(0.113) (0.1044) (0.1231) (0.001) (0.8662) (0.3446) 
Duality 0.0421 0.042 0.0419 0.0406 0.0414 0.0417 
 
(  <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) 
Foreign Salest-1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
(0.4483) (0.4578) (0.4656) (0.7041) (0.5759) (0.5036) 
Previous Cross Border Acquirer 0.4032 0.4013 0.4005 0.4035 0.4002 0.4053 
 
(  <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) 
Intercept -0.7978 -0.7894 -0.7854 -0.7046 -0.7263 -0.7944 
 
(  <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) 
       
       N 12204 12204 12204 12204 12204 12204 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered St errors at the country level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Panel D: OLS analysis of merger negotiations 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FD 76.5999** 
     
 
(0.0121) 
     FDt-1 
 
56.0272 
    
  
(0.1541) 
    FDt-2 
  
65.2848 
   
   
(0.113) 
   #FD 
   
75.8913** 
  
    
(0.0159) 
  %FD on board 
    
542.5729*** 
 
     
(0.0055) 
 FID 
     
94.8087 
      
(0.2402) 
Log(Assets)t-1 84.9523 85.5444 84.9753 71.4909 76.1802 83.3366 
 
( <.0001) ( <.0001) (  <.0001) (0.0002) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) 
ROAt-1 1.6464 1.643 1.6446 1.9181 1.8031 1.5911 
 
(0.3105) (0.3115) (0.3085) (0.2663) (0.2858) (0.3183) 
Board Sizet-1 23.8392 24.3896 24.3218 15.3625 26.5679 24.8209 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0039) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) 
Duality -22.788 -22.8029 -22.9142 -26.4921 -23.815 -23.5459 
 
(0.2234) (0.2251) (0.2231) (0.1824) (0.2133) (0.2088) 
Foreign Salest-1 -0.0889 -0.0838 -0.087 -0.1872 -0.1372 -0.0996 
 
(0.2101) (0.2375) (0.2289) (0.1103) (0.1526) (0.2385) 
Previous Cross Border Acquirer -48.7444 -47.599 -49.1517 -49.1517 -57.6811 -48.2881 
 
(0.0301) (0.0293) (0.0218) (0.0015) (0.0034) (0.0187) 
Intercept -1378.59 -1393.07 -1381.91 -1098.72 -1234.7 -1361.91 
 
( <.0001) ( <.0001) (  <.0001) (0.0009) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) 
       adj R squared 0.02663 0.02655 0.02659 0.02953 0.02809 0.02672 
N 12204 12204 12204 12204 12204 12204 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered St errors at the country level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Panel E: Balanced logit analysis 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FD 0.4152* 
     
 
(0.0631) 
     FDt-1 
 
0.4602** 
    
  
(0.0415) 
    FDt-2 
  
0.1439 
   
   
(0.5204) 
   #FD 
   
0.0372 
  
    
(0.4925) 
  %FD on board 
    
0.408 
 
     
(0.4504) 
 FID 
     
-0.7394*** 
      
(0.0012) 
Log(Assets)t-1 0.0481 0.0486 0.055 0.0513 0.0555 0.0879 
 
(0.3691) (0.3646) (0.2983) (0.3338) (0.2867) (0.092) 
ROAt-1 0.000546 0.000606 0.000149 0.000267 0.000215 -0.00131 
 
(0.8698) (0.8557) (0.964) (0.9354) (0.9478) (0.6872) 
Board Independence -0.142 -0.14 -0.1123 -0.1124 -0.1092 0.1071 
 
(0.5455) (0.5523) (0.632) (0.6302) (0.6379) (0.6585) 
Duality -0.0286 -0.0305 -0.0238 -0.023 -0.0218 -0.0362 
 
(0.7145) (0.6964) (0.7616) (0.7717) (0.7823) (0.6309) 
Diversified Cross Border merger 0.3102 0.3024 0.2929 0.318 0.3077 0.2667 
 
(0.1653) (0.1774) (0.1851) (0.1543) (0.1651) (0.2253) 
Private target 0.9688 0.9804 0.9573 0.9614 0.9621 0.9912 
 
( <.0001) (<.0001) ( <.0001) (  <.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Percent Acquired 0.0276 0.0275 0.0272 0.0273 0.0272 0.0279 
 
( <.0001) (<.0001) ( <.0001) (  <.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Previous Cross Border Acquirer -0.3506 -0.3847 -0.2818 -0.2731 -0.2762 -0.1682 
 
(0.2052) (0.1708) (0.3114) (0.3171) (0.314) (0.5572) 
Intercept -2.5049 -2.4999 -2.5115 -2.4589 -2.5242 -2.9949 
 
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0028) (0.002) (0.0003) 
       Pseudo R squared 0.3622 0.3636 0.3569 0.3572 0.3573 0.3724 
N 610 610 610 610 610 610 
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 8: Foreign directors and announcement period returns 
This table tests hypothesis H2.1. Panel A reports the average abnormal returns (CARs) at the merger 
announcement dates for the windows specified in the table. The CARs are calculated as specified in 
equations in the Panel A. The panel compares the averages for firms with one foreign director, multiple 
foreign directors, and no foreign directors. Panel B reports the effect of foreign directors on cross-border 
mergers abnormal returns in a multivariate analysis. The dependent variable is the CAR with the window 
of (-2, +2). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. P-values are 
reported in parenthesis. The variable definitions are in the appendix. 
 
Panel A: Foreign directors and cumulative abnormal returns 
             
                                                          
    
        ∏      
    
    
       
CAR (1) One FD (2) Multiple FD (3) No FD Test 1-3 Test 2-3 Test 1-2 
(-1,+1) 0.00652 0.00602 0.0105 -1.08 -1.14 0.7516 
(-2,+2) 0.00858 0.00647 0.0103 -0.32 -0.501 0.94 
(0,+1) 0.0064 0.00658 0.0118 -1.64 -1.49 -0.12 
(-5,+5) 0.00823 0.00153 0.00365 0.5 -0.22 1.99** 
(0,+10) 0.00449 -0.00088 -0.00145 0.68 0.06 1.66* 
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Panel B: Regression analysis of CARs 
      
                       ∑        
 
            
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FD 0.005943** 
     
 
(0.0392) 
     
FDt-1 
 
0.005615* 
    
  
(0.055) 
    
FDt-2 
  
0.006927** 
   
   
(0.0125) 
   
#FD 
   
0.000751 
  
    
(0.2548) 
  
%FD on board 
    
0.01566** 
 
     
(0.0474) 
 
FID 
     
0.00253 
      
(0.4165) 
Log(Assets)t-1 -0.00268 -0.00285 -0.00294 -0.00247 -0.0027 -0.00245 
 
(0.005) (0.0062) (0.0035) (0.0067) (0.006) (0.0093) 
Board Sizet-1 0.000138 0.000168 0.00013 0.000206 0.000325 0.000283 
 
(0.8158) (0.7753) (0.8217) (0.7205) (0.5791) (0.6323) 
Board Independence 0.004946 0.004853 0.005006 0.005377 0.005309 0.004632 
 
(0.1933) (0.2209) (0.2039) (0.1479) (0.1642) (0.2496) 
Duality -0.00125 -0.00119 -0.00118 -0.00133 -0.00144 -0.00131 
 
(0.0834) (0.1045) (0.1102) (0.0766) (0.0696) (0.0626) 
Foreign Assetst-1 -0.00004 -0.00005 -0.00005 -0.00003 -0.00004 -0.00003 
 
(0.5638) (0.4777) (0.4561) (0.6716) (0.569) (0.6727) 
Foreign Salest-1 0.00005 0.00004 0.00004 0.00005 0.00004 0.00005 
 
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0008) 
Diversified Cross Border merger -0.00043 -0.00033 -0.0006 -0.00019 -0.00055 -0.00016 
 
(0.9049) (0.9247) (0.8627) (0.9563) (0.8733) (0.9648) 
Private target 0.038811 0.038415 0.038924 0.037432 0.037562 0.037777 
 
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) 
Percent Acquired -0.00019 -0.00018 -0.0002 -0.00014 -0.00018 -0.00013 
 
(0.1897) (0.2606) (0.1922) (0.3026) (0.2162) (0.3584) 
Intercept 0.046799 0.022553 0.025842 0.017146 0.046282 0.038948 
 
(0.1023) (0.4663) (0.3897) (0.5602) (0.1237) (0.165) 
       
adj R squared 0.03038 0.02911 0.02975 0.02831 0.02831 0.03058 
N 1158 1158 1158 1158 1158 1158 
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered St errors at the country level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 9: Legal regime and accounting standards effects on CARs. 
This table tests hypothesis H2.2. Panel A reports the results of a multivariate analysis of the interaction 
effect of foreign directors and the legal regime or the accounting standards of the target firm. Legal 
regime and accounting standards are drawn from La Porta et.al (1998). The dependent variable is the 
CAR with the window of (-2, +2). Panel B reports the results of a multivariate analysis where the 
dependent variable is the same as in panel A. The Better legal FD and Better accounting FD variables are 
binary variables that assume the value of one if the acquiring firm has at least one foreign director that is 
from a country with a better legal regime or accounting standards respectively. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. P-values are reported in parenthesis. The 
variable definitions are in the appendix. 
 
Panel A: Legal regime and accounting standards and the target firm 
      
                                           ∑       
 
   
        
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
FD 0.005425* 0.003498 0.004841* 0.006091** 
 
(0.0542) (0.239) (0.076) (0.025) 
FD*LR -0.00429 
 
-0.00903 
 
 
(0.4848) 
 
(0.2745) 
 FD*AS 
 
0.000152 0.000307 
 
  
(0.3958) (0.2824) 
 FD*AS*LR 
   
-0.00014* 
    
(0.0717) 
LR 0.002 0.00329 0.0051 
 (0.704)  (0.576) (0.3791) 
AS  0.00005 -0.0001 0.00002 
  (0.8235) (0.503) (0.8901) 
Log(Assets)t-1 -0.00283 -0.00242 -0.00288 -0.00269 
 
(0.0082) (0.0227) (0.0077) (0.0094) 
Board Sizet-1 0.000296 0.000389 0.000466 0.000297 
 
(0.6305) (0.5673) (0.49) (0.5861) 
Board Independence 0.00383 0.004153 0.004736 0.004045 
 
(0.2674) (0.2482) (0.2086) (0.2034) 
Duality -0.0015 -0.00162 -0.00152 -0.00136 
 
(0.0883) (0.0793) (0.0873) (0.0357) 
Foreign Assetst-1 -0.00005 -0.00002 -0.00003 -0.00003 
 
(0.5626) (0.772) (0.7174) (0.7377) 
Foreign Salest-1 0.00004 0.00005 0.00005 0.00004 
 
(0.0003) ( <.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
Diversified Cross Border merger 0.00027 -0.00077 0.00004 -0.00018 
 
(0.9137) (0.8341) (0.9888) (0.9518) 
Private target 0.04071 0.03968 0.03996 0.04041 
 
(0.0003) (0.0013) (0.0008) (0.0002) 
Percent Acquired -0.00012 -0.00033 -0.00031 -0.00028 
 
(0.4343) (0.0423) (0.0645) (0.0678) 
Friendly merger -0.02334 -0.02624 -0.02492 -0.02555 
 
(0.2569) (0.193) (0.2308) (0.1938) 
Previous Cross Border Acquirer -0.0048 -0.00332 -0.00339 -0.00346 
 
(0.2466) (0.3419) (0.3523) (0.3367) 
Intercept 0.044904 0.057989 0.063664 0.060111 
 
(0.1245) (0.0471) (0.0316) (0.0312) 
     adj R squared 0.033 0.03712 0.03726 0.03691 
N 1109 1028 1002 1054 
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered St errors at the country level Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Panel B: Legal regime and accounting standards of the acquiring firm 
      
                                                ∑       
 
   
        
 
 
(1) (2) 
Better legal FD 0.008247* 
 
 
(0.0892) 
 Better accounting FD 
 
0.008923* 
  
(0.0524) 
Log(Assets)t-1 -0.00527 -0.00505 
 
(0.0013) (0.0019) 
Board Sizet-1 0.000371 0.000367 
 
(0.4593) (0.4751) 
Board Independence 0.001527 0.001337 
 
(0.6915) (0.7302) 
Duality -0.00033 -0.00025 
 
(0.5356) (0.6897) 
Percent Acquired -0.00018 -0.00017 
 
(0.166) (0.1928) 
Previous Cross Border Acquirer -0.00348 -0.0036 
 
(0.337) (0.3295) 
Intercept 0.104952 0.101639 
 
(0.0006) (0.0008) 
   adj R squared 0.03373 0.03373 
N 1686 1686 
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes 
Clustered st errors at the country level Yes Yes 
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Table 10: Foreign director’s impact on target type in cross-border mergers 
This table tests H3.1. Panel A reports some univariate analyses. Private target is a binary variable that 
equals to one if the cross-border merger involves a privately-held target and zero otherwise. Number of 
private targets is the number of cross-border deals that involve a privately held-target in a given year. 
Volume of mergers with private targets is the dollar volume of cross-border mergers that involve 
privately-held targets in a given year and zero otherwise. Panel B reports the results of a Logit model 
where the dependent variable is Private target. Panel C reports the results of Poisson model where the 
dependent variable is Number of private targets. Panel D reports the results of OLS model where the 
dependent variable is Volume of mergers with private targets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. P-values are reported in parenthesis. The variable definitions are in 
the appendix. 
 
Panel A: Foreign directors and private targets 
 
Firms with foreign 
directors 
firms with no foreign 
directors 
Test 
statistics 
Private Target 0.34 0.4427 -13.14*** 
Number of private targets 0.776 0.7368 2.33** 
Volume of mergers with private targets 47.0138 28.4876 6.59*** 
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Panel B: Logit analysis of target type 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FD -0.0131 
     
 
(0.7675) 
     FDt-1 
 
-0.00968 
    
  
(0.8263) 
    FDt-2 
  
-0.0201 
   
   
(0.6483) 
   #FD 
   
0.00337 
  
    
(0.7548) 
  %FD on board 
    
0.000024 
 
     
(0.9998) 
 FID 
     
0.0258 
      
(0.5703) 
Log(Assets)t-1 -0.2347 -0.2348 -0.2344 -0.2358 -0.2352 -0.2363 
 
(<.0001) (  <.0001) (  <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) (<.0001) 
ROAt-1 0.00401 0.00401 0.00401 0.00403 0.00402 0.00401 
 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.0146) (0.0149) (0.0149) 
Board Sizet-1 -0.0141 -0.0142 -0.014 -0.0149 -0.0145 -0.0147 
 
(0.0062) (0.0056) (0.0061) (0.0046) (0.0041) (0.0037) 
Duality 0.0155 0.0155 0.0155 0.0153 0.0155 0.0153 
 
(0.2962) (0.296) (0.2946) (0.3013) (0.2965) (0.3031) 
Foreign Salest-1 0.000307 0.000306 0.00031 0.000295 0.000302 0.000292 
 
(0.4981) (0.499) (0.4962) (0.5078) (0.5016) (0.5107) 
Previous Cross Border Acquirer 0.1509 0.1507 0.152 0.1489 0.1497 0.1479 
 
(0.0062) (0.0064) (0.006) (0.0069) (0.0067) (0.0073) 
Intercept 2.7908 2.7915 2.7864 2.8059 2.7953 2.8091 
 
(<.0001) (  <.0001) (  <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) (<.0001) 
       Pseudo -R square 0.1564 0.1564 0.1564 0.1564 0.1564 0.1564 
N 12199 12199 12199 12199 12199 12199 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Panel C: Poisson analysis of target type 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FD 0.1085*** 
     
 
( <.0001) 
     
FDt-1 
 
0.1173*** 
    
  
(<.0001) 
    
FDt-2 
  
0.1169*** 
   
   
( <.0001) 
   
#FD 
   
0.034*** 
  
    
( <.0001) 
  
%FD on board 
    
0.3188*** 
 
     
(  <.0001) 
 
FID 
     
0.1059*** 
      
( <.0001) 
Log(Assets)t-1 -0.0378 -0.0384 -0.0388 -0.0406 -0.0406 -0.039 
 
( <.0001) (<.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) (  <.0001) ( <.0001) 
ROAt-1 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0014 0.0014 0.0012 
 
(0.1095) (0.1002) (0.0975) (0.0795) (0.0863) (0.1189) 
Board Sizet-1 -0.0147 -0.0147 -0.0145 -0.0171 -0.0115 -0.0132 
 
( <.0001) (<.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) (  <.0001) ( <.0001) 
Duality 0.0511 0.051 0.0509 0.0498 0.0508 0.0505 
 
( <.0001) (<.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) (  <.0001) ( <.0001) 
Foreign Salest-1 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 
 
(0.0192) (0.0201) (0.0207) (0.0416) (0.025) (0.0246) 
Previous Cross Border Acquirer 0.5334 0.5312 0.5305 0.5365 0.5337 0.5368 
 
( <.0001) (<.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) (  <.0001) ( <.0001) 
Intercept 0.1498 0.16 0.1662 0.2109 0.1845 0.1561 
 
(0.2969) (0.2655) (0.248) (0.1435) (0.199) (0.2776) 
       
       
N 12199 12199 12199 12199 12199 12199 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Panel D: OLS analysis of target type 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FD 8.26341** 
     
 
(0.0382) 
     FDt-1 
 
4.09267 
    
  
(0.3104) 
    FDt-2 
  
1.95624 
   
   
(0.6274) 
   #FD 
   
2.20591** 
  
    
(0.0131) 
  %FD on board 
    
18.32916** 
 
     
(0.0171) 
 FID 
     
5.11548* 
      
(0.0748) 
Log(Assets)t-1 11.17943 11.31808 11.39635 11.01458 11.09435 11.25043 
 
( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) 
ROAt-1 0.07955 0.078 0.07664 0.08522 0.08245 0.07484 
 
(0.5214) (0.5301) (0.5408) (0.492) (0.508) (0.5497) 
Board Sizet-1 -0.82563 -0.72741 -0.68091 -0.94521 -0.61046 -0.68974 
 
(0.0828) (0.1033) (0.1271) (0.0385) (0.1751) (0.1213) 
Foreign Salest-1 -0.01117 -0.0101 -0.00959 -0.01246 -0.01137 -0.01059 
 
(0.5143) (0.5315) (0.5584) (0.4491) (0.4815) (0.5218) 
Previous Cross Border Acquirer -9.25314 -8.94696 -8.7489 -9.03839 -9.0475 -8.99405 
 
(0.1183) (0.1336) (0.1432) (0.1316) (0.1283) (0.1337) 
Intercept -124.193 -126.819 -128.273 -120.792 -123.713 -125.832 
 
( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) 
       adj-R square 0.01162 0.01147 0.01143 0.01169 0.01161 0.0115 
N 12199 12199 12199 12199 12199 12199 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered St errors at the country level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 11: The effect of foreign directors on choice of target 
This table test H3.2. The dependent variable is the target firm’s Market-to-Book ratio one year before the 
merger. All observations involve cross-border deals. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels respectively. P-values are reported in parenthesis. The variable definitions are in the 
appendix. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FD -1.67475* 
     
 
(0.0857) 
     
FDt-1 
 
-1.5158* 
    
  
(0.0544) 
    
FDt-2 
  
-1.4998** 
   
   
(0.0279) 
   
#FD 
   
-0.01117 
  
    
(0.9374) 
  
%FD on board 
    
-1.38452 
 
     
(0.3116) 
 
FID 
     
-2.20783 
      
(0.3258) 
Log(Assets)t-1 0.05163 0.05668 0.06697 -0.00071 0.03466 0.10116 
 
(0.8365) (0.8207) (0.7888) (0.9977) (0.8918) (0.704) 
ROAt-1 0.01678 0.01665 0.01607 0.017 0.01668 0.01847 
 
(0.6568) (0.6592) (0.6682) (0.6488) (0.6549) (0.634) 
Board Sizet-1 0.64148 0.63682 0.63442 0.61175 0.60463 0.62843 
 
(0.0884) (0.0872) (0.0863) (0.098) (0.0929) (0.0955) 
Board Independence -2.55069 -2.55703 -2.54059 -2.57226 -2.60738 -1.89775 
 
(0.0182) (0.0186) (0.0187) (0.0198) (0.0192) (0.0075) 
Duality -0.48311 -0.48484 -0.4866 -0.49899 -0.49499 -0.48783 
 
(0.2268) (0.2269) (0.2273) (0.2241) (0.2226) (0.2254) 
Foreign Salest-1 -0.00541 -0.00543 -0.00544 -0.00639 -0.00601 -0.00448 
 
(0.5508) (0.5536) (0.556) (0.5167) (0.5251) (0.5753) 
Relative deal size -412.934 -412.915 -407.198 -421.2 -403.09 -381.001 
 
(0.5274) (0.5277) (0.5329) (0.5152) (0.5307) (0.5379) 
Percent Acquired 0.04082 0.04076 0.04042 0.04035 0.04083 0.04201 
 
(0.3971) (0.3973) (0.3993) (0.4002) (0.3968) (0.3973) 
Previous Cross Border Acquirer 0.97666 0.9959 1.01654 0.88587 0.92175 0.89524 
 
(0.2989) (0.2885) (0.2729) (0.3184) (0.3125) (0.3248) 
Intercept -2.90782 -2.98459 -3.50278 -1.79352 -2.51454 -3.77345 
 
(0.4611) (0.4495) (0.3764) (0.6553) (0.5424) (0.4011) 
       
adj R squared 0.02923 0.02919 0.02919 0.029 0.02903 0.02943 
N 1719 1719 1719 1719 1719 1719 
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered St errors at the country level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 12: Foreign director’s impact on cross-border merger price 
This table test H4.1. The dependent variable is the value of the transaction of the merger over the market 
capitalization of the target firm one year before the merger. All observations involve cross-border deals. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. P-values are reported in 
parenthesis. The variable definitions are in the appendix. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FD -264.84* 
     
 
(0.061) 
     
FDt-1 
 
-258.369* 
    
  
(0.0653) 
    
FDt-1 
  
-265.87** 
   
   
(0.0414) 
   
#FD 
   
-48.6724* 
  
    
(0.0684) 
  
%FD on board 
    
-386.73 
 
     
(0.2623) 
 
FID 
     
-213.461* 
      
(0.0589) 
Log(Assets)t-1 31.2614 32.6118 35.2825 41.2996 22.3254 30.1257 
 
(0.1654) (0.1434) (0.1111) (0.1075) (0.323) (0.1692) 
Board Independence -361.672 -363.099 -363.35 -363.813 -374.01 -329.784 
 
(0.178) (0.1772) (0.1793) (0.1753) (0.1653) (0.2251) 
Duality 33.2112 33.2394 32.7618 28.4258 28.0034 27.8406 
 
(0.0557) (0.0545) (0.0554) (0.1042) (0.1073) (0.0983) 
Foreign Assetst-1 2.0851 2.0331 2.069 1.894 1.9526 2.0166 
 
(0.2243) (0.2389) (0.2288) (0.2831) (0.2574) (0.2454) 
Foreign Salest-1 0.2064 0.2227 0.2315 0.1215 0.1085 0.2465 
 
(0.7395) (0.7252) (0.7141) (0.8328) (0.8524) (0.6874) 
Percent Acquired 19.2561 19.2567 19.2181 19.5245 19.3472 19.3141 
 
( <.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) ( <.0001) (  <.0001) ( <.0001) 
Previous Cross Border Acquirer 223.1293 236.0966 241.323 224.686 230.1895 222.1893 
 
(0.1381) (0.1267) (0.1226) (0.1362) (0.1304) (0.1418) 
Intercept -651.118 -689.137 -753.513 -805.624 -512.945 -621.784 
 
(0.2263) (0.212) (0.1766) (0.1748) (0.3448) (0.2289) 
       
adj R squared 0.3489 0.3486 0.3489 0.3477 0.3462 0.3472 
N 907 907 907 907 907 907 
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 13: Analysis of foreign director’s impact on the method of payment in cross-border mergers 
This table tests H4.2a and H4.2b. Panel A reports some univariate tests. D_Cash is a dummy variable that 
equals to one if the deal is a 100% finance with cash and zero otherwise. %Cash is the percentage of cash 
in the merger transaction payment package. D_Mixed is a dummy variable that equals to one if the deal is 
finance by a mixed ratio of cash and equity. D_Equity is a dummy variable that equals to one if the deal is 
a 100% finance with equity and zero otherwise. Panel B reports the results of a logit analysis where the 
dependent variable is D_Cash. Panel C reports the results of an OLS analysis where the dependent 
variable is %Cash. All observations involve cross-border deals. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. P-values are reported in parenthesis. The variable definitions are in 
the appendix. 
 
Panel A: Foreign directors and the method of payment 
 
Firms with foreign directors firms with no foreign directors Test statistics 
D_Cash 0.8015 0.757 6.67*** 
% Cash 0.8763 0.8561 4.19*** 
D_Mixed 0.1244 0.1676 -7.59*** 
D_Equity 0.0676 0.0699 -0.57 
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Panel B: Logit analysis of method of payment 
            |             [                ∑       
 
   
        ]               
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FD -0.1302** 
     
 
(0.0109) 
     
FDt-1 
 
-0.1288*** 
    
  
(0.0093) 
    
FDt-2 
  
-0.1363** 
   
   
(0.0203) 
   
#FD 
   
-0.0768*** 
  
    
( <.0001) 
  
%FD on board 
    
-0.5086*** 
 
     
( <.0001) 
 
FID 
     
-0.146* 
      
(0.0739) 
Log(Assets)t-1 0.3422 0.3426 0.3433 0.3526 0.3491 0.3426 
 
( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) 
ROAt-1 0.00893 0.0089 0.00893 0.00867 0.0088 0.00905 
 
(0.0127) (0.0123) (0.0117) (0.0161) (0.0141) (0.011) 
Board Sizet-1 -0.00744 -0.00785 -0.00805 0.0015 -0.0116 -0.00876 
 
(0.5448) (0.5283) (0.522) (0.8985) (0.3544) (0.4679) 
Board Independence -0.0805 -0.0804 -0.0804 -0.0791 -0.079 -0.0721 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) ( <.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) 
Duality 0.03940 0.03960 0.03960 0.04070 0.03930 0.03780 
 
(0.064) (0.0624) (0.0629) (0.0258) (0.0478) (0.0837) 
Foreign Assetst-1 -0.00131 -0.00134 -0.00132 -0.00069 -0.00100 -0.00133 
 
(0.2061) (0.1826) (0.176) (0.4914) (0.3228) (0.1937) 
Foreign Salest-1 -0.00008 -0.00008 -0.00007 -0.00003 -0.00005 -0.00006 
 
(0.7477) (0.7464) (0.759) (0.8974) (0.8237) (0.801) 
Previous Cross Border Acquirer -0.073 -0.0711 -0.0703 -0.0738 -0.0741 -0.0775 
 
(0.2576) (0.2721) (0.2837) (0.2609) (0.2547) (0.225) 
Intercept -3.1992 -3.2058 -3.214 -3.4156 -3.2711 -3.221 
 
( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) 
       
Pseudo R squared 0.1641 0.1641 0.1642 0.1673 0.1654 0.1642 
N 9123 9123 9123 9123 9123 9123 
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered St errors at the country level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Panel C: Tobit analysis of method of payment 
                     ∑        
 
                                                          
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FD -0.02*** 
     
 
(0.0006) 
     FDt-1 
 
-0.02*** 
    
  
(0.0002) 
    FDt-2 
  
-0.019*** 
   
   
(0.0002) 
   #FD 
   
-0.009*** 
  
    
( <.0001) 
  %FD on board 
    
-0.07*** 
 
     
(<.0001) 
 FID 
     
-0.01401 
      
(0.1837) 
Log(Assets)t-1 0.033045 0.033005 0.03306 0.034062 0.033836 0.032806 
 
(<.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
ROAt-1 0.002323 0.002323 0.002325 0.002291 0.002308 0.002339 
 
(<.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Board Sizet-1 -0.00083 -0.00094 -0.00095 -6.1E-05 -0.00145 -0.00117 
 
(0.2659) (0.2104) (0.2007) (0.9368) (0.0412) (0.1374) 
Board Independence -0.00607 -0.00607 -0.00605 -0.0058 -0.00588 -0.00524 
 
(0.0169) (0.0154) (0.0158) (0.0303) (0.0269) (0.073) 
Duality 0.00060 0.00060 0.00060 0.00090 0.00072 0.00032 
 
(0.806) (0.8069) (0.8077) (0.6934) (0.7583) (0.8994) 
Foreign Assetst-1 -0.00003 -0.00004 -0.00004 0.00003 0.00001 -0.00006 
 
(0.8074) (0.7393) (0.7532) (0.8021) (0.9439) (0.6361) 
Foreign Salest-1 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 
 
(0.2232) (0.2202) (0.2261) (0.3579) (0.2251) (0.2593) 
Previous Cross Border Acquirer 0.002648 0.002705 0.002856 0.002204 0.002407 0.001595 
 
(0.73) (0.7245) (0.7107) (0.7764) (0.756) (0.8357) 
Intercept 0.396875 0.398526 0.397484 0.372301 0.384424 0.40349 
 
(<.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
       adj R squared 0.1267 0.1264 0.1265 0.1292 0.1282 0.126 
N 9072 9072 9072 9072 9072 9072 
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered St errors at the country level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 14: Propensity score matching 
Firms are matched on assets, ROA, foreign assets, foreign sales, leverage, cash, and board size. I compute 
the propensity that a firm has a foreign director using the following Probit model: 
        |                    ∑        
 
                     (16) 
Where      are the characteristics mentioned above. Based on this model, each firm gets a score based on 
the firm’s characteristics. I match a firm with foreign director in a particular country in a particular year 
and industry with a firm with no foreign directors based on the nearest matched score. I do a t-test 
between these two groups of firms to examine their propensity to engage in cross-border mergers. *, **, 
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. P-values are reported in 
parenthesis. The variable definitions are in the appendix. 
 
Separation 
Variable 
 
Cross-border merger Num_CrossBorder CrossBorder_Volume 
FD 
Firms with foreign directors 0.5263 1.1979 573.9 
Firms without foreign directors 0.3829 0.9864 358.9 
     
 
Test statistic 17.65*** 7.58*** 5.5*** 
     
     
FDt-1 
Firms with foreign directors 0.5241 1.2369 577.3 
Firms without foreign directors 0.3909 1.0737 383.6 
     
 
Test statistic 16.27*** 5.55*** 4.97*** 
     
     
FDt-2 
Firms with foreign directors 0.5182 1.2646 595.1 
Firms without foreign directors 0.387 1.1345 405.7 
     
 
Test statistic 15.91*** 4.25*** 3.75*** 
     
     
FID 
Firms with foreign directors 0.541 1.2858 592.7 
Firms without foreign directors 0.4246 1.066 636.4 
     
 
Test statistic 11.56*** 6.94*** -0.7 
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Table 15: Heckman (1979) procedure 
This table reports the results of the Heckman (1979) two-stage procedure. In the first stage, I estimate the 
determinants of appointing foreign directors in a particular firm.  
        |                ∑        
 
                   (17) 
Then, I compute the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) to estimate the second stage regressions. Panels A, B, and 
C reports the results of the second-stage analysis. Panel A reports the results from the Logit analysis after 
correcting for Heckman method. Panel B reports the results from the Poisson analysis after correcting for 
Heckman method. Panel C reports the results from the OLS analysis after correcting for Heckman 
method.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. P-values are 
reported in parenthesis. The variable definitions are in the appendix. 
 
Panel A: Logit Analysis 
                 |                              ∑        
 
                     (20) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
FD 0.6066*** 
   
 
(<.0001) 
   FDt-1 
 
0.5862*** 
  
  
( <.0001) 
  FDt-2 
  
0.5665*** 
 
   
( <.0001) 
 FID 
   
0.5374*** 
    
( <.0001) 
Log(Assets)t-1 0.0254 0.0279 0.0339 0.1176 
 
(0.1531) (0.2336) (0.226) ( <.0001) 
ROAt-1 0.00177 0.00176 0.00163 0.00154 
 
(0.2263) (0.2445) (0.2817) (0.2172) 
Board Sizet-1 0.025 0.0308 0.038 0.0993 
 
(0.2386) (0.1945) (0.1346) ( <.0001) 
Board Independence -0.3607 -0.3633 -0.3644 -0.469 
 
(<.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) 
Duality -0.0112 -0.0115 -0.0115 -0.00804 
 
(0.5803) (0.5727) (0.5729) (0.6868) 
Foreign Assetst-1 0.0215 0.0222 0.0232 0.0325 
 
(<.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) 
Foreign Salest-1 0.00813 0.00825 0.00838 0.00981 
 
(0.2387) (0.2378) (0.235) (0.1706) 
IMR -0.4507 -0.213 0.1519 5.3707 
 
(0.727) (0.8898) (0.9312) (0.0019) 
Intercept -1.6203 -1.8447 -2.2156 -7.4507 
 
(0.2136) (0.2469) (0.2278) ( <.0001) 
     Pseudo -R square 0.2553 0.2543 0.2534 0.2511 
N 25754 25754 25754 25754 
Clustered St errors at the country level Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Panel B: Poisson Analysis 
                                       ∑        
 
                                  (21)     
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
FD 0.2833*** 
   
 
( <.0001) 
   FDt-1 
 
0.283*** 
  
  
(<.0001) 
  FDt-2 
  
0.2814*** 
 
   
( <.0001) 
 FID 
   
0.1404*** 
    
( <.0001) 
Log(Assets)t-1 0.1396 0.1303 0.123 0.1677 
 
( <.0001) (<.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) 
ROAt-1 0.0033 0.0037 0.0038 0.0028 
 
( <.0001) (<.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) 
Board Sizet-1 -0.0681 -0.069 -0.0694 -0.0286 
 
( <.0001) (<.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) 
Board Independence 0.035 0.0354 0.0378 0.0104 
 
(0.0331) (0.0313) (0.0214) (0.5414) 
Duality 0.0897 0.0897 0.0897 0.0922 
 
( <.0001) (<.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) 
Foreign Assetst-1 0.0034 0.003 0.0027 0.0091 
 
( <.0001) (<.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) 
Foreign Salest-1 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 
 
( <.0001) (<.0001) (0.002) ( <.0001) 
IMR -3.6492 -3.914 -4.1544 -2.0046 
 
( <.0001) ( <.0001) (-4.1544) (-4.1544) 
Intercept 0.1413 0.4612 0.7361 -1.423 
 
(0.5333) (0.0606) (0.0043) ( <.0001) 
     N 25754 25754 25754 25754 
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Panel C: OLS Analysis 
                                    ∑        
 
                                         (22) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
FD 23.6* 
   
 
(0.0812) 
   FDt-1 
 
28.6** 
  
  
(0.0472) 
  FDt-2 
  
30.9** 
 
   
(0.0344) 
 FID 
   
24.6** 
    
(0.0269) 
Log(Assets)t-1 -59.8 -42.3 -41.8 -96.4 
 
( <.0001) (0.0074) (0.0161) (0.0011) 
ROAt-1 -21.1 -21.3 -21.3 -21.2 
 
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0031) (0.0035) 
Board Sizet-1 -5.7 11.2 11 -26.3 
 
(0.6591) (0.1974) (0.1863) (0.3354) 
Board Independence -56.4 -56.4 -56.7 -51.5 
 
(0.0022) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0011) 
Duality -3.9 -4.2 -4.2 -3.8 
 
(0.1317) (0.1214) (0.1238) (0.1392) 
Foreign Assetst-1 -0.5 2.2 2.2 -4.6 
 
(0.8211) (0.214) (0.2154) (0.3554) 
Previous Cross-Border Acquirer -49 -42.6 -43 -47.8 
 
(0.002) (0.0133) (0.0131) (0.0025) 
IMR -567.7 538.1 555.3 -2926.4 
 
(0.4291) (0.3238) (0.3313) (0.2434) 
Intercept 1556.9 469.6 453 3875.3 
 
(0.0178) (0.4092) (0.4611) (0.1047) 
     adj-R square 0.07607 0.07604 0.07605 0.07779 
N 25754 25754 25754 25754 
Clustered St errors at the country level Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Appendix: 
Variable Definition Source 
#FD The number of foreign directors in a firm in a year BoardEx 
% Cash The percentage of transaction that is paid in cash SDC  
% FD on board The percentage of foreign directors in a board relative to board size BoardEx 
% of shares acquired The percentage of shares acquired in a merger SDC 
Assets Total assets of a firm in a year WorldScope 
Board Independence The percentage of board members who are independent in a firm BoardEx 
Board Size The number of directors in a firm BoardEx 
Book Value of Equity The book value of a firm’s equity WorldScope 
CAR Cumulative Abnormal return from a merger Datastream 
CD (cultural distance) Cultural distance measure between the country of the foreign 
director and the country of the target firm 
Hofstede 
measures 
CEO Binary variable equals to one if the director is the CEO of the firm BoardEx 
Chair Binary variable equals to one if the director is the chairman of the 
firm 
BoardEx 
Cross-border merger A binary variable equals to one if the firm engaged in at least one 
cross-border merger in a particular year 
SDC 
D_Cash A binary variable that equals to one if the method of payment in a 
merger is cash 
SDC 
D_Mixed A binary variable that equals to one if the method of payment in a 
merger is equity 
SDC 
D_Mixed A binary variable that equals to one if the method of payment in a 
merger is mixed 
SDC 
Debt/TA Liabilities over total assets WorldScope 
Duality Binary variable equals to one if the director is both the CEO and 
chairman of the board 
BoardEx 
FD Binary variable equals to one if the firm has at least one foreign 
director 
BoardEx 
FID Binary variable equals to one if the firm has at least one foreign 
independent director 
BoardEx 
Foreign Assets The percentage of assets of a firm which are incorporated in a 
foreign country 
WorldScope 
Foreign Sales The percentage of a firm’s sales coming from other countries WorldScope 
Hostile mergers A binary variable equals to one if a firm engaged in a hostile 
merger 
SDC 
Independent Binary variable equals to one if the director is independent (non-
executive director) 
BoardEx 
Market value Market capitalization of a firm at the end of fiscal year WorldScope 
Merger A binary variable equals to one if the firm engaged in at least one 
merger in a particular year 
SDC 
Previous cross-border Acquirer A binary variable equals to one if the acquirer in a merger had a 
previous cross-border merger 
SDC 
Private target A binary variable equals to one if the target of a merger is private SDC 
Purchase price The total value of the transaction of a merger SDC 
Relative deal size The purchase price / Total assets SDC / 
WorldScope 
ROA Return on Assets WorldScope 
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